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ABSTRACT 
During the past century there have been significant changes 
in the economic and social structure that have resulted in 
new forms of criminal opportunities. Fraudulent 
telemarketers are among those that have seized such 
opportunities to defraud consumers out of billions of 
dollars annually. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
determine the decision-making process of criminal 
telemarketers and the means by which they commit fraud. 
Data analysis draws from semi-structured interviews with 48 
subjects who have been convicted under federal law. First, 
the organization, management, and accountability structure 
of criminal telemarketing enterprises are examined. Next, 
the interaction process between fraudsters and victims is 
explored from a social-psychological perspective. The 
subjects' backgrounds and criminal careers and the lure of 
criminal telemarketing and the lifestyles it affords are 
then provided. Finally, the thought processes of 
fraudulent telemarketers are analyzed in the context of 
denial of crime, techniques of neutralization, and 
organizational design, before a rational choice perspective 
is applied. The author concludes that fraudulent 
telemarketers embrace the cultural goal of capital 
accumulation, exploit ambiguity in the law, design diffuse 
accountability structures in their organization to avoid 
criminal responsibility, and ultimately "ascend n to the 
status of marginalized middle-class persons. 
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Writing at the dawn of the 20th century, Ross (1907: 3) 
noted cogently that crime "changes its quality as society 
develops." Ross focused specifically on growing social and 
economic interdependence and the variety of ways this 
permitted both exploitation of trust and the commission of 
crime at a distance from victims. The transformative 
social and economic changes that Ross noted gained speed as 
the century progressed. For instance, in the United States 
and other Western nations, the middle decades of the 
century saw the emergence and expansion of state policies 
and corporate practices. 
This development included a fundamental shift in the 
state's public welfare functions, which had the effect of 
expanding programs and subsidies for citizens across the 
income spectrum. One measure of this is the fact that in 
1992, 51.7 percent of American families were receiving some 
form of federal payment, ranging from Social Security, 
Medicare and military retirement benefits to agricultural 
subsidies (Samuelson, 1995: 158). In constant dollars the 
federal outlay for entitlement programs increased more than 
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1,900 percent between 1945 and 1995 - from $75 billion to 
$1. 5 trillion (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, 1959; Social Security Administration, 1999). 
Concurrently, goods that were either unknown or 
unattainable decades earlier became readily available in 
the domestic economy. Houses, automobiles, refrigerators, 
television sets and a host of other commodities now were 
within reach of a growing segment of the population. The 
greater disposable income available to citizens allowed 
them not only to purchase these commodities, but also to 
obtain new comprehensive insurance policies offered by 
insurance underwriters. Increasingly, the middle-class 
family was insured against major hazards to life, home and 
business as well as loss of or damage to household items 
(Clarke, 1990). 
Additional changes occurred in the structure and 
dynamics of economic relationships and in communications 
technology (Adler, 1992; Lash and Urry, 1994). Electronic 
financial transfers among banks and businesses, automatic 
teller machines (Hirschhorn, 1985), and home banking 
increasingly came into use across the globe (Silverstone, 
1991). Of even greater significance is the widespread use 
of telecommunications (Batty and Barr, 1994; Turkle, 1995), 
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electronic financial transactions, and consumer credit 
(Tickell, 1996), which foreshadows a depersonalized, 
cashless economy. In this new world of personal computers 
and virtual identities, individuals and organizations 
conduct business with remote others whose credentials and 
intentions cannot be determined easily. 
There has been a parallel shift in the U. S. 
occupational structure as well, with routine production 
giving way to in-person services as the dominant mode of 
employment. According to Reich (1991), there are 
essentially three broad categories of work emerging in the 
United States: routine production services, in-person 
services, and symbolic-analytic services. Routine 
production services entail the repetitive tasks of 
producing finished products tradable in world commerce. 
In-person services also involve repetitive tasks but their 
services must be provided person-to-person. They need not 
have acquired much education and the servers are in direct 
contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of their work. 
"Their immediate objects are specific customers rather than 
streams of metal, fabric, or data" (Reich, 1991: 176). 
By 1990, routine production work comprised about one­
quarter of the jobs performed by Americans and the number 
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was declining. That same year, in-person services 
accounted for about 30 percent of the American labor force 
and their numbers were increasing rapidly (Reich, 1991: 
177). Symbolic-analysts solve, identify, and broker 
problems by manipulating symbols. They rarely come into 
contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of their work and 
currently account for no more than 20 percent of American 
jobs (Reich, 1991: 178-9). 
Emergent Opportunities 
While the nature of business transactions has been altered 
fundamentally by transformations of economic relationships, 
the capacity for credible oversight of emergent forms of 
criminal lure has not kept pace. The net result of these 
political and economic developments was the provision of 
new white-collar criminal opportunities (Taylor, 1999; 
Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey, 2001). The State and the 
array of provisions it makes available to citizens and 
organizations is a frequent target of fraud offenders, one 
they need not leave home or office to exploit. Federally 
funded health care programs, for example, have given 
physicians and hospitals access to new pools of tax revenue 
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for which oversight is so weak that it has been called a 
"license to steal" (Sparrow, 1996). The growth of health 
insurance fraud, therefore, can be seen as "emblematic of 
the emerging forms of white-collar crime that reflect the 
changing economy of the late twentieth century" (Tillman, 
1998: 197). New criminal opportunities extend far beyond 
healthcare. 
For individuals, exploitation of these white-collar 
criminal opportunities may be motivated by a variety of 
circumstances and meanings, whether feelings of 
entitlement, anger over past treatment by state 
functionaries, or simple greed. Occasional media reports 
and research give reason to believe, however, that a 
significant proportion of white-collar criminals approach 
it with a spirit of calling (e.g. , Abagnale, 1980; Francis, 
1988; Jackson, 1994). Little is known about these 
vocational predators and how they compare with their 
predecessors of earlier eras (Glaser, 1972). 
While the investigation of professional thieves and 
their pursuits has a long history in criminology, the canon 
is replete with portraits of offenders who have passed from 
the scene. However, for contemporary observers, "fraud 
masters" (Jackson, 1994) deservedly command more attention 
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than "cut purses" (Tobias, 1967), "cannons" (Maurer, 1964) 
and "good burglars" (Shover, 1973). Economic and social 
change inevitably transform the worlds in which offenders 
entertain options and organize for pursuit of criminal 
income (Hobbs, 1997; McIntosh, 1975; Shover, 1983). The 
new entrepreneurial milieu is an enabling environment for a 
great range and variety of money-making schemes (Ruggiero 
and South, 1997). 
The landscape of emergent criminal opportunities has 
proven to be fertile territory for the growth of fraud 
(Shover, 1996). Fraud is misrepresentation or deception 
used to secure unfair or unlawful gain, typically by 
perpetrators who create and exploit the appearance of a 
routine transaction. Fraud violates trust, it is non­
confrontational, and it can be carried out over long 
distance. Its distinguishing characteristics, therefore, 
stand in stark contrast to robbery, burglary and other 
street crimes that require offenders to confront their 
victims or to enter their homes or businesses. 
Fraud varies immensely in organizational complexity 
and reach, for example, from small vinyl siding scams to 
international banking crimes that can destabilize national 
economies. The number of Americans victimized by fraud is 
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large and greatly exceeds the number victimized by serious 
street crime (Titus, 2001). A 1991 survey of U.S. 
households found that compared to crimes of burglary, 
robbery, assault and theft, fraud "appears to be very 
common" (Titus, Heinzelmann, and Boyle, .1995: 65). A 
national survey conducted in 1999 found that 36 percent of 
American households had experienced fraud victimization in 
the preceding 12 months (Rebovich and Layne, 2000). 
Telemarketing Fraud 
The rapid growth of telemarketing is one of several 
consequential changes in the nature of economic 
relationships in Western countries in recent decades. 
Telemarketing is a unique vehicle in the service industry 
as it enlists technology to expand pools of potential 
customers and affords direct contact with them. In 2000, 
telemarketing sales accounted for $611.7 billion in revenue 
in the United States, an increase of 167 percent over 
comparable sales for 1995. Increased growth is predicted 
for the future. Total annual sales from telephone 
marketing are expected to reach $939.5 billion by the year 
2005 (Direct Marketing Association, 2001). 
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The reasons for the growth of telemarketing are 
understood easily in the context of the "general 
acceleration of everyday life, characterized by 
increasingly complicated personal and domestic timetables" 
(Taylor, 1999: 45). The need to coordinate personal 
schedules and to economize time now drives many household 
activities. The daily schedule no longer permits either 
the pace or the style of shopping that were commonplace a 
few decades ago. In search of convenience, sale of 
merchandise via telemarketing has gained in popularity. 
While telemarketing has become an important part of 
the legitimate economy, fraudsters also have been quick to 
exploit the criminal opportunities it presents. 
Telemarketing fraud touches the lives of many citizens. A 
1992 poll of a national sample of Americans showed that 2 
percent of respondents had been victimized by fraud in the 
preceding six months (Harris, 1992). This exceeds the 
victimization rate for all Index crimes except larceny. A 
comparison of 1992 poll results with data from the 1992 
Uniform Crime Reports shows that Americans were seven times 
more likely to be victims of telemarketing fraud than 
victims of robbery in that year (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1993). 
8 
Estimates of aggregate annual financial losses to 
telemarketing fraud range upwards of $40 billion, a toll 
that exceeds the combined monetary loss from all street 
crimes (U. S. Department of Justice, 2000). There are 
countless variations on the basic telemarketing fraud 
scheme, but typically a con.sumer receives a phone call from 
a high-pressure salesperson who solicits funds or sells 
products based on false assertions or enticing claims. 
Callers offer an enormous variety of products and services, 
and often they use names that sound similar to bona fide 
charities and other reputable organizations (U. S. Senate, 
1993) . 
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) 
estimates that in 1996, there were some 140, 000 
telemarketing firms in the United States and that up to ten 
percent of them were fraudulent (AARP, 1996a). Elderly 
persons are disproportionately victimized by telemarketing 
fraud. There are several reasons for this pattern. The 
elderly are more likely than younger citizens to have 
disposable income and are more often at home. 
Additionally, loneliness and diminished intellectual acumen 
may increase their vulnerability. This, however, does not 
mean that the elderly alone are targeted by telemarketers 
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as people of all ages have fallen prey to telemarketing 
scams. Some victims of telemarketing fraud are harmed 
severely by their experiences with it; it can erode both 
financial savings and self-esteem (Shichor, Doocy and Geis, 
·1996). Repeat victimization is not uncommon, and elderly 
victims, in particular, may be left with seriously depleted 
fiscal resources as they are less likely to be employed. 
The size, permanence, and geographic mobility of 
criminal telemarketing organiza�ions can vary 
substantially. One segment of the criminal telemarketing 
industry is made up of somewhat large enterprises. "Boiler 
rooms, " operations featuring extensive telephone banks and 
large numbers of sales agents, have become less common in 
recent years, largely because of the law enforcement 
interest they attract. There is reason to believe, 
however, that criminal telemarketers increasingly are 
locating operations in countries with little governmental 
oversight and operating across international borders (e.g. , 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). 
On the other hand, some fraudulent organizations are 
very small, consisting of only two or three persons (See 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2000), many of which are set 
up and operate in a community for only a few weeks or 
10 
months before moving on. They are commonly referred to as 
rip and tear operations. Doocy et al. (2001) observe 
simply that the telemarketers they studied "seemed to be 
extraordinarily mobile vocationally" (p. 17). Rip and tear 
operators count on the fact that up to six months time may 
pass before law enforcement agencies become aware of and 
target them. Research on this segment of the telemarketing 
industry is exceedingly rare due to the fact that they are 
moving targets. This mobility also makes it difficult for 
law enforcement agencies to investigate their operations. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that some of these 
criminal entrepreneurs may operate with impunity for years. 
Sutherland's (1940} offender-based definition of 
white-collar crime emphasizes as its essential 
characteristic the status and power of those who commit it 
(Albanese, 1996). Viewed this way, telemarketing fraud is 
not white-collar crime as the status and power of criminal 
telemarketers is not recognized by legitimate society. 
Offense-based definitions of white-collar crime, on the 
other hand, highlight offenses with specific formal 
characteristics without regard to the status of those who 
commit them. Wheeler et al. (1982: 642) defined white­
collar crime as "economic offenses committed through the 
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use of some combination of fraud deception, or collusion." 
Weisburd et al. (1991), for example, used the criminal code 
as the starting point for drawing a sample of white-collar 
offenders. The population from which it was drawn included 
all persons who were convicted of or pleaded guilty to any 
of eight statutorily defined crimes. The distinction 
between elite and ordinary white-collar crime is made by 
Shover (1998). Looked at through the lens of offense-based 
definitions, telemarketing fraud indisputably is ordinary 
white-collar crime. 
Recent investigations on career criminals (e. g. , 
Blumstein, Cohen and Farrington, 1988) have mainly focused 
on street offenders. Investigators have found that most 
street offenders hail from locations in the class and 
social structure where the young generally do not acquire 
the human capital requisite to success in the world of 
well-paid and respectable work. Additionally, a 
constellation of risk factors predisposes some to unusually 
early criminality, and a substantial proportion of males 
reared in these circumstances will acquire arrest and court 
records before reaching adulthood. For most, however, 
aging and the changes that accompany it eventually cause a 
reduction in, or curtailment of, serious street crime. 
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When compared to the number of investigations into 
lives and careers of street-crime offenders, the corpus of 
research into the criminal careers of white-collar 
offenders is small. The extant research on white-collar 
offenders suggests that not all are one-time or accidental 
violators_; some have histories of multiple arrests and 
convictions. Some investigators, for example, have found 
that when samples of ordinary white-collar criminals are 
examined, upwards to 21 percent have previous felony 
convictions (Weisburd et al., 1991). When offender-based 
approaches to white-collar crime are employed, there are 
substantially fewer previous arrests in the backgrounds of 
offenders. 
Research on former employees of a California-based 
fraudulent telemarketing firm found that 30 percent of 162 
sales agents had records of at least one criminal offense, 
and another 16.4 percent had records of alcohol or drug 
offenses (Doocy et al., 2002). This suggests that the 
backgrounds and criminal experiences of telemarketing 
offenders in broad outline may not differ greatly from what 
previous studies have suggested is characteristic of 
ordinary white-collar offenders. It also lends credibility 
to the assumption that at least some telemarketing fraud is 
13 
committed by offenders for whom crime is a long-standing 
pattern or vocation. The fact that telemarketing fraud is 
perpetrated in an organizational context facilitates the 
moral transformation of others without prior criminal 
records. 
In addition to being organized, the criminal endeavors 
of fraudulent telemarketers are entrepreneurial in nature. 
This business-like approach to crime suggests not only that 
criminal telemarketers embrace the societal goal of capital 
accumulation but also they are suited to pursue established 
pathways to success. The pursuit of profit is a universal 
goal of individuals in the United States as it is in other 
capitalist nations. In Crime and the American Dream, 
Messner and Rosenfeld (2001: 5) assert that "crime in 
America derives in significant measure, from highly prized 
cultural and social conditions." Cohen (1955) contends 
that "individuals are encouraged to pursue the somewhat 
broader goal of middle-class status. That is, individuals 
are urged to seek the financial success, reputation, and 
lifestyle associated with the middle class." While it is 
obvious that criminal telemarketers actively pursue 
financial gain, whether they desire "middle-class status" 
is unclear. 
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From all accounts, many of the larger fraudulent 
telemarketing firms closely resemble legitimate business 
firms. Doocy et al. (2001: 21) describe telescamming as an 
"inventive offshoot of legitimate enterprise." They 
explain it in the context of the capitalist structure which 
"encourages the accumulation by any tactic, but imposes a 
penalty if the effort is illegal" (Doocy et al., 2001: 21). 
As O'Connor (1973) points out, it is up to the state to 
monitor both facets of this pursuit. The state has an 
obligation to create and maintain the conditions under 
which capital accumulation is possible and it must 
simultaneously create and maintain conditions of social 
harmony, including protection of the public. 
O'Connor goes on to suggest that there is serious 
potential for conflict between these two obligations. 
A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive 
forces to help one social class accumulate capital at 
the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and 
hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. 
But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting 
the process of capital accumulation risks drying up 
the source of its own power, the economy's surplus 
production capacity and the taxes drawn from that 
surplus (O'Connor, 1973: 6). 
That the state has not previously enacted unduly 
restrictive measures on telephone sales has facilitated 
criminal telemarketers pursuit of capital accumulation. 
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Despite the increased prominence of telemarketing in the 
economy, however, practitioners are not permitted to 
exploit its potential at the expense of the public. Thus, 
telemarketing fraud is defined in 18 United States Code 
2325 as: 
A plan, program, promotion, or campaign that is 
conducted to induce purchases of goods or services, or 
participation in a contest or sweepstakes, by use of 
one or more interstate telephone calls initiated by a 
person who is conducting the plan, program, or 
campaign. 
Although telemarketing fraud is defined in 18 U.S. C. , 
section 2325, most criminal telemarketers are charged under 
the wire fraud statute {18 U.S.C. , section 1343): Whoever, 
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or article 
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of 
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate 
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, 
or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
Offenders may also be charged with mail fraud (18 U. S. C., 
section 1341), money laundering {18 U. S. C. , section 1956) 
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or criminal consp iracy (18 U.S.C., section 371). It is 
important to note that the law does not specifically 
delineate what actions or behaviors const itute fraud. As a 
result, the prescriptive aspect of the law is subject to 
interpretation. 
Research Problem 
The criminal decision-making of fraudulent telemarketers as 
it pertains to the law and possible ramifications remains 
largely unexplored. Rational-choice theories of crime have 
stimulated numerous investigations of street-offender 
decision-making (e.g., Bennet and Wright, 1984; Feeney, 
1986; Katz, 1988; Shover and Honaker, 1992; Tunnell, 1992; 
Wright and Decker, 1997; Hochstetler, forthcoming). There 
is remarkable consistency in the results of these studies. 
Burglars, armed robbers and other street criminals are 
anything but the careful calculating actors sketched in 
classical criminological theory. Age, the influence of 
compan ions, mood, and drug altered states of consciousness, 
whether singly or in combination, constra in severely their 
rationality. 
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Although rational-choice theory has been extended to 
white-collar crime by a number of investigators (e. g. , 
Paternoster and Simpson, 1993; Shover and Bryant, 1993), 
there are few tests of its explanatory and predictive 
merits (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; Simpson and Koper, 
1992). Despite the fact that many believe white-collar 
criminals may be among the most rational of offenders 
(e. g. , Braithwaite and Geis, 1982; Weisburd, Waring and 
Chayet, 1990), understanding of their decision-making lags 
far behind what is known about the behavior of street 
criminals. 
Surprisingly little is known about the fraudulent 
telemarketers who have stepped forward to exploit the new 
white-collar criminal opportunities. Their social origins 
and characteristics, the attractions and compensations of 
their work, the way they organize and manage their criminal 
enterprises, and the process by which they perpetrate fraud 
are largely unexplored areas of investigation. The extent 
to which white-collar criminals are aware of and take 
account of the criminal justice apparatus and its threats 
is unclear. The extent to which answers to these and other 
questions about the white-collar criminal decision-making 
process would necessitate modifications of crime-as-choice 
18 
theory remains unclear as well. From a policy standpoint, 
it would be useful to understand the forces that cause them 
either to extend or to terminate criminal participation. 
This dissertation redresses this situation with analysis of 
data on criminal telemarketing and offenders. The approach 
is both descriptive and interpretive. 
The problem of telemarketing fraud cannot be addressed 
adequately by exclusive focus on the individuals who 
perpetrate it. It generally is not committed by solitary 
offenders for its operational challenges require the 
coordinated efforts of two or more individuals (Francis, 
1988; Schulte, 1995; Stevenson, 2000). Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the organizational context through 
which criminal telemarketers facilitate fraud. It is 
equally important to analyze the interaction process 
wherein the fraud is actually perpetrated. 
Doocy et al. (2001) suggest that �successful sales 
talents are similar to those of a successful actor: an 
ability to convince others that you are what you truly are 
not, and to have them [consumers] believe that the lines 
you speak are truths." In other words, sellers are given 
wide latitude in making their sales pitches while it is up 
to consumers to discern the actual value of products or 
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services. While this may be true of sales in general, it 
contributes little to understanding the i�teraction process 
wherein telemarketing fraudsters swindle funds from 
unwitting victims. To better comprehend the phenomenon, it 
would be helpful to gain insight into the perceptions of 
the "sellers ll and buyers ll that participate in fraudulent 
transactions. 
To explore fully the phenomenon of telemarketing 
fraud, it is necessary to examine it at macro, meso, and 
micro-levels. This study examines how criminal 
telemarketers exploit ambiguity at the legal, 
organizational, and interactional levels. By definition, 
ambiguity is the state of being "ambiguous" - capable of 
being understood in two or more possible senses or ways 
(Merriam-Webster, 1997). It is synonymous with vagueness, 
uncertainty, haziness, doubt, and indistinctness. For 
purposes of this study, ambiguity in all its derivative 
forms is explored in the context of the law, organizational 
structure and management, and the interaction process. 
Generally, how do fraudulent telemarketers organize 
and manage their criminal enterprises to exploit criminal 
opportunities? What is the process by which they carry out 
the fraud? What are the backgrounds and criminal decision-
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making processes of·fraudulent telemarketers? This 
dissertation analyzes the cultural and legal factors that 
underlie criminal telemarketing, the social organization 
and management of fraudulent telemarketing enterprises, and 
whether organizational structure helps explain the 
decision-making process of individual offenders. It also 
explores the interaction processes utilized to perpetrate 
fraud and the backgrounds and decision-making of the 
individual offenders. 
More specifically: 
1. What are the backgrounds, criminal histories, and 
lifestyles of the sample subjects? 
2.  How are fraudulent telemarketing firms organized and 
managed? 
3. What is the organizational routine? 
4. What is the lure of criminal telemarketing to those 
that participate in it? 
5. How do criminal telemarketers perpetrate fraud 
interactionally? 
6. How do offenders and victims perceive the interaction 
process? 
7. What is the decision-making process of the offenders? 
8. How do offenders rationalize their criminal actions? 
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The methodology employed is detailed (Chapter 2)  
before the design, routine, management and accountability 
structure - that is, the social organization - of criminal 
telemarketing operations are examined (Chapter 3). The 
interaction process. between offender and victim is analyzed 
from a social-psychological perspective (Chapter 4) and 
then the backgrounds and criminal careers as well as the 
lure of criminal telemarketing and lifestyles of the sample 
subjects are provided (Chapter 5). Next, the thought 
processes of individual offenders are revealed. 
Specifically, I consider the denial of crime, techniques of 
neutralization, organizational design, and rational choice 
perspective (Chapter 6). The author's conclusion and 




Research into telemarketing fraud does not have a long 
history. Few studies have been conducted. In fact, 
criminological research has been greatly limited prior to 
the current study. Most of the knowledge gained to date 
has been gathered in a non-scientific manner by law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies and victim advocate 
groups. Albeit unsystematically, the American Association 
of Retired Persons (AARP, 1996a; 1996b) has provided 
valuable information to educate victims about the existence 
of criminal telemarketers while law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies have produced enforcement statistics. 
Doocy et al. (2001) pursued knowledge about the 
offenders themselves. The investigators reviewed 
background reports of 162 telemarketers who had previously 
worked at a California-based fraudulent telemarketing firm. 
The findings of this study were rather limited but did 
produce age and criminal history statistics. The 
researchers also obtained a sole interview and eight 
surveys from fraudulent telemarketers. While the study was 
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qualitatively limited, the relevant information is reported 
later in this paper. 
The current study uses qualitative interviews to fill 
the gap in knowledge about fraudulent telemarketers. In 
this method of research, interviews are less structured 
than survey interviews; researchers ask open-ended 
questions and elicit specific responses but participants 
are allowed and prompted to explain and clarify their 
responses (Babbie, 1998; Cromwell, 2003). It is a method 
that allows access to participants' knowledge, experience, 
and opinions in their own words (Reinharz, 1992; Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995; Johnson, 2002; Warren, 2002). The results of 
qualitative interviews offer "deep" or "thick" descriptive 
information and understanding of the activity being studied 
(Johnson, 2002). 
We know little about telemarketing fraud, hence the 
need for qualitative interviews. Understanding the 
motivations behind participants' criminal activity is 
central to this study because it allows the researcher to 
go beyond common sense explanations (Babbie, 1998; Johnson, 
2002; Cromwell, 2003). "Effective crime control strategies 
must take into account the factors that drive crime. Field 
research that allows offenders to speak for themselves is 
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ideally suited to these studies ll (Cromwell, 2003). The 
purpose of each interview is to uncover potentially 
relevant data. Therefore, "it is best not to structure 
interviews too tightly, but rather to allow sufficient 
space for other potentially relevant concepts to emerge and 
to include conceptual areas brought to the investigation or 
uncovered during the research process ll (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990: 181-2) . 
Sample 
Theoretical sampling was employed to research 
telemarketing fraud and criminal telemarketers. According 
to Strauss and Corbin (1990: 177), the aim of theoretical 
sampling is to sample events and incidents that are 
indicative of categories, their properties, and dimensions. 
In other words, the interest is in gathering data about 
what subjects do; the range of conditions that give rise to 
their actions and variations in action; and how conditions 
change or stay the same over time and with what impact. 
"Guiding theoretical sampling are questions and comparisons 
that evolve during analysis that help a researcher to 
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discover and relate relevant categories, their properties, 
and dimensions" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 178). 
Theoretical sampling ensures the noting of variation 
and process, as well as of density. "A certain degree of 
flexibility is needed because the investigator must respond 
to and make the most out of data-relevant situations that 
may arise while in the field" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 
178) . "Sampling is open to those persons, places, and 
situations that will provide the greatest opportunity to 
gather the most relevant data about the phenomenon under 
investigation" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 181). "The 
researcher chooses the sites, persons, and documents that 
will maximize opportunities for verifying the story line, 
relationships between categories, and for filling in poorly 
developed categories" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 183). 
In grounded theory research, the researcher pursues 
generalizations by making comparisons across social 
situations. "It seeks theory that is comparable with the 
evidence, that is precise and rigorous, that is capable of 
replication, and is generalizable" (Neuman, 1994: 32 3). 
Decisions regarding the number of interviews depend upon 
access, available resources, research goals, and time. The 
general rule in grounded theory research is to sample until 
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theoretical saturation of each category is reached. 
Theoretical saturation occurs when no new or relevant data 
seem to emerge regarding a category, the category accounts 
for all of the paradigm elements along with variation and 
process, and the relationships between categories are well 
established and validated (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 188). 
Most of the data for this dissertation were gathered 
in semi-structured personal interviews with 48 
telemarketing offenders convicted under federal law. Since 
there are no lists of the names - sampling frames - of 
criminal telemarketers, investigators interested in 
learning about them and their activities cannot draw random 
samples for study. Sampling began with examination of 
major metropolitan newspapers for the past five years and 
approximately 75 web sites that contained information about 
telemarketing fraud as well as names of convicted· 
offenders. Additional names were gathered from pre­
sentence reports of interview subjects. These search 
processes yielded the names of 308 persons who were 
convicted of telemarketing fraud in the period 1996 through 
2000 in the U.S. For reasons that never became clear, the 
proportion of names that were matched with incarcerated 
inmates was much lower than expected. Of the 308 names 
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submitted to the Bureau of Prisons Office of Research and 
Evaluation, only 74 were returned with indication they were 
confined in institutions. 
Interviews were completed with 25 of these. Twenty­
six (26) elected not to meet with the investigator, two 
declined to be interviewed after hearing the presentation 
of research objectives and methods, and seven had been 
released prior to the investigators' institutional visit. 
No attempt was made to contact or interview fourteen of the 
incarcerated offenders, principally because there were no 
other telemarketing offenders incarcerated in the 
institutions where they were confined, and it would not 
have been cost effective to travel there in hopes of 
securing a solitary interview. 
Under the terms of an agreement with the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, names were submitted to personnel in 
their Office of Research and Evaluation, who reported the 
institutional locations of those currently incarcerated. 
Institutional wardens were then made aware of the 
researcher's interest in interviewing these inmates. The 
warden or the warden's designee then presented to the 
inmates the written description of the research and its 
objectives and inquired if s/he was agreeable to meeting 
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with the investigator when he vis ited the institution. The 
written description of the project is attached as Appendix 
A. 
The researcher later traveled to a number of 
institutions to meet with inmates who responded 
aff irmatively, to describe and explain the research 
objectives and to interview those who elected to 
participate in the study. Those offenders that agreed to 
be interviewed were ensured of conf identiality and were 
asked to sign a consent form. A copy of the consent form 
is attached as Appendix B. Twenty-f ive members of the 
sample were incarcerated when interviewed. They were 
conf ined in twelve federal prisons, from Oregon to Florida 
and Massachusetts to Arizona. 
To ensure that the sample included a sufficient 
number of people with diverse telemarketing experience, as 
interviewing progressed, the researcher also included some 
offenders under federal probation supervision. I reasoned 
that their involvement in telemarketing fraud probably was 
not as lengthy or as serious as was the case with the 
incarcerated subjects. U.S. Probation Officers and U.S. 
Attorneys in f ive states provided the investigator with 
names of potential interview subjects. I interviewed 23 
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parolees and probationers, 15 in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 8 
in other cities. Las Vegas was an early hotbed of criminal 
telemarketing, and it continues to be a home base for many 
operations. 
Data Collection 
The final interview sample consisted of forty-eight 
subjects. Among them were thirty-six white males, six 
African-American males, and six white females. All 
interviews followed an interview guide, which was revised 
as data collection progressed and analytic insights were 
developed and tested. The original topical interview guide 
is attached as Appendix C and the final revised guide is 
attached as Appendix D. The interviews explored a range of 
topics, including subj ects ' background and criminal 
history, their employment history, and the nature and 
circumstances of their initial and subsequent participation 
in telemarketing fraud. The investigator also explored the 
characteristics and operating procedures of the 
organizations for which subjects had worked. This 
information provided an understanding of how fraudulent 
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telemarketing organizations operate and factors that may 
explain the ir differential success. 
Interviews lasted from 45 minutes to 7 hours ; however, 
most lasted between one and one and half hours. The 
subjects confined in prison took considerably longer to 
.interview as they were conducted during the early stages of 
data collection and the subjects spent a significant amount 
of time discussing their legal appeals . Most of the 
imprisoned subjects and the researcher met in visiting 
rooms at the respective prisons ; complete privacy was 
provided although a few prisons kept a guard within view. 
The majority of interviews with probationers and parolees 
took place in probation offices, three were conducted at 
restaurants, and the remaining two were done by telephone. 
In addition to interviews with telemarketing 
offenders, I had access to pre-sentence investigat ion 
reports for 40 of the 48 subjects. Examination of these 
served not only as an independent check on the validity of 
information elicited during the interviews but also 
provided a more complete picture of the subjects ' 
backgrounds and circumstances. I also interviewed four 
acquaintances who formerly worked as telemarketers at 
fraudulent firms for short periods of time and five 
31 
legitimate telemarketers, two of whom once held office in 
telemarketing trade associations. The purpose of these 
interviews was to discern how fraudulent telemarketers 
differed from legitimate telemarketers . 
In addition, I interviewed four assistant U . S .  
attorneys with extensive experience prosecuting 
telemarketing offenders, four U . S .  probation officers who 
have supervised a large number of convicted telemarketers, 
and a state official with the Nevada Consumer Affairs 
Division . The information gained from these interviews was 
valuable as it provided a law enforcement perspective on 
telemarketing. I also examined eight depositions of 
victims of telemarketing fraud made by law enforcement 
personnel and three voluminous criminal trial transcripts 
containing detailed descriptions of criminal telemarketing 
organizations and operations . 
Finally, I made site visits to five telemarketing 
operations, two of which appeared to operate fraudulently . 
The purpose of these visits was to examine the operations 
in practice. The similarities and distinctions between 
legitimate and illegitimate operations that had been 
verbalized in interviews became more clear as a result. 
The researcher was able to observe aspects of the 
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respective businesses that were not described during the 
interview process . For example, the differences in 
professionalism and management techniques became visibly 
apparent. Field notes were made during visits to the 
legitimate sites and immediately after departure from the 
allegedly fraudulent sites and were later transcribed for 
analysis. 
Data Analysis 
Interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed for 
analysis using N-Vivo , a software package for text-based 
data (Richards, 1999 ) .  N-Vi vo allows the researcher to 
code, recode and store ideas, concepts, categories and 
themes relevant to the qualitative data being analyzed . 
Databases are created and can systematically be retrieved 
and managed. Additionally, N-Vi vo offers the ability _to 
maintain information about cases by storing at tribute� and 
information also can be exported to create spreadsheets and 
databases. 
N-Vi vo utilizes a classification system for relating, 
categorizing, characterizing, coding, and manipulating the 
concepts, topics, and ideas relevant to a qualitative 
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research project (Richards, 1999). It is necessary for the 
researcher to generate the categories from data within the 
documents. Specific categories are used to code project 
documentation where a particular topic occurs. The 
specific categories can then be grouped into any number of 
sets, which can be studied for their features, contents, 
themes, etc. (Richards, 1999). 
The original research questions and field notes were 
used as a guide to determine general themes for 
exploration. The investigator began formal analysis of the 
data set by reviewing the interview documents and coding 
passages according to content. This required that a 
specific category be designated - for each passage according 
to its particular content. As analysis continued, the need 
to establish new categories lessened as subsequent passages 
of similar content were fit within previously established 
codes. 
Upon completion of coding by specific content, the 
investigator placed the various passages under broader 
conceptual headings: cultural influences, law, offender 
backgrounds, social organization, social interaction, and 
criminal calculus. I then reviewed the passages within 
each broad category in order to determine more specific 
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themes. At that point, I was able to group the specific 
categories into sets and thus organize the data to address 
the research questions. 
I also conducted statistical analyses using the SPSS 
computer software program for quantitative analysis. I ran 
cross-tabulations on several variables that had theoretical 
relevance; eight of the tables are incorporated in the 
paper. Cross-tabulations provide the distribution of 
frequencies of variables within cross-referenced 
categories. The tables reveal the within category and 
within group percentages for the variables that are cross­
tabulated. This required that all variables utilized be 
entered as categorical data, hence numerical data were 
grouped as needed. 
Age, number of marriages, number of children, years in 
telemarketing, and income were entered as numerical 
variables. Race was entered as white and non-white; gender 
was male and female. Education was categorized as less 
than �igh school, high school degree (including GED), some 
college, college degree, and masters degree. Parent 1 s 
employment refers to the occupation of the head of the 
household, usually the father; categories consisted of 
laborer, managerial/professorial, and business owner. 
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Prior record was a dichotomous variable of yes or no; and 
the present status of the subj ect was listed as prison, 
parole, and probation. Telemarketing positions of the 
subj ects were entered as sales agents which includes 
closers, reloaders, managers, and owners. Finally a 
category was created for admission of guilt, which 
consisted of yes, no and awareness. 
Methodological Reservations 
Criminologists have long voiced concern about the potential 
shortcomings of research based on samples of offenders 
known to the police or other criminal j ustice agencies. 
The issues are well known. To begin, known offenders and 
their experiences may not be representative of the larger 
population of of fenders : their arrest and conviction are 
prima facie evidence that they have been unsuccessful and, 
therefore, may differ in important ways from offenders who 
do not have official criminal records (Wright et al. , 1992;  
McCall 1978). Known offenders also may not be honest or 
forthcoming with investigators for fear of repercussions 
from criminal justice agencies and personnel (Yablonski, 
19 56). Last, there is the problem of eliciting information 
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about street- leve l dynamics and concerns when sub jects, if 
incarcerated, - are far removed from the free wor ld and its 
constraints . 
There are no simp le or straightforward so lutions to 
sample se lection problems and the use of known offenders. 
Reason suggests, however, that some issues and topics 
probably can be explored wel l  using known offenders with 
litt le fear of bias, even if this is not the case for a l l  
areas of inquiry. Lifesty les and careers, for example, are 
one thing, decision-making is another (Shover and Honaker, 
1992). Almost certainly, the former can be reca l led more 
clear ly and accurate ly than the detai ls of complex 
cognitive or decision-making processes. Simi lar ly, known 
offenders may be forthcoming and candid about relationships 
with family members, but they may be reluctant to divulge 
information on il licit income if they fear it could be used 
by state officials to extract hidden income or monies. 
There is no doubt that investigations of street crime 
using samples of known offenders have produced detailed, 
accurate and useful data on a range of topics ( Shover and 
Honaker, 1992 ; Shover, 1985 ; Feeney, 1986 ; Scu l ly and 
Maro lla, 1984 ; Benson, 1985). Put di fferent ly, research 
using prisoners or other known offenders has demonstrab le 
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value. There is little reason, moreover , to believe that 
the results of these studies contradict or are inconsistent 
with what has been learned from studies using active 
offenders. More important , despite misgivings about using 
offenders known to criminal justice agencies, there is 
little hard evidence available on which to judge whether 
they think , act and report information differently than 
free-ranging offenders . 
This combined with its cost-effectiveness persuaded me 
to use a sample of convicted telemarketers under 
institutional or community supervision. Simply, there is 
no other way to access these offenders. I acknowledge that 
the precise relationship of this sample to larger 
populations of theoretical and substantive interest is 
unknown , but it does capture persistent telemarketing fraud 
o f fenders, the obj ect o f  considerable publ ic and o f f icial 
concern . 
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Chapter 3 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF TELEMARKETING FRAUD 
Criminal telemarketers generally do not act alone. They 
usually enlist the cooperative efforts of other 
individuals, resulting in the need to organize and manage 
their criminal enterprises. Thus, I set out to explore the 
structure and management of the subjects' criminal 
organizations. More specifically, I wanted to determine 
whether or not the criminal firms are hierarchical replete 
with a management and accountability structure. I also 
examined the recruitment and socialization processes and 
the routines criminal telemarketers employ to perpetuate 
fraud. The subjects maintained a defensive stance with 
respect to the inner-workings of their organizations for 
the most part. Explication required piecing together 
information from a variety of sources. It also was 
instructive to determine whether or not criminal firms 
differed significantly in organizational context from 
legitimate operations. 
The products and services offered by criminal 
telemarketers span a wide gamut. Examples of commonly 
employed schemes include prizes and sweepstakes deals, 
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magazine sales, credit card sales, work-at-home schemes, 
advance fee loan offers, credit card loss protection 
programs, buyers ' clubs, and travel/ vacation offers. A 
high proportion of the companies represented by the 
research subj ects promised that those who purchased 
products from them were odds-on winners of a prize soon to 
be awarded once other matters were settled. Typically, the 
products were either personalized or " cause of the day" 
(e. g. , Say No to Drugs) items . The prices of these items 
were grossly inflated and the valuable prizes never 
awarded. 
Other subj ects sold private stocks that by definition 
are not listed or traded on a stock exchange . 
Telemarketers nevertheless are able to entice investors 
with smooth talk and a promising prospectus. Dependent 
upon their salesmen for market reports, those who invest 
soon discover that the non-existent stocks take a nose­
dive, and they lose their investments. The movie Boiler 
Room (Warner Home Video, 2000) is an entertaining and 
generally accurate depiction of these operations. 
A couple of subj ects sold investment shares in cable 
companies that were said to be on the cutting edge of 
providing access to previously unreachable land areas. 
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Naturally, the deal fell through in the end and the clients 
absorbed the loss. Another subj ect sold inexpensive 
gemstones with fraudulent certificates of grossly inflated 
value and authenticity . The stones were sealed in display 
cases such that purchasers would have difficulty getting 
them appraised, particularly since they were told that if 
they broke the seal, the value of the stones would decrease 
and the certificate of authenticity would become invalid. 
Some research subj ects solicited money for nonexistent 
charities or for legitimate organizations they did not 
represent. These fraudulent telemarketers place calls to 
unwitting victims and prey upon their good nature and 
humanitarianism. A few more brazen firms simply told 
victims that they had won a large sum of money. To " cash 
in" on the proceeds, the victims were required to send in 
several thousand dollars to pay for alleged taxes and 
origination fees. The higher the amount of the award, the 
higher the fees. The fraudsters could afford to offer 
awards allegedly worth millions of dollars since there was 
never any payout. 
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Structure and Routine 
Larger fraudulent telemarketing operations commonly take on 
the characteristics and dynamics of formal organizations; 
they are hierarchical, with a division of labor, graduated 
pay and advancement opportunities. Established by 
individuals with previous experience in fraudulent sales, 
they generally employ commissioned sales agents to call 
potential customers, to make the initial pitch, and to weed 
out the cautious and the steadfastly disinterested. 
Experienced telemarketers generally do not call individuals 
randomly but work instead from lead lists (also known as 
"mooch lists"). Individuals whose names appear on lead 
lists typically are distinguished by past demonstrated 
interest or participation in promotions of one kind or 
another. 
Lead lists are indispensable to criminal 
telemarketers. They are purchased from any of dozens of 
businesses that compile and sell information on consumer 
behavior and expressed preferences. Lead lists usually are 
generated by legitimate marketing firms that obtain 
consumer information from sweepstakes entry forms and 
purchaser questionnaires, such as those that accompany 
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product warranties. Owners may spend heavily on good 
lists, often paying as much as $10 per name. 
A 20 percent close rate on a lead list is considered a 
"very good" resource, whereas owners can expect less than 
10 percent on lists that cost $1 per name. Telemarketers 
that operate on an in-bound basis wherein consumers call 
into the company, utilize lead lists with consumer 
addresses. These firms mail out attractive offers hoping 
that the recipients will be enticed to call the business. 
They are less expensive but also produce only about a 1 
percent response rate. 
When a person is contacted by telephone, the sales 
agent generally works from a script. Scripts are written 
materials that lay out both successful sales approaches and 
responses (rebuttals) to whatever reception sales agents 
meet with from those they reach by phone . Promising 
contacts are turned over to a closer, a more experienced 
and better paid sa les agen t . A former owner told me : 
I initiated a racetrack where I built all my 
telemarketing booths in a circle, and then I built a 
circle inside the circle . So there was a racetrack, a 
path going all around the circle, and I used closers 
that would [take over] as soon as they heard a buying 
signal. As soon as they [sales agents] heard a buying 
signal on the telephone they [turned it over] to 
somebody else to close the deal. So I could use 25 
people in a room and just have 5 closers, 5 people 
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that could sell. And the other ones are j ust really 
initiating the sale and trying to develop interest. 
Reloaders are the most effective closers. Much like 
account executives in legitimate businesses, they maintain 
contacts with . individuals who previously sent money to the 
company (i. e., "purchased" from it) in hopes of persuading 
them to send more. As one subj ect told me: 
I had it so perfected that I could get these customers 
to buy again . . . .  I made sure they were happy so I 
could sell them again. It didn't do me, I didn't want 
the one time. I didn't want the two-timer. I wanted 
to sell these people ten times. 
The organization of larger telemarketing firms and the 
routine that employees follow when handling promising calls 
explains why those who buy from them typically report 
contact with multiple salespersons (AARP, 1996b). 
Fraudulent telemarketers generally prefer to bill 
their victims directly via credit card, but this process 
creates the potential for charge backs and external review 
by regulatory personnel and law enforcement. Consequently, 
customers usually are coached to write out a check during 
the phone call and directed to send it by overnight mail. 
Otherwise, the salesperson dispatches a courier to pick up 
the check or cash. Goods or services either are not 
delivered at all, or they are substantially inferior to 
what was promised. 
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The subj ects of this study unstintingly employ the 
rhetoric of legitimate business when describing their 
operations and activities. Accounts of their telemarketing 
activities are replete with references to "customers, " 
"purchases, " "account executives, " "premiums" and such. 
When they talk, however, of "customers" who "bought" from 
their establishments, they are referring to victims who 
sent them money and whom they hoped could be induced to 
make additional "purchases" despite .receiving little of 
value in return for earlier ones. Throughout this paper, 
the rhetoric employed by the subj ects is utilized in 
descriptions of their criminal operations and activities. 
The owners are the idea men. They begin set up of the 
operations by locating office space and obtaining telephone 
services. There is little financial risk, largely because 
there is little overhead. Although owners often are 
required to post a bond with the state regulatory agency 
prior to start-up, sales are on commission, and products 
are provided by private contractors. Whereas legitimate 
marketing firms are enlisted by businesses to market their 
products, criminal telemarketers enlist businesses to 
provide products simply as reason to contact consumers they 
wish to defraud. 
45 
The goal of fraudulent telemarketers is to induce 
consumers to pay substantially increased prices or fees for 
products by promising awards to those who purchase. For 
example , they often enlist the services of a printing 
company , to make personalized pens and other trinkets and 
attach an exorbitant price to the products. More brazen 
owners may promise a product or cash award without ever 
sending any out to the consumers and some simply solicit 
donations for a non-existent charity. 
The organizational flow chart [Figure 3 . 1 ] provides 
the basic hierarchical structure and routine of larger 
criminal telemarketing firms. Owners do not have direct 
contact with clients , however they often develop the 
scripts which the sales agents then follow. While scripts 
generally require approval by a state regulatory agency , 
the s ales agents deviate from the approved script s  during 
the sales transactions. The owners then employ managers to 
train the sales agents on how to present the script in a 
more persuasive manner and to oversee the day-to-day 
operations. Managers stress the fact that individual 
income is based on commission and encourage sales agents to 
incorporate their own personal style when employing the 
scripts. 


















Figure 3 . 1 :  Organizational Structure and Routine 
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While closers technically are subj ect to the authority 
of the manager, reloaders are set up as account executives 
and maintain near complete autonomy in dealing with their 
clients. The transactions of sales agents and closers, on 
the other hand, often are subj ected to review by the office 
verifier, if there is one. After a consumer agrees to make 
a purchase, albeit based on false promises, s/he is placed 
on the phone with the verifier allegedly for the purpose of 
making sure that all the information is correct. During 
these tape-recorded conversations, it is "verified" that 
the consumer is "aware" of the conditions of the purchase 
and that no additional promises were made. Naturally, the 
consumer has been coached by the sales agent/closer to not 
reveal the "inside" information, { i.e., s/he '  s a "winner") , 
that has been provided, or risk "queering the deal. " 
Criminal telemarketers usually count on the fact that 
most victims will not take the time or effort to complain, 
and they use verification tapes as their first line of 
defense should a consumer initiate a complaint. For 
victims who are more persistent in their demand for a 
refund, many of the fraudsters have developed ways to 
satisfy and yet still rip off disgruntled consumers . They 
do this by setting up recovery rooms. 
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Recovery rooms are based on the concept of legitimate 
firms that provide a service representing consumers against 
businesses by whom they ' ve been defrauded. Criminal 
telemarketers have one of their own employees call 
dissatisfied customers and offer to represent the consumer 
against the business. Naturally, the employee proceeds 
under the guise of an independent recovery company. The 
result is that the customer recoups a portion, usually 
half, of what s/he lost, the complaint is abated, and the 
company keeps the rest. 
Sample Operation 
Among the subjects of this research were some who 
identified and located owners of vacant property, led them 
to believe that buyers for the property could be found 
easily, and then charged high fees to advertise it. The 
key to this scam is that the victims were made to believe 
that the telemarketers had buyers interested in the lots 
whereas there were, in reality, only a few buyers -
individuals that were interested in vacant lots generally. 
Six (6) of the sample subjects worked for this particular 
company, which provided additional insight into how the 
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roles of the various positions are played out within an 
organizational setting. While the product/service they 
pedaled is somewhat unique, it does provide a deeper 
understanding of fraudulent operations. 
The Texas operation, hereafter referred to as XYZ 
Company, w�s developed by two men experienced in real 
estate sales . A silent partner, who also possessed prior 
real estate experience, provided financial backing. The 
basic concept was to offer owners of vacant land the 
opportunity to list their land for sale and be matched with 
interested buyers. The partners developed divisions of 
labor with separate departments to handle: ( 1) potential 
sellers, ( 2)  potential buyers, ( 3) computer entry and 
matching, and ( 4) accounting. Over time, the company grew 
to include approximately 30-40 employees per shift with a 
total of about 250 employees during the 3-year period in 
which the business operated. 
The two managing partners located the tracts of land 
by researching title abstracts accessible to the public and 
sent out postcards to the land owners, soliciting them to 
call the business if they desired to sell their land. The 
sales agents fielded calls and entered the information into 
the computer base. Gullible sellers were required to pay a 
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listing fee to have their land placed in the computer 
listing service. 
For the matching part, the fraudsters placed in 
newspapers and other media sources general advertisements 
stating that "land [ is ]  available for purchase. " 
Interested buyers were provided a toll-free number to call 
XYZ Company and specify in what region they sought to 
purchase land. These requests were then " matched" with 
parcels of land listed for sale by the sellers and a list 
of matches were submitted to the potential buyers. 
Interested buyers were not required to pay fees. 
Although the sellers perceived that the company was . 
actively engaged in selling their land, the subjects 
defended that the service offered was solely listing the 
properties. In other words, the subjects alleged that it 
was an advertising company as opposed to a real estate 
sales operation. The business did, in fact, compile a list 
of land tracts for sale and advertised, albeit generally. 
Nearly 30, 000 sellers were listed at the time of the 
investigation and the company took in about $9 million 
dollars in revenue over the three-year span. (Listings 
required periodic renewal. ) Approximately 200 tracts of 
land were sold during the same period to a total of 30 
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different buyers. These lands were generally sold at very 
reduced prices. The managers and partners perpetuated the 
myth that the service was doing well by talking in terms of 
matching properties, which in reality meant that some 
buyers expressed a general interest in land tracts, 
although not necessarily any of those listed for sale. 
They also boasted of actual sales made by soliciting and 
posting testimonials from sellers who somehow were lucky 
enough to sell their land. 
The fraud was perpetrated through representations that 
the company and its agents made to the sellers. Upon 
determining the owner of a tract of land, the company would 
send a personalized postcard to potential sellers, listing 
their specific tracts of land and asking them if they were 
" interested in selling their land for cash today. " If so, 
they were directed to call the company " within the next 72 
hours . "  When - a  potential seller would call in, they were 
given a sales pitch devised by the managing partners, that 
implied that the company had " buyers interested in land 
like [ yours ] already in the computer. " This was done to 
create the impression that a sale would be imminent. 
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Recruitment and Socializ ation 
Criminal telemarketers need to recruit and replace 
personnel, _ restrict the number of persons knowledgeable 
about their criminal purpose, and hide assets (Shover, 
1996). These problems are solved in most criminal 
organizations through specialized roles, spatial dispersion 
of members, and strategic ignorance of operations (Katz, 
1980; Reuter, 1983) . Etzioni (1961, 1964) identifies two 
concepts central to the professionalization process -
selectivity and socialization. "Selectivity, or 
recruitment, involves the active search for the right 
person for a particular j ob" (1964 : 68-69). Organizational 
socialization consists of "the processes by which the 
beliefs, norms and perspectives of the participants are 
brought into line with those of the organization" (Etzioni 
1961 : 142). 
While Etzioni (1961 : 158-159) contends that "each 
concept could substitute partially for the other, " 
presumably the best organizational results are obtained 
when both selection and socialization are high. "When 
selectivity is low . . .  organizational socialization is 
expected to adapt the personnel to the needs of the 
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organization" ( Winfree et, al. , 1984 : 209 ) . According to 
organizational theory, "the organization can compensate for 
' failures' in the . . .  recruitment process by increasing 
its control over new recruits, and subsequently initiating 
organizational socialization" ( Winfree et, al. , 1984: 222 ) . 
Requiring no formal education and only limited 
training, telemarketing provides employment opportunity to 
a wide array of individuals, providing an attractive 
breeding ground for modern day con artists. The 
individuals that are drawn to telemarketing generally do 
not have substantial education and they generally lack 
prior professional work experience. ( The educational 
backgrounds of the subjects are provided in greater detail 
in Chapter 5. ) As a result, criminal telemarketing firms 
recruit from a pool of untrained individuals who often lack 
business sophistication. 
None of the subjects said that as children they 
aspired to a career in telemarketing. Some had previous 
sales experience before beginning the work, but most did 
not. Their introduction to it was fortuitous; while still 
in high school or, more commonly, while in college, they 
either responded to attractive ads in the newspaper or were 
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recruited by friends or acquaintances who boasted about the 
amount of money they were making. 
[A  former acquaintance ] . . .  looked me up, found me 
and said "you gotta come out here. . We're gonna 
make a ton of money. " I went out for three weeks -­
left my wife back home. And I got on the phones, and 
I was making a thousand dollars a week. I'm like, 
"Oh, my God, Jenni, pack the stuff, we're going to 
Arizona. " . . .  He [ the acquaintance ] was like, "man, 
you're, you're a pro at this shit. " And I just, I 
don't know what it was. I was number one . . . .  I 
don't know, I loved it. 
Since selectivity in the recruitment process is virtually 
non-existent and the recruits are inexperienced, the 
socialization process is both emphasized and effective. 
Generally, new agents are provided with a script and a 
list of responses (rebuttals) to consumer resistance and 
immediately placed on the phones. Although some companies 
provide training, it is usually iri the context of being 
coached during the initiation process. The managers hold 
daily sales meetings to inspire the sales agents. 
Sometimes, inspirational speakers such as Zig Ziegler and 
others are brought in to help train the sales agents to be 
more effective closers. In reality, owners and managers 
emphasize that the recruits are being paid on commission, 
which acts as a form of self-motivation. In other words, 
they need to find a way to close the deals in order to get 
paid. 
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The execution of the pitch does not begin and end with 
the scripted pitch. Rather, the sales agents are given 
latitude to use their own unique skills. Often, the 
managers suggest that newer sales agents observe some of 
the more experienced and successful agents. It is known by 
management, albeit unacknowledged, that the exemplary 
agents deviate from the script in order to get results. As 
noted by Hobbs (1995) and Winlow (2001), the influence of 
others is remarkably similar in criminal telemarketing to 
what is known about the criminal careers of street 
criminals, particularly those who go on to pursue crime 
with a high degree of skil l and success. Having received 
guidance from successful closers, the sales agents soon 
learn to act on their own initiative and employ a more 
personal style in order to increase sales. 
Managers of criminal firms motivate their sales agents 
in other ways as wel l. Law enforcement officials, for 
example, have said that, 
sel lers often have mirrors in the cubicles in 
which they work. They are told to look into the 
mirror and see the face of a hot-shot 
salesperson. Sometimes there wil l  be a motto on 
the wal l,  such as : "Each No gets me closer to the 
Yes I want. " Boiler room owners and managers . .  
. may put large bil ls on a bul letin board and say 
that the next sale or the highest total for the 
day wil l  qualify for this extra reward. Often 
the sales people have to stand up when they 
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consummate a transaction, so that the boss can 
note them and they can take pleasure in the 
achievement (Doocy et al. , 2002 : 171 -72). 
Sales agents not only receive recogni tion for 
successful transactions from management and colleagues 
but also develop a spirit of competi tion. Several 
agents referred to their competitive nature as a 
driving force. As one subject told me, 
You could be selling a $10 thousand ticket, you 
could be selling a $49. 95 ticket. And it's the 
same principle, it's the same rules. I t's the 
same game. I like to win. I like to win in all 
the games I play, you know. And the money is a 
reason to be there, and a reason to have that 
job. But winning is what I want to do. I want 
to beat everybody else in the of fice. I want to 
beat that person I am talking to on the phone. 
Several of the subjects said that use of cocaine and 
other drugs increases their hunger for money and makes them 
less concerned about how they get it. Owners sometimes 
encourage drug use by their employees because this causes 
the latter to run through their earnings quickly, 
necessitating a return to the telephone : 
You know, i t's a weird philosophy I have on sales, and 
you probably won't like it. But I'm intelligent 
enough to know that i t  works. And I - - the best 
salesmen in the world are compulsive people that are 
easily addicted. To be a great salesman you can't be 
complacent. You can't be comfortable in your 
surroundings. I started to realize the best salesmen 
were the salesmen that got paid on Friday, that had 
that money spent on Monday. ' Cause they would perform 
Monday through Friday. I f  the guy saved his money and 
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was like me, I didn't l ike him because eventually he 
wasn't gonna work for me, he was gonna work for 
himself. So I either have drugs or girls around, a 
lot of women that would make sure these guys went 
through their money, you know, those type of girls. 
Do you understand what I'm saying? 
The principle upon which criminal telemarketers stimulate 
their members to work is a reflection of what occurs in 
thelarger society; they encourage their members to funnel 
their "earnings" into the "economy" and the resulting debt 
requires a commitment to work. 
Management and Accountability 
To the unsuspecting, the day-to-day activities of a 
criminal telemarketing operation may be indistinguishable 
from a legitimate business. Therein lies a major reason 
for its criminal potential, its success, and its appeal; 
criminal telemarketing lends itself easily to respectable 
constructions of organizational and individual activities. 
Both its illicit nature and individual culpability can be 
managed behind an organizational front and shared 
rhetorical scripts. 
During the interviews, most of the subjects continued 
to hide behind these scripts as they expressed awareness 
only of their particular positions and responsibilities. 
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The subjects denied personal responsib ility and asserted 
that any potential wrong-doing must be the fault of others 
in the organization. Generally, the owners stated that the 
managers were in charge of oversight while the sales agents 
claimed near-complete ignorance of the operat ion. The 
managers , primarily responsible for ensuring that the 
company made money, contended that the sales agents must 
have deviated from the scripts without their knowledge. 
Criminal Operations 
Figure 3 . 2 depicts the management and accountab ility 
structure of larger criminal telemarketing firms. The 
solid lines denote direct supervision while the broken 
lines indicate direct communication without strict 
accountability. The owners enlist the services of managers 
to run the organization and implement their criminal plans. 
The organizational design not only facilitates fraud for 
profit and at the same time s·erves to protect individuals 
against criminal implication. The accountability structure 
of their organizations is sufficiently diffuse to allow the 
various participants to deny personal respons ibility for 
wrong doing and deflect blame. 
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Figure 3 . 2 :  Fraudulent Organization Management and 
Accountability 
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Generally, the owners give full responsibility for the 
organ ization to the managers, providing them with a single 
controlling mandate: maximize prof it. While the owners 
secure lead lists and are involved in the development of 
scripts and " inspirational " devices, interviews and site 
visits reveal that they are less involved in the daily 
act ivities of the operation. Having hired someone to 
oversee the employees, the owners can lay claim that they 
are not personally responsible for the actions of 
individual workers. 
The managers ' primary responsibility is to train and 
motivate the sales agents. They accomplish this task by 
pressuring the sales agents, recognizing those that "sell, " 
and creating a culture of competition as discussed above. 
Although the managers are technically in charge of all of 
the sales agents, they give more latitude to closers and 
exercise virtually no control over reloaders and recovery 
agents. In fact, the managers promote agents that produce 
results and have little need for direction. The verifiers 
in criminal organizations also are not supervised by the 
managers; their role is to get the customers to deny on 
tape that any false promises were made by the sales agents. 
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While on the surface it appears that the managers and 
sales agents would be held strictly responsible for any 
wrong doing, thus shielding the owner, the structure 
permits the sales agents to deny accountability as well . 
The sales agents are provided with substantial discretion 
on how they decide_ to employ the scripts . They are 
encouraged by the manager to inj ect sales pitches with 
their own personal styles and pick up tips by watching 
other agents . The manager's endorsement of the sales 
agents ' "creativity, " however, is off the record. The 
managers defend that they simply cannot listen in on every 
call and thus, it is up to the agents not to cross the line 
between good salesmanship and deceit . 
For their part, the sales agents contend that they 
simply work from the scripts provided and suggest that if 
the company is produc ing the products they are pedaling, 
then there is no wrong doing . Meanwhile, closers deal with 
consumers that have already expressed an interest in the 
product or service and reloaders engage with repeat 
customers with whom they have developed a personal 
relationship . As a result, the closers and reloaders are 
less likely to have complaints as their clients . The 
repeat customers are even less likely to complain as 
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evidenced by their continued commitment to the company. 
Likewise, recovery agents receive few complaints as they 
set out to satisfy aggrieved customers and actually fulfill 
their promises, although still defrauding them . 
While a few individuals admitted guilt, most of the 
research subjects hid behind the organizational front and 
limited their knowledge and responsibility to their 
particular positions in the operation. The interviews of 
subjects working for XYZ Company referenced above exemplify 
how the scenario is played out within an organization. 
Interviews were conducted with a managing partner, silent 
partner, sales manager, closer, and two sales agents. From 
top to bottom, they all asserted that they were providing a 
viable service. The managing partner and sales manager 
defended the system and placed any blame for the alleged 
fraud on the sales agents. The silent partner also felt 
that fault would have to lie with the agents as he 
"believed" that the business itself was legitimate in 
concept. 
The sales agents and the closer, nicknamed " The 
Hammer, " defended the service as ardently as the managers 
and placed blame on the consumers. In other words, it was 
the fault of the "sellers" if they misinterpreted what the 
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service provided. The sales agents contended that if  there 
were problems with the business, it would have to be the 
responsibility of the owners and manager . In other words, 
they were doing nothing other than presenting the scripts. 
However, the agents maintained the legitimacy of the 
service and their practices suggesting that they were j ust 
doing what sales people do every day in society. It is 
interesting to note that the silent partner was convicted 
under the concept of willful blindness. Willful blindness 
is a legal concept that suggests that a person knowingly 
turns a blind eye to the wrong-doing of others under his or 
her control . 
In order to see the organizations in practice, I made 
visits to three legitimate telemarketing firms and two 
allegedly illegitimate firms . An acquaintance that had 
been in tel emarketing for 18 years a l lowed me to observe 
her company ' s  operation and set up on-site interviews for 
me with the owner and manager of two additional legitimate 
firms. I also had the opportunity to visit two 
telemarketing firms that authorities suspected were 
fraudulent and speak with a manager and some of  the 
employees. The owners of the two presumably criminal 
operations advertised in the local newspaper. I wanted to 
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see how legitimate telemarketers handled the potential for 
fraud and whether or not the fraudulent operations were 
transparent . 
The first business site was in a seedy area of town 
and was located near a strip club and sex shop . . The 
windows on the outside of the office were shaded with cheap 
material akin to that of inexpensive shading wrap that 
teenagers sometimes place on the windows of cars . The 
reception area was noticeably separated from the phone room 
itself . The receptionist summoned an assistant manager, a 
young female, to talk to me. I asked the manager if it 
would be all right to see the operation and she escorted me 
to the sales room. 
We sat down in her cubicle and she immediately began 
to explain the sales agent positions and pay structure. 
She stated that the agents "make $15 on the first sale of 
the week, $25 on the second, $50 on the third, $50 + $100 
bonus on the fourth, and then $50 for each sale 
thereafter. " She went on, '' [ G ]  ood salesmen make about a 
$1, 000 a week. There are 3 reloaders which make triple 
that, but someone has to die before you can move into one 
of those positions. " They also had an order verifier. The 
manager explained that it was a mail-out operation where 
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consumers receive a postcard from the company notifying 
them that they have won an award. Upon calling in, the 
consumers were told that they won one of our prizes, which 
included a car, a trip, an entertainment system, and a 
$ 1500 cash award. This allowed the sales agents to make a 
pitch for the products they were selling. 
In addition to the owner, the organization had 2 
managers, 1 secretary, and about 40 employees. The owner 
was usually on site from 7 am to 2 pm (in his private 
office) but was on one of his twice-daily runs to the post 
office during the time I visited. The products they were 
selling included magnetic business cards, key rings, and 
pens at a cost of $ 498.50 (per package of 100). Products 
were delivered and checks received within 72 hours via 
overnight mail. The manager stated, " [ D ] ress however you 
want. You never have to meet with the clients. The owner 
wil l meet with them if necessary." She looked at me and 
stated, " I  can see that you are a positive person. You 
would make a lot of sales." 
The cubicles were very small and had what appeared to 
be plywood make-shift walls covered . with a carpet-type 
material . The desks also were made of plywood propped up 
on the walls with slanted two-by-fours holding them in 
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place. Each cubicle had a phone and whatever items the 
sales agents placed within them. There was music playing 
and constant talk between the workers while those actively 
on the phone took orders from customers that had called in 
response to the postcard naming them as award winners. 
Some of the employees voluntarily approached me to 
talk about the job. One male agent with long hair and a 
beard told me how easy it was, "I took half a dozen orders 
in 15 minutes. " Another with glasses and a dirty shirt, 
smiled and nodded in agreement as he ate some pizza. A 
third male agent, who appeared unkempt, walked out of his 
cubicle and broadly declared, \\ [ M ] aking money. That's what 
I'm all about. " 
The agents appeared to have control over the hours 
they worked. For instance, an older male came out of his 
cubicle and announced that he decided that he was done for 
the day. "Gonna get a [ motorcycle ] ride in. " During the 
entire time, the sales agents listened intently for their 
phones to ring and somehow were able to determine when it 
was the distinctive ring of their particular telephones. 
Several of the female agents remained in their cubicles for 
the most part and did not engage in conversation, but 
livened up when the phone rang. 
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The manager proceeded to provide more information 
about the operation. She told me that the agents work from 
a script and there is a four-hour training session, 
" [ S ] omeone assists you on the phones during your first 
morning. " "And," she continued, "don ' t  worry, you ' ll learn 
all ot the rebuttals. Like if a guy says, ' I ' ll have to 
ask my wife. ' Well, would your wife be upset with you if 
you won $1,500 ?"  I asked her how they could afford to 
give away so many prizes and she explained that the trips 
are the most common prize and "the packages were purchased 
for $30 each as some promotion for the vacation industry. " 
The owner did not return during my visit so I left my cell 
phone number for him to contact me. He never did. 
At the second site, the employee in the reception area 
appeared a bit more guarded and although she talked to me 
about the operation, she did not allow me to enter the 
sales room. She spoke in terms of the positions available 
(sales agents) and stated that good agents often made over 
$1,000 a week. The operation consisted of marketing 
products for several different companies, which were not 
named. The employee simply referred to it as a customer 
service based enterprise. She emphasized the need for 
"good communication skills and the ability to deal with 
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rejection, yet maintain persistence. " The interview was 
cut short as the owner finally entered and suggested that 
he did not have time to meet with me. I provided him with 
my cell phone number so that he could reschedule at a time 
more convenient, but he never contacted me. 
Outside of the office, I had the opportunity to speak 
with some of the sales agents. One engaged me in 
conversation, asking where I was from. I told him that I 
was a graduate student from Tennessee. He went on to tell 
me that he was in college but dropped out and was thinking 
of returning, but just has not found the time or desire. 
He proceeded to tell me that he was presently working and 
"just partying for a while. . making some money, trying 
not to work too hard, you know. " I asked him how he liked 
working in telemarketing and he replied, " [N ] ot bad 
Don't gotta answer to anybody, and the money's good. " I 
then inquired if it was a pretty nice place to work. He 
responded, "Hell no, it's a shit-hole, man. " He stated 
that he comes outside just to get out of his cubicle for a 
while. I mentioned that it looked nice in the front and he 
went on, "Yeah, it's pretty fuckin' sweet, but we don't 
hang up front. That's for the big man. " 
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By th is time two others came out of the building and 
joined in the conversation. They started talking about 
work and one of them asked me if I was interested in 
getting a job .  I told him that I never really thought 
about working in telemarketing. The other agent then 
echoed the comments of the first agent, stating that the 
work is easy and the money is good . I asked, "What exactly 
is it that you do ? "  He replied, "You just call people up 
and tell them you have this really good fuckin ' deal, sell 
' em some shit, and they say ' okay ' and you get a 2 5  percent 
cut of the check. " When I asked what they were sell ing he 
replied , "A bunch of shit; pens, key chains, shit like 
that. " I inquired, "You guys make a lot of money ? "  The 
same agent responded, "Fuck yeah, last week I made 1, 500 
bucks . "  The first guy nodded his head and simply said, "We 
do all right. " At that point, they started talking about 
some "chick " that just started working there and whether or 
not she was "hot. " At that point, I decided to leave to 
get to my next appointment . 
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Legitimate Operations 
The management and accountability structure of legitimate 
telemarketing firms stood in stark contrast to that of the 
criminal operations. One of the five legitimate 
telemarketers I interviewed was the President/CEO of a 
large network of telemarketing firms. He provided me with 
a model of his entire organization; the section of the flow 
chart that applies to call centers is replicated in Figure 
3 . 3 . There are several other aspects of this operation 
that supply services and products, develop advertising, and 
take care of other corporate matters. 
When asked how he avoids fraud, the CEO replied, "I 
do not try to avoid fraud purposely, but rather I do not 
provide the incentives that would lead to fraud. " He 
contended that criminal telemarketers "are set up for 
fraud. . They use an outbound calling approach and 
hire anyone off the street interested in making money. " 
His company works on an inbound basis only where agents do 
not cold call consumers, but rather the company advertises 
and interested consumers call into the business. It is a 
consumer-based business that provides services and products 
such as hospitality packages and cell phones, using 
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catalogues and infomercials "to stimulate consumer 
interest. " He stated that it is important to avoid 
"miracle drugs" selling. In other words, his company does 
not sell "worthless products based on false promises. " He 
added, " [W ] e're not selling widgets here . "  
The CEO wants the operations to last, whereas "raucous 
firms with insincere personnel will only last 6 to 8 months 
and then break up before resurfacing under another name. " 
He believes the inbound approach provides a more consistent 
and stable environment, which will lead to longevity of the 
firm. He also purposely sets up call centers in small 
towns where there is an increased "quality of labor" due to 
the lack of other economic opportunity. 
The CEO asserted that to be successful, " [ M ] anagement 
needs to set up an incentive policy to get results but not 
to create temptation. " He continued, " [ T ] he more sales an 
agent makes, the more monitoring [s /he ]  receives. " When I 
asked him if the fact that his sites are somewhat remote 
creates an oversight problem, he contended that it does not 
"as long as [ they ] employ decent management and provide an 
appropriate base salary with little variable compensation. " 
The CEO also stressed the importance of non-material 
considerations. " [ T ] his is not done just to prevent fraud 
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but rather to develop lasting working relationships with 
the employees by balancing their lifestyles. " He noted 
that the company draws from a completely different employee 
base as "small town citizens are generally content with a 
base salary, benefits , and job stability. ll Although he 
asserted that he has never had any problems with deception 
by his employees, he admitted that there have been three 
cases of credit card fraud, which were immediately reported 
to the police. 
The sales agents are directly managed by coaches , mid­
level supervisors. Each coach is in charge of ten customer 
service representatives (sales agents). The agents make 
$7 . 25 an hour ($22,000 annually) and the coaches make a 
base salary of $9 an hour ($25,000 annually). The 
supervisors oversee the coaches and monitor the number of 
cal ls per number of agents and draw a somewhat higher 
salary. The sales agents are trained by an independent 
team of individuals, trainers who do not have a direct 
pecuniary interest in the outcomes of transactions. 
The call center managers are responsible for 
overseeing the entire local operation, which includes a 
human resources department and administrative and technical 
staff. The call centers fall under the authority of the 
74 
vice president of the business unit and the site managers 
report directly to that office. Additionally, corporate 
executives visit the call centers often for the purpose of 
stimulating interest, motivating the employees, and 
auditing the center for quality. In the end, there is no 
uncertainty with respect to the responsibility of 
individual actors. There are several layers of oversight 
as well as open communication at all levels of the 
operation. 
When I asked the CEO about regulations, he stated that 
"regulatory agencies do not have much of a presence . At 
least telemarketers are not aware of it. . We just do 
what makes sense. " He suggests that the regulations might 
be too stringent and indicated that he would be curious to 
see if his company was in compliance if he had the time. 
The CEO also stated that he is astonished about how much 
fraudsters know about regulations as evidenced by the fact 
that they hire attorneys. " They have to be riding the 
fence. " He suspects that criminal telemarketers hire 
attorneys at the outset in order to have the attorneys 
suggest that they appeared legitimate should they get 
caught. 
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As noted above, I visited the operations of three 
legitimate telemarketing firms. The first site was in a 
large corporate business center. The operation consisted 
of outbound phone sales, marketing a wide variety of 
products on behalf of business clients. The managers ran 
the entire operation and reported to regional executives. 
The extensive phone room was spacious and contained 
approximately 50 semi-private cubicles. The employees ' 
individual work areas were nicely furnished and 
personalized and provided sufficient privacy to conduct 
business. The operation did not have "closers " but did 
have two assistant managers and five verifiers on site at 
all times. While the assistant managers spent most of 
their time on the floor with the sales agents, the 
verifiers continually monitored sales transactions from 
their o f f ices. 
The managers and other supervisory staff had glass 
offices that surrounded the sales floor and I noticed 
several sales agents walk into and out of these offices. 
There appeared to be open communication between sales 
agents and the supervisors. The agents were nicely dressed 
and had access to a semi-lavish lounge to socialize during 
breaks. Although I did not have the opportunity to 
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interview the manager at length, she related an approach 
similar to that of the CEO cited above, stating that there 
were multiple tiers of supervision and accountability. 
The second site visit was to a company that conducts 
business with other businesses with total transactions per 
company ranging from $15, 000 to $10, 000, 000 annually. It 
was located in a business development that was not as large 
as the corporate center of the first site. The owner 
stated that he started selling on his own while a student 
in college and eventually had too much business to handle 
alone. As a result, he asked friends if they wanted to . 
help out and then built up the business over the next six 
years. By the age 31, his company was making $1, 4000, 000 
in profits annually. While it was not as large, nor as 
elaborate as the large firm, the owners "take care of [ our ] 
employees by providing them with stability, benefits, and 
comfort." The cubicles were filled with employees ' 
personal items , which according to the owner, "suggests 
that they plan to stay." 
The agents are paid to find other businesses to 
purchase liquidator assets. That is, they generate leads 
and attempt. to sell the assets of smaller businesses to 
larger ones. The product is a lead report and its value is 
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based upon whether or · not the agents can make a viable 
connection between liquidating business and potential 
purchasers . The owner contended that agents need to be 
well aware of all aspects of the businesses in order to 
make a sale. All calls are tape-recorded and clients may 
listen to the tapes should they have any questions about 
the sales transaction. About half of the sales agents have 
baccalaureate degrees. The owners search for employees 
with "inquisitive minds and good communication skills. " 
The organization is hierarchical, consisting of 
owners, directors, managers, senior associates, and 
associates. There are approximately 33 employees in the 
sales department with 9 support staff, providing an 
approximate 1 to 3 support to sales ratio. The owner 
asserted that the large support to sales ratio creates more 
effective communication because it helps keep the 
associates abreast of the necessary information. According 
to the owner, " [ F ] raudsters generally provide no support 
because they don't market a real product and don't want to 
deliver anything of value. " 
The owner suggested that fraudsters "try to convince 
victims to buy when they don't need the products, " whereas 
the associates in " [his ] company are more like detectives 
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trying to figure out who needs the products . "  In other 
words , his agents are not sellers , but rather reporters of 
the facts . He asserted that " if they [fraudsters ] really 
had a viable product, then they would have more support and 
commun ication . "  The owner believes that the high ratio of 
support staff to associates in his firm "provides quality 
assurance , helps with supervision of the operation , and 
. increases retention of employees. " 
Associates make from $26, 000 to $32, 000 as well as 
bonuses and benef its . The informant promises his employees 
"good working conditions rather than money only . " He 
contends that this nets a staff with "more commitment to 
the company and less potential for fraud . "  The owner 
continued , " [ I ] t ' s necessary to create an honest culture 
and use screening as a constraint against potent ial fraud . 
Providing money as the only incentive is in itself an 
incentive to commit fraud . "  He stated that h is company has 
reta ined its cl ient base as wel l  as 9 5 %  of the employees 
over the years . When I asked him if he adheres to 
regulations , the owner admitted he was not wel l informed 
about them , but suggested that "regulations can be too 
strict at times such as the fact that you need the consent 
of two parties to record calls . "  
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The third site visit was to a relatively small 
telemarketing firm that was located in a relatively remote 
area still in the process of development for use by other 
businesses. The office was very plush with an attractive 
lounge that the employees used both for business meetings 
and daily socializing. The top section of the employees ' 
cubicles were made of glass on one side purportedly to "aid 
in the flow of communication . "  
The main product is documentary videos that are 
educational about increasing production in the workplace . 
The videos are based on the fish philosophy, which is the 
brainchild of a fish company in the Northwest that 
emphasizes good working conditions and rapport with 
customers. The workplace is very comfortable and sociable, 
reflecting the philosophy of the products the agents sell. 
The company made approximately $15 mill ion in 2000 after an 
increase of about 50% annually during the prior three 
years. There are 40 people in the company and only 11 
sales people. The manager stated that they are very 
selective about who they choose to interview for positions 
with the company and only 5 to 7 interviews are conducted 
every three months . 
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According to the manager, sales agents make upwards to 
%50, 000 and also receive benef its, job stability, and good 
working conditions. 
It would be easy for employees to make other choices 
and make more money, but they won ' t  because they enjoy 
the quality of life that we provide them. The goal is 
to up-sel l, but they [the agents ] are not selling 
something that they don ' t  beiieve in. I would have to 
know it has value . . . .  It is important to maintain 
who they are as a person [of integrity ] when engaged 
with clients. 
This last comment echoed that of another legit imate 
telemarketer I interviewed. He claimed that he "did not 
like who [he ]  became when he was a police off icer for 8 
years, but did like who he was as a telemarketer because he 
believed in what he was doing. " 
When I asked the manager if maintaining this type of 
organ izational culture would slow prof its, she responded, 
Our sales are based on in tegri ty sel l ing versus frauds 
who are all about money . . . .  We have even continued 
to experience an increase in prof it after 9 -11 
because we emphasize quality of life rather than 
money . . . .  We also put money back into the company 
and employee benefits rather than spend it on drugs 
and cars like them [frauds ] .  
The manager went on to suggest that integrity is an 
aberration in sales but that "9-11 [terrorist attacks ] has 
consumers rethinking the process. " She also stated that 
the company was adverse to the label sales. 
are not sales agents but rather idea agen ts. " 
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" Our agents 
The manager as serted that the various division s in the 
company are "fully integrated and in constant communication 
so that each person is fully aware of the others '  
responsibilities. " When I asked about the importance of 
regulatory agencies to this field , she replied , " I  am not 
very aware of any regulatory agencie s. They are not really 
present. " She stated that she does not feel the need to 
educate organizational employees about regulation s because 
"we believe we are following whatever regulation s may exist 
and we ' re doing okay . .  [ S ] o  it ' s  better to gain 
forgiveness  than permission. " However , she admitted that 
they would be more reactionary if they were audited. 
Contextual Comparison 
Criminal telemarketers do not develop models of their 
operation s for external review. In order to illuminate 
more fully the management and accountability structure of 
crim inal telemarketing firms , it is  helpful to draw a 
comparison between legitimate and illegitimate 
organizations [Figure 3 . 4 ] .  As noted in Chapter 1 ,  changes 
in the structure of economic and social relation ships 
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Figure 3 . 4 :  Comparison of Organizational Contexts 
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Like their legitimate counterparts, telemarketers organize 
their enterprises for profit maximization and are subj ect 
to governmental regulation. 
Both legitimate businesses and criminal telemarketing 
firms have organizational drivers or goals and obj ectives 
that act as mechanisms, which shape the design of their 
respective organizations . These goals necessitate the 
development of an organizational culture - the totality of 
formal and informal practices that guide the actions of 
employees - designed to fulfill the firms' obj ectives. 
Ultimately, the success of the enterprise depends upon the 
performance of individual actors and requires an 
appropriate incentive structure - individual drivers. 
There is a significant difference from the outset : 
one entrepreneur desires to conduct a legal business while 
the other desires to shield his criminal actions from 
detection. Legitimate organizations not only strive for 
profit and growth, but also desire to develop a reputation 
as a leader in their chosen fields and garner the respect 
of those with whom they do business and the community at 
large. They are likely to comply with regulations, if 
aware of them and not cost prohibitive, and plan to 
maintain the business for the long term. Criminal 
8 4  
telemarketing firms , on the other hand { are in brazen 
pursuit of profit and growth is only important if it is 
necessary to increase profits. 
Although criminal organizations are not respectable , 
they desire the appearance of respectability in order to 
better persuade potential customers and perhaps to enhance 
their statuses as successful businessmen. Likewise , 
criminal telemarketers seek to avoid regulatory 
constraints , although they comply to the extent that it is 
necessary for a potential legal defense. While the owners 
would like to carry on their criminal enterprise until 
their greed is satiated , they are content with making as 
much money as possible in the present before moving on. 
As a result of the difference in the organizational 
drivers of legitimate and illegitimate firms , especially in 
light of criminal telemarketers ' additional goal of 
avoiding criminal responsibility , their respective 
organizational cultures are easily distinguishable. 
Legitimate firms have a strict authority structure and thus 
its members are held accountable according to their 
position in the established hierarchy. The discretion that 
employees may exercise is limited by their specified roles , 
which are often detailed in writing. The owners and 
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managers encourage employees to take pride in working for 
the organization and provide non-material as well as 
material benefits, such as nice working conditions and 
health insurance. 
By contrast, criminal telemarketing firms have a loose 
authority structure where the liability of each employee is 
set according to his or her position. No one is held 
strictly responsible for others allowing the participants 
to deny accountability for others' actions despite the fact 
that they are acting in furtherance of organizational 
objectives. Wide discretion is purposely awarded to 
members in the operation so that they can pursue the single 
goal of increasing profit. There is no pride in working 
for the firm but rather individual achievement is 
acknowledged, often resulting in competition between the 
agents within the organi zation. Final ly, a person ' s  
success is determined by how much money s /he makes and 
there are no non -material incentives . 
As a result of the difference in organizational 
cultures established by the two types of firms, the 
interests of the individual workers vary substantially . 
Employees in legitimate operations desire job security, 
financial stability, health benefits and other perks (e. g. , 
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vacation and retirement), and quality working conditions. 
They also take pride in their performance on behalf of the 
company with the intent of being recognized and moving up 
in the organization. By contrast, fraudulent telemarketers 
are primarily interested in financial gain, potential for 
moving into more lucrative positions, and limited personal 
restrictions. They do not work on behalf of the firm but 
instead compete against co-workers for individual 
recognition. In fact, many of the owners interviewed went 
into competition with their previous employers. 
While criminal telemarketers set up operations to 
mirror legitimate businesses, the inner workings of the 
fraudulent organizations differ significantly in their 
management and accountability structures. Their 
similarities begin and end with the goal of making a 
profit. The fraudsters are organized with the dual goals 
of maximizing profit and defending themselves against 
criminal responsibility. The specialized roles in criminal 
organizations, including management, are developed for the 
sole purpose of making money rather than supervision and 
accountability. The interconnectedness of its constituents 
is purposely diffuse to promote the use of each 
individual's criminal ingenuity toward enhancing profits 
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and, at the same time, guarding against individual 
responsibility. 
It is apparent that criminal telemarketers design 
their organizations to facilitate large-scale fraud . 
However, the actual fraud committed upon the public is 
carried out via person-to-person interaction . As the next 
chapter reveals, there is more to fraud than " puf fery" and 
" pushing the envelope" in sales transactions. 
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Chapter 4 
THE INTERACTION PROCESS 
Although a product of its organizational design, the crux 
of telemarketing fraud occurs at the interpersonal level. 
Thus, it is important to analyze the interaction process 
between the offenders and victims from a social­
psychological perspective. The extant literature on script 
theory informs as to the underlying process upon which 
people interact in social situations. Generally, script 
theory proposes that individuals act and react in social 
situations within the context of sets of expectations based 
on a learned way of doing things over time. Criminal 
telemarketers operate within the general framework of 
common societal scripts and then manipulate the process in 
order to perpetrate fraud. 
By creating a definition of the situation based on 
deceit, fraudsters capitalize on the inherent ambiguity in 
stranger-to-stranger interactions by casting the victim in 
a desired identity. As a result, the "relationships" 
discussed in this section are all based on deception 
although terms similar to sincere relationships are 
utilized. The interview data, victim depositions, and 
89 
trial transcripts reveal how offenders and victims interact 
and how they perceive one another during sales 
transact ions. 
Social Psychology of Interaction 
In examining the negotiated order between two or more 
individuals in interaction , Thomas (1928) developed the 
construct of "the definition of the situation. " He 
contends that subjective definitions of situations must 
enter into any account of human behavior because ident ical 
situations do not always lead to the same behavior (Thomas , 
192 8 )  In other words , situations do not merely exist in 
static form , but rather are defined by the indiv iduals in 
the interaction process. Consequently , variation in the 
outcomes of situations results from indiv idual variation in 
the definitions situations and subsequent adjustive 
efforts , which ult imately leads to decisions on act ion 
(Stryker , 1980) . 
Script theorists suggest that the human mind is 
analogous to a computer that processes a great deal of 
social information in the most efficient manner possible 
(Abelson 19 76 , 1981). Because individuals are continually 
inundated with social information , they are selective in 
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what is noticed, remembered, or inferred from a variety of 
situations (Backman, 1985 ; Markus, 197 7). This leads to 
the development of cognitive structures and scripts that 
provide frameworks for the interpretation of situations or 
events that are based on general knowledge of human action 
and knowledge of specific events (Abelson, 1981). 
Cognitive scripts are based on the variety of 
experiences of an individual, which are learned as 
vignettes that are integral to efficient decision -making 
(Abelson, 197 6). Individuals draw on cognitive scripts to 
interpret social situations by selecting a script · 
representative of the present situation and adopting a 
particular role from the script that is consistent with his 
or her expectations of situational outcomes . Script 
selection and role taking provides individuals with 
cognitive frameworks for behavioral decision-making, while 
requiring less cognitive effort than original framing for 
each situation ( Abelson, 197 6). 
Goffman (1959) suggests that people assign one another 
categorical identities, based on past experience, one 
another ' s  appearance and conduct, and the setting where 
they interact . Couch (1989) refers to these 
categorizations as functi onal i denti ti es or typi fi ed 
91 
actions that suggest what will be expected of each per�on 
and what they can expect from one another during the 
interaction. To the extent that those expectations are 
fulfilled, people engage in recurrent patterns of 
interaction and construct lasting forms of social 
relationships . The assignment of categorical identities 
serves to activate social relationships, however activation 
is not automatic, nor inevitable. 
Goffman (1959 ) likens the actions of individuals to 
performances in a drama . He contends that individuals seek 
information about others during interaction in order to 
better define and negotiate situations . Pertinent 
information is based on obj ective characteristics such as 
indicators of status and subj ective characteristics that 
are verbally communicated . This enables the individual to 
better form his  or her perception of the interac tion and to 
anticipate responses in the situation . The interpretation 
of information is based on prior experiences with similar 
individuals and the consistency or inconsistency of the 
present information with those prior experiences (Goffman, 
1959 ) 
Couch (1989 ) suggests that individuals ' 
identifications of one another may not correspond and 
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consequently the results may lead to confusion and 
conflict. Even when the identifications do correspond, 
confusion and conflict can result from different 
perceptions of the form of the relationship under the 
attending circumstances. Also, individuals may alter their 
identities and thus the form of the relationship. As a 
result, social relationships are as flexible and fragile as 
the interactions that perpetuate them (Cahill, 1995). 
Some scripts may be used to meet the needs of an 
individual, rather than to interpret or negotiate the 
situation generally (Schank and Abelson, 197 7). In this 
instance, the individual may act to invoke scripts that are 
personalized, less stylized and may lead to difficulties in 
interpretation for others in the interaction (Schank and 
Abelson, 197 7 ; Ross and Nisbet, 1991). The discontinuity 
between accepted scripts may be used as techniques of 
manipulation to lure individuals into an interaction that 
they do not recognize as deceptive (Schank and Abelson, 
197 7). Such use is deceptive because participants in 
situations where personal scripts are used often are not 
aware of their role in the scripted situation (Abelson, 
1981). While the personal scripts have a similar structure 
to the general situat ional scripts, they are based solely 
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on the experiences of the individual who typically has used 
these techniques to meet similar past needs (Schank and 
Abelson , 1977)  . 
Impression management is one of the key elements for 
success in sales. During the interaction , the salespersons 
must convey confidence in the definition of the situation 
they present in order to facilitate the perception of 
reality in others (Goffman, 1959 ) .  This confidence must be 
presented in the front stage region of the interaction , 
which necessitates the use of props (e.g., expensive 
clothing, briefcases , and mannerisms ) .  Thus, the 
presenters need engage in high levels of impression 
management based on cultural stereotypes (Goffman, 1959: 
2 8 )  
The management of doubt is another important dynamic 
in many social settings, especially sales. Wiley ( 19 9 8 ) 
contends that salespersons actively attempt to influence 
customers into suspending their doubt about their need for 
some product in order to make a sale . In other words, the 
salesperson attempts to reduce the suspicions held by the 
customer and draw him into a commodity drama. As a result , 
the customer is faced with the need to express some type of 
identity with respect to the purchase. In essence , how he 
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proceeds becomes a self-defining moment. In an attempt to 
get the customers to put off their doubt about the 
purchase, the salespersons point out the potential rewards, 
which must include appeals to some need of the consumer 
(Wiley, 1998) . 
Telemarketing Sales 
One of the interview subjects stated that when he was 
initially recruited, he read the script and asked, " [ H ] ow 
do you tell people this story and get them to buy over the 
phone when you have never met them?" Advancement in 
technology, specifically telecommunications, not only 
permits telemarketers to reach countless potential 
consumers, but also facilitates manipulation in the 
interaction process. Communicating with someone over the 
telephone helps to remove certain barriers to making a 
connection that otherwise would prove problematic in 
person. For example, telemarketers need not present an 
impressive personal appearance or business setting. 
Most important, contact via telephone allows a 
salesperson to create an identity of his or her choosing, 
which facilitates control of the communication between the 
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part ies. While it takes more time and effort to develop a 
strong rapport over the phone, there is also the benef it of 
the fact that other stimuli, which may serve to distract 
the actors, are blocked out. This allows the participants 
to have more intimate communication and thus ult imately 
develop a stronger bond. 
Compliance Techniques 
The primary goal of salespersons is to gain the 
compl i ance of consumers. Compliance consists of yielding 
to direct, explicit appeals meant to produce certain 
behavior or agreement with a part icular point of view. 
Whereas the pressures on a person to conform are generally 
implicit and not in the form of direct requests or demands, 
compliance pressures are more overt ( Feldman, 2001 ) .  
According to Feldman, there are four major methods of 
facilitating compliance in social interaction. 
In the foo t-in- the-door techni que, a person is f irst 
asked to agree to a small request, but later is asked to 
comply with a more important one. If the person agrees to 
the first request , compliance with the later, larger 
request is considerably more likely {see Freedman and 
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Fraser, 19 6 6). This method is often successful due to the 
commitment of the person of whom the request is made, that 
person's self-redefinition, or because the requests make 
norms of conduct relevant (Renno, Cialdini, and Kallgren, 
1993). Additionally, if agreement to the requests permits 
the attainment of significant personal goals, compliance is 
more likely (Gorassini and Olson, 1995). 
The door-in-the-face technique is a procedure in which 
a large request to which refusal is expected, is followed 
by a smaller one. The belief is that the initial, large 
request makes people more receptive to the subsequent 
smaller request (see Dillard, 199 1). This strategy is 
often effective due to the exchange of reciprocal 
concessions between the person making the request and his 
or her target, self-presentational factors (Pendleton and 
Batson, 1979), or the existence of perceptual contrast. 
The contrast occurs due to the fact that initial exposure 
to a very powerful stimulus, causes a subsequent stimulus 
to appear less potent than it would if presented by itself 
(see Shanab and O'Neill, 1979 ; Cantrill and Seibold, 198 6). 
In the process of low-balling, an initial agreement is 
reached, but then the seller reveals additional costs. 
This usually works because people tend to emphasize the 
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advantages of the deal in order to justify their initial 
decision (see Cialdini, 1988) or because a sense of 
personal commitment to the salesperson may act to persuade 
the person to accept the deal (Burger and Petty, 1981) . 
The that ' s-not-all technique occurs when a customer is 
offered a deal at an initial inflated price, and just after 
making the offer, the salesperson offers an incentive, 
discount, or bonus to clinch the deal (see Burger, 1986; 
Pollock et al. , 1998). As a result, the buyer feels that 
s/he is coming out ahead in the transaction . 
Fraudulent Transactions 
As social actors, consumers are quite familiar with 
the foregoing techniques. While upon realization they may 
dislike that the techniques have been successfully served 
to gain their compliance, the consumers can at least place 
them in their repertoire of cognitive scripts. This allows 
them to call upon these experiences during similar social 
situations in the future. Unfortunately for consumers, 
fraudulent telemarketers have developed their own unique 
methods ·of gaining compliance, and as a result these 
cognitive scripts are of little assistance. 
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Instead of merely employing sales techniques at the 
product level, criminal telemarketers begin by manipulating 
the societal scripts at the very foundation of social 
interaction. In doing so, criminal telemarketers embrace 
certain roles for themselves and cast the victims into 
coinciding counter-roles, thereby attributing a desired 
identity to the victims [Figure 4 . 1 ] . Through this act of 
al tercas ting the victim, the fraudsters successfully 
manipulate the script, which facilitates a transaction 
ultimately based on fraud and deceit (see Weinstein and 
Deutschberger, 1963). 
Fraudulent telemarketers initially utilize general 
societal norms and values to lay the foundation for a 
"relationship" with their victims . Recall that throughout 
this chapter references made to " relationships " and " bonds" 
between the fraudsters and victims are based on deception 
and thus are not to be interpreted in the true sense of the 
words used to describe them. As the social relationship 
advances, the newly created bond requires an advanced set 
of norms, which allows the fraudsters to dictate the 
reciprocity of the consumers. For example, norms of 
politeness will cause a victim to stay on the phone and are 




( salient ) 
Figure 4 . 1 :  The Soc ial Psychology of Fraud 
Criminal telemarketers attempt to define and redefine 
the situation in order to maintain communication with the 
victim as the victim attempts to ascertain the potential 
value of participating in the transaction . Herein lies the 
poignancy of the motto articulated in Doocy's ( 200 1) study, 
" Each No gets me closer to the Yes I want. " What the 
author of the phrase means is that as long as s/he keeps 
the victim on the phone, s/he can redefine the situation 
until s/he forges the relationship. In order words, s/he 
continually adjusts the definition of the situation to the 
point that the victim perceives its reality, thus adopting 
a desired identity and yielding compliance .  
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Before they even pick up the phone, however, cr iminal 
telemarketers need to select their targets. They acquire 
lead l ists that contain names of consumers that have 
expressed an interest in part icipating in promot ions of one 
kind or another in the past. During the init ial stage of 
the interact ion, fraudsters rely upon norms, such as 
pol iteness, which prompt the victims to hear them out. 
They act qu ickly in def ining the situat ion by using their 
best professional voice and a name, often a pseudonym, that 
sounds soph ist icated. In furtherance of this impress ion 
management, they identify themselves as representat ives of 
a reputable-sound ing organization, which gives the 
appearance of legitimacy. At times, criminal telemarketers 
will go a step further and try to dist inguish themselves 
from classic telemarketers, usually by making a negative 
reference to the latter. 
Additionally, fraudulent telemarketers often will 
distance themselves from the company for which they work by 
providing " inside information" to the vict im. For example, 
a fraudster will say someth ing to the effect of, "According 
to company rules, I ' m not supposed to tell you this, but I 
like you. " This creates the impression that the 
telemarketer is siding with the victim against his or her 
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own company, which tends to form an al liance between the 
fraudster and the victim . As a result, a greater bond is 
formed between the participants and the commitment to 
shared norms and values is enhanced . 
At some point, the fraudsters take on the role of 
beneficent actors, tel ling the victims that they are the 
lucky recipients of a remarkable deal. This is effective 
in altercasting the victims, placing them in the role of 
beneficial recipients. Consequently, the victims 
internalize the coinciding norms and continue in the 
interaction. More important, providing gifts to the 
victims creates the impression that they owe the 
telemarketers a debt. 
In furtherance of their criminal pursuits, fraudsters 
often wil l attribute some quality to the victim in order to 
properly cast him or her into a desired identity. For 
instance, relying on the fact that people are socialized to 
take advantage of a good deal, a fraudster may say, " [N ] ow, 
you ' re an intel ligent person. You would know a good deal 
when you see one, right? Of course you would. " Consumers 
pursuing high self-concept are inclined to embrace such a 
characterization. In the end, creating a sense of urgency 
is the fraudulent telemarketers most potent tool. The use 
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of the telephone helps to ensure urgency as a decision must 
be made before the conversation concludes. There is no 
time to reflect. Otherwise, the victims would have time to 
gain relevant information that would allow them to reassess 
the script and ultimately the transaction. 
Once a fraudster is successful in altercasting the 
consumer, creating a sense of debt, and enhancing the 
commitment to norms of interaction, s/he may further 
develop commonalities with the victim. This will allow the 
fraudster to form a lasting relationship and make similar 
contacts with the victim in the future. In other words, 
s/he can call upon the victim and present additional 
propositions from time to time in the future . This will be 
perceived as loyalty to the victim resulting from their 
new�y created friendship. Reloaders, for instance, often 
will call victims just to chat without talking about any 
offers. This practice allows the fraudsters to further 
gain the confidence of the consumers, plac ing them in line 
for repeat victimization. Criminal telemarketers are most 
successful with elderly victims who are isolated and 
possibly have diminished intellectual acumen, which 




One of the subjects who was on parole agreed to assist me 
at a presentation to local law enforcement and senior 
citizen agencies on telemarketing fraud. I had him enter 
the room before the audience and stay behind a screen so 
that he could make a pi tch to one of the participants. We 
used telephones as props to make it more realistic, yet 
both actors spoke out loud so that all in attendance could 
listen. While the purpose of the exercise was to have the 
seminar participants assess the caller's character, the 
pitch he gave exemplifies the techniques used by fraudulent 
telemarketers. The pitch is paraphrased here. I have 
placed comments in brackets to point out various aspects of 
the technique . The seminar attendee's responses are 
italicized. 
Good afternoon, Mrs. Smith [ personalized] ,  I am 
Richard Johnson [ respectable] with National 
Distribution Enterprises [ legitimacy] .  How are you 
today? Okay. Good, well your day is about to get 
better. Now hold on to your seat because what I have 
to tell you is going to make you smile so wide that 
you'll be able to eat a banana sideways. You've 
probably heard about those telemarketing firms that 
got in trouble for not giving away prizes. Well, 
we've been commissioned to give away those awards 
[ beneficent actor ] and you've been selected to win one 
of these valuable prizes [ beneficiary - debt ] . 
And last but not least $10,000. Now let me ask you, 
if you drew a bad straw and won the last prize on the 
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list - the $10, 000 - would you be upset with that? 
No. Of  course not, what intelligent person would 
[ reinforce identity] ?  Now, Myrtle, may I call you 
Myrtle [ relationship advances - enhanced norms ] ? Yes , 
sure. Myrtle, I like you and I hope you don't end up 
with just the $10, 000 [ alliance - enhanced loyalty ] ,  
but let's see what would happen if you did. And all 
you need to do in order to receive your award is to 
send $5, 000 for which you will receive a complete set 
of professionally crafted personalized items [ the 
catch ] � By the way Myrtle, a portion of the proceeds 
of these items will be contributed to programs for 
inner-city children in your name [ appeal to 
humanitarianism ] .  Now, let's, well why don't you do 
the math? I want you to write this down. Have you 
got a pen? Yes . Write down $10, 000 - got that? 
Okay. Now write underneath that $5, 000. Now subtract 
what you would send for this worthy cause from the 
$10, 000 award. What does that leave you with? 
$5 , 0 00. Not bad, huh? Now, all we ask in return is 
that you allow us to take a picture of you with the 
$10, 000 check. 
Notice that very little time is spent talking about 
the sale itself. From an obj ective standpoint it is 
difficult to imagine that these pitches work. Of course, 
the victim must trust that the caller is going to send the 
award. There is a certain amount of risk decision-making 
that the victim engages in, but the sense of urgency does 
not give him or her the time to properly analyze the 
situation. Naturally, there are variations not only in the 
scheme, but also in the responses of the victims. That is 
why sales agents are often provided with a list of 
rebuttals. They are encouraged to memorize the rebuttals 
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so they use them instinctively. By do ing so, they are 
constantly able to adjust and redefine the situation. 
While fraudulent telemarketers may not understand the 
soc ial-psychological underpinnings of their practice, they 
do know that the techni ques work. The success of criminal 
telemarketers depends upon the individual skills of the 
sales personnel to manipulate soc ietal scripts in order to 
define and redefine the situation. As an aside, the 
educated audience stated that the telemarketer behind the 
screen was a tall, good-looking, well-dressed, educated man 
in his forties. He was none of these. In fact, he was not 
even well-spoken when responding to questions from the 
seminar parti cipants. To protect the subject, I stated 
that he was not a criminal telemarketer but rather an 
acquaintance who was familiar with their practi ces. 
The Bargain 
The products criminal telemarketers sell are l imited 
only by the human imagination. They could include magnets 
with company logos, fad bumper stickers, septi c  tank 
deodorant, · or widgets. It really does not matter. What 
they are really selling are the premiums. Premiums are 
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prizes that the customer may be awarded if s/he agrees to 
purchase a host of "Say No to Drugs" bumper stickers or 
whatever product the caller is pedaling. The customers are 
told that they will be awarded a valuable prize, whose 
value turns out to have been grossly overestimated, such as 
a boom box described as a home entertainment center. 
Consequently, the customers are really bargaining for 
the awards. In essence, they are somewhat complicit as 
they are trying to get something of greater value than the 
money they spend. The consumers are playing the odds but 
the odds are deceiving. Often, the booby prize is listed 
before a more tangible prize that is announced as "last but 
not least, " such as the $10, 000 in the above example. It 
is not until the package arrives at their home and that 
they realize that they've been taken, yet often the victims 
fall for another pitch later on down the line. Some of the 
telemarketing firms hit the victims up for another purchase 
before sending the awards and often do not send anything 
until the customer calls in to complain. One victim 
recounted her experience when she stated, 
[ H ] e called me just about every day during the past 
year. We just talked about things we were both 
interested in most of the time. Once in a while he 
told me that I needed to send more money and that's 
why the prize hadn't arrived yet . 
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The victim was an 80 -year-old invalid who was taken for 
nearly $50,000 and never received anything of real value . 
Obviously, the relationships that criminal 
telemarketers develop with their victims are not sincere, 
nor are they usually long-lasting . Most sales agents are 
primarily interested in completing the present fraudulent 
transaction and getting their cut of the check. While they 
often pursue consumers who have been duped in the past by 
other companies, it is the victim who sends out signals 
about his or her willingness to engage in future 
transactions . This stands in stark contrast to family 
businesses that operate on the premise of developing 
lasting relationships with their customers and retailers 
that develop working relationships that are akin to 
acquaintanceships . In this context, telemarketers may be 
described as players looking for a one-night stand. 
Reloaders are the most effective players as they are known 
for their ability to make a "booty call" to the same 
victim (s). 
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Subj ects' Perspectives 
The ability to manipulate customers was one of the primary 
rewards that the fraudulent telemarketers suggested kept 
them attracted to telemarketing. 
It was the money, but it was [also ] the ability to 
control people, to be able to say over the phone, 
"John, go pick up your pen and write this down." And 
you write it down ! · You do exactly like a robot - ­
they would do exactly what they were told to do. And 
they would do it pleasingly, they would do it without 
hesitation, because, again, they had enough confidence 
and faith in you to believe that you were gonna do the 
right thing about it. 
Most of the interview subj ects took similar delight and 
pride in their ability to control their victims. They were 
extremely confident in their ability to make the sale. 
Several commented that they were "the best." While 
questioning one of the interview subj ects about any 
dislikes of the business, I suggested that daily rej ection 
might be one. She stated that she does not deal with 
rej ection on a daily basis. " People do not rej ect my 
sales. I don ' t  let them. " Another referred to himself as 
a "verbal assassin." 
While fraudulent telemarketers all have their own 
unique talents and beliefs as to what makes them good at 
sales, there is a consensus that good sales require the 
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ability to " push the envelope " between creative 
representation and blatant misrepresentation. This was 
referred to as the gray line and puffery. The subjects are 
under the impression that it is okay to be creative as long 
as they do not state a blatant lie . For example, interview 
subjects that worked for the XYZ Company referenced 
earlier, contended that suggesting they "have buyers 
interested in property just like that of the seller" is 
different than saying that they " have a buyer for the 
seller ' s  property. " The subjects also defended the use of 
urgency - interested sellers must call within 72 hours - as 
simply "good sales practice. " 
Several agents suggested that it was their job "to 
convince the consumer of what [ s/he ]  needed. " One of the 
subjects suggested, however, that there is a difference 
between dealing with businessmen versus housewives . "For 
businessmen, I merely present their options and let them 
make a decision. They are holding all the cards. " Whereas 
with housewives, he stated that it is his " job to convince 
them. " The subject was unable to articulate the difference 
in profile, but alluded to a perceived difference in 
intelligence, which might reflect gender biases. 
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The subj ects also contend that creating the impression 
that customers are getting a great deal for relatively 
little in return is simply good sales practice. One of the 
subj ects put it this way: " [ T ] he key is to have the 
customer step over the line without actually having to say 
the dirty words." During subsequent interviews, I posed 
the question as a moral issue and most of the subj ects 
reflected only briefly before concluding that it is "the 
way of business" in our culture. 
In addition, and in defense of their actions, the 
fraudsters fault the victims for blindly participating in 
the transactions. 
If these people can't read, so be it. Screw them, you 
know. It [ doesn't say] everybody 's  gonna get the 
diamond and sapphire tennis bracelet. They're dumb 
enough not to read, dumb enough to send me the money, 
I really don't care, you know. I'm doing what I have 
to do to stay out of j ail. They're doing what they 
have to do to fix their fix. They're promo j unkies, 
and we're gonna find them and get them, and we're 
gonna keep getting them. And they're gonna keep 
buying. And, you know what I used to say, "they're 
gonna blow their money in Vegas, they're gonna spend 
it somewhere. I want to be the one to get it. 
The fact that they could so easily distance themselves from 
the victims is perplexing, even if it is over the 
telephone. Although a few subj ects expressed remorse over 
taking the money of their victims, they suggested that they 
experienced remorse only they got caught and had time to 
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reflect. All but one of the few were no longer 
incarcerated and the other subject was about to be paroled . 
I suspect that it was partially the result of the fact that 
the subjects needed to express some modicum of remorse in 
order to appease their probation officers . 
An offhand comment by the subject who assisted me with 
the seminar perhaps provided the most enlightening insight 
on the issue of how they perceive their victims. I housed 
him the night before the seminar, and he insisted that I 
meet him at a strip club . Sometime before 3 A . M . ,  I asked 
him why so many of criminal telemarketers frequented strip 
clubs and dated strippers . The subject replied, " [ B ] ecause 
we're just alike . . We're all about the money . ll  I 
asked him to elaborate and he stated, ,"We sell a dream . ll 
He then spoke about how the strippers make men think that 
there is a chance that they could actually keep company 
with the strippers, which explains why they "invest ll their 
money in them . 
I asked the subject why he never looked the strippers 
in the eye when he went up to the stage. The subject 
pointed out that strippers do not look directly at their 
clients and it is an unwritten rule that the men are not 
supposed to look directly at them . "You're paying for 
1 12 
their bodies and they don't want you to think that they are 
part of the deal. " I took this to mean that they try to 
distance themselves from the "transaction. " I took this to 
mean that the dream is their body and the entire illusion 
is that of the client. The strippers share no 
responsibility for any misperceptions about the 
transaction. 
Sweet and Tewksbury (2000 ) noted that central to the 
interactional strategies used by strippers to maximize 
their monetary gain is the cynical performance, which 
creates counterfeit intimacy (see Goffman, 1959 ; Siguwade, 
1995). The notion of cynical performance is used to 
describe a social actor with little belief in his or her 
performance, but who nonetheles s  uses  the performance and 
elicits responses to achieve other ends (Sweet and 
Tewksbury, 2000: 137). This concept is consistent with the 
way criminal telemarketers blame the victim and avoid 
feelings of remorse. In es sence, fraudulent telemarketers 
make dealing with victims a moral non-dilemma, and refuse 
to deal with the is sue directly. 
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Victims' Accounts 
It is important to note from the outset that the victims' 
accounts to which I had access were from elderly people who 
had been victimized repeatedly. The reason for this is 
that the government sought out senior citizens as they were 
the most aggrieved group, which allowed the state to better 
establish a pattern of deceit. Younger consumers and those 
who are scammed only once or twice are much less likely to 
file a complaint. They are also harder to locate. 
Elderly citizens are the segment of the population 
that is most victimized by telemarketing fraud and with 
whom society needs be most concerned. While they recognize 
that it is acceptable to hang up the phone, they are 
initially prone to listening to what the pitch is about 
(AARP, 1996b) . This leaves them open to the manipulation 
techniques of criminal telemarketers. They also are less 
likely to report their losses to family and friends because 
they fear being embarrassed (AARP, 1996c) and having to 
give up control of their affairs. 
The individuals who provided accounts of their 
interaction with criminal telemarketers, although advanced 
in age, vehemently denied any diminished mental capacity. 
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They also acknowledged that they have entered other 
sweepstakes and promotions, but pointed out that they knew 
they had a " one in a million chance to win " these types of 
contests. It is obvious from the victims ' descriptions of 
their relationships with telemarketers, that the fraudsters 
manipulated the societal scripts and capitalized on the 
newly created bonds. As one victim put it, "Well he - he 
was a smooth talker, yeah. From the first time he called 
me I had conf idence in him. " 
Some fraudsters had to work a little harder to gain 
the victim ' s  trust, but not much harder. One of the 
victims noted how the fraudster appealed to her values. 
Yes , I was a little bit worried at first and then he 
says, well, he says, " [ Y ] ou ' re a man of your word, 
aren ' t  you.? " And I says, " [ Y ] es sir, " I says. And 
he - he more or less told me that his mother and 
father raised him to be honest with people. And I 
said, well, I said, " [ T ] hat ' s  the way I am. " 
Another victim simply said, " I  had built a bond to him or a 
friendship with him , that I thought he was a good honest 
boy. " 
One of the criminal telemarketers not on ly built trust 
with his victim, but employed the techni que of distancing 
himself from classic telemarketers to do so. 
Because he had earned so much of my trust in him in 
the different days that he had called me and talked to 
me. And he ' d  talk to me about other compan ies that I 
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should stay away from and all . It seems as though he 
had knowledge of what was going on in the whole 
telemarketing business. 
Even after being warned by friends and neighbors, one of 
the victims gave her personal telemarketer the benef it of 
the doubt. " I  have been told by local people that I was 
being scammed from the very beginning, but I didn ' t  believe 
it because I believed J. T. was telling me the truth about 
everything. " 
When developing repeat vict ims, it is necessary for 
the criminal telemarketers to establish a deeper 
relationship with the victims . One of the fraudsters went 
to great lengths by engaging in daily communication with 
his victim in order to strengthen the bond and thus the 
victim ' s  obligations in the relationship . 
Well, we became so friendly over the phone that he 
reported to me every morning about his dating and all 
the night before and we just had conversations like 
that most of the time, not about business. It ' s  just 
every once in a while he would bring in about the 
business part of it. 
Other relationships became even more advanced . One vict im 
reported that, " [ I ]  looked on him more or less as a son or 
a nephew or something and we would just discuss different 
things of interest to both of us . "  Another victim still 
maintained loyalty to her criminal telemarketer at the time 
of trial . "Mr . [Name ] was always very courteous and if we 
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chose up sides , I would have said he was on my side against 
[ Telemarketing Company ] . " 
In their dealings with criminal telemarketers, victims 
stated that they believed that they were already winners of 
a major prize. As one noted, " [ T ] hey give me the 
impression that I'm rather special. " When asked how he 
first became involved with the telemarketing company ; one 
gentleman's response typified the lure. 
I don't know why I got duped into this situation. I'm 
not at all sure. But all of a sudden this happened. 
You get a call and the, well, I've been retired since 
1980 and my wife had been ill and I've just been here. 
So for interest you begin to listen to something and 
you come up with this $250, 000. 00 and that's not too 
bad, you know, especially at my age. So I begin to, 
I ' d listen to him and they were rather convincing 
people. You know liars can be the best folks in the 
world. 
The victims all agreed that they were hopeful of paying a 
sum of money and getting something of more value in return. 
One simply stated, "I have to admit that I was tempted by 
those four possible awards. " 
Victims who were involved in one in four promotion 
scams stated that they were never told by the telemarketers 
that there were 3, 500 of the booby prizes. They believed 
there were only four prizes total and that it was between 
them and three other people as to who gets which prize. 
One of the victims thought in terms of her chances of 
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having bad luck, rather than good luck. " So this company, 
it was def initely that I would get one of those four 
awards. Only question from my point of view was, four, and 
one of them was something that I had no interest in. Would 
I have the bad luck to receive that ? "  
Most of the victims thought that the money they sent 
to the company was for taxes or that the products they 
received were merely to create an invoice to protect the 
company. When asked what she received from the company , 
one victim told a story similar to others, 
Well, those usual invoices that all these compan ies 
seem to expect and I ' ve questioned it. Sometimes, 
they ' ve explained that this is necessary to convince 
the U.S. government that I ' m  not a relative - or a 
favored person in some way that - it ' s  more business 
like and the first one was - was money clips and 
brass letter openers and - and pens and an emergency 
survival kit. 
Additionally , several of the victims felt grateful when the 
telemarketer would "get the okay " from his boss to reduce 
the fee. A couple of the victims felt fortunate to receive 
the "sen ior citizen discount. " 
When asked what they thought they paid the money for , 
one woman said plainly what all of the victims had 
expressed. "Well, obviously for one of the maj or awards. " 
Two of the victims thought only about the award and did not 
pay much attention at all to the taxes. When asked if she 
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was told what she would have to do in order to "see that 
one million dollar check," one of the victims stated, "Yes, 
I was supposed to have a picture taken of me and have my 
social security and driver's license and I was to pay a 
certain amount of money as that would cost tax wise. " When 
asked the same question, another victim only mentioned the 
photo and had to be prompted to recall that she also was 
required to pay a substantial amount of money. 
Of course, the big awards were never given out, but 
that did not stop the fraudsters from repeatedly defrauding 
the victims. When questioned as to why they would continue 
to contribute, most of the victims stated that they felt 
they were already too involved to quit. One of the award 
winners stated, " [ B ] ecause I had already put in $1,000 and 
then if I didn't - didn't send more then it was definite 
that I was not gonna get anything. " Another victim went 
for new prizes with greater odds. 
They had a program going on later on. The second one 
that I had entered and they convinced me that their 
awards were much more valuable than they were in the 
first program that they had. And I sent them a check 
for $3,500. [ third time ] I had sent them a 
check for $4,000 because their awards were so much 
greater and the person that I had talked to on the 
telephone told me that since I had entered previous 
programs that there was a better chance of me winning 
than someone just entering the program. 
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The male subject quoted earlier sent money on seven 
different occasions in pursuit of the same award. "I'm 
still trying to keep active this $2 50, 000 that I'm chasing 
in the wind. " Others were looking to make up for their 
past losses. 
Several of the victims felt encouraged when they 
received calls from different telemarketers from the same 
company. They beleived that the new person would be able 
to "make things right. " They also were duped into thinking 
that failure to receive a major award was a problem with 
the company rather than the individual telemarketer. Thus, 
the victims were receptive to the same agent when s/he 
changed companies. In the end, it was the sense of urgency 
that the criminal telemarketers created that made the scams 
effective. All of the victims reported that they 
dispatched checks through courier (UPS and FedEx) or 
Western Union. One recounted that the courier was at his 
doorstep "within an hour. " 
Victims continue to get involved with telemarketers 
for the same reason most people in our society are prone to 
enter contests They are socialized to take advantage of a 
"good deal" when they see it. Criminal telemarketers build 
up the dream from the outset to entice the victims, but 
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also must convince the victims of their legitimacy and the 
reality of the "great deal. " In addition to the "greed n of 
gullible consumers and the bond that the criminal 
telemarketers create with them, repeat victims are also 
susceptible to throwing good money after bad. Their 
investments are similar to individuals who constantly put 
money into a problematic car. Once the victims place a 
certain amount of money into something, it is difficult to 
stop as they cannot accept that the initial outlay is 
irretrievable. In other words, they are trying to recoup 




Unlike most street crime, telemarketing has legitimate as 
well as illegitimate contingencies. It would inform to 
determine the demographic pool from which the offenders 
hailed and to assess whether or not the subjects had any 
significant criminal histories. Due to the entrepreneurial 
and organizational nature of their criminal endeavors, it 
is important also to examine what factors influenced the 
subjects to pursue and persist at fraudulent telemarketing 
and what kind of lifestyle their criminal pursuits afforded 
them. 
Of all those who begin employment in telemarketing, 
some quickly discover it is not their cup of tea; they 
dislike it or they do not perform well at it. Others find 
the work attractive and rewarding but see it only as a 
means to other life and career goals. Most, therefore, 
pursue telemarketing work only temporarily. Some, however, 
discover they are good at telephone sales, and they are 
drawn to the income and the lifestyle it can provide. On 
average, the members of the interview sample were employed 
in telemarketing for 8 years. Their ages when interviewed 
ranged from 26 to 69 years, with a mean of 42.2 years. The 
122 
sample included thirty-five (73%) white males, six (12. 5%) 
African-American males, six (12. 5%) white females , and one 
Hispanic male. 
Offender Bac kgrounds 
Although much less is known about white-collar offenders 
than about street criminals, evidence suggests they are 
drawn from offender pools with quite different social 
characteristics. As a group , they are older, better 
educated , and include a higher proportion of whites and 
females. According to Weisburd et al . (1991) ,  many are 
respected in their home communities. They are less likely 
to come from disadvantaged sectors of the population, and 
they are more likely to have records of well-paid 
legitimate employment. 
An enormous body of research on street criminals has 
shown that many are products of disadvantaged and 
disorderly parental homes. I was interested in determining 
if the homes in which the subjects were reared reveal · 
similar or functionally equivalent criminogenic 
characteristics. Overwhelmingly, the members of the sample 
describe their parents as conventional and hard-working and 
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family financial circumstances as secure if not 
comfortable. They were reared in families whose parents 
prided themselves on how well they provided for their 
families and whose conversations and admonitions stressed 
the importance of financial matters and taking care of 
business . 
Nearly all of the subj ects reported coming from 
middle-class neighborhoods. Their parental families were 
gender- traditional, with the father providing the main 
source of income. Although the fathers ' reported 
occupations ranged from machinist to owner of a chain of 
retail stores, thirty-four were business owners (37.5%) or 
held professional/managerial (33%) positions. All but one 
of the remaining fathers (n = 14) maintained steady 
employment ;  of those, half held sales positions and two 
were career mi l i tary personnel . Only one father had no 
reported occupation and had spent time in prison. One-half 
of the mothers were employed outside the home as well. The 
significance of this is that a substantial proportion 
(70.5%) of the subj ects were exposed to or acquired 
entrepreneurial perspectives and skills while young. 
Although I questioned the subj ects at length about 
their early and adolescent years, their responses reveal 
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little that distinguishes them from others of similar age 
and class background. Certainly, the disadvantages and 
pathologies commonplace in the early lives of most street 
criminals are hardly in evidence here . What others have 
noted is no less true of these subjects : "One searches in 
vain for early precursors or early hints of trouble in the 
life history of the typical white-collar offender. For 
most, [ t ] heir crimes do not appear . . .  to be 
deeply rooted in a troubled social background" (Benson and 
Kerley, 2001 : 133). 
If the subj ects' early years reveal few clues to 
their later criminality, there also are few signs that 
they distinguished themselves in conventional ways. 
Their educational careers , for example , are 
unremarkable. Eight (17%) dropped out of high school, 
although most (83%) graduated and five of the eight 
drop-outs obtained a GED. Twenty-nine (60%) attended 
college, but on average they invested only two years 
in the quest for a degree. Only five (10%) claimed a 
baccalaureate degree with one of the subj ects going on 
to receive a masters degree. 
The subj ects also were not very successful in 
their personal relationships. Nearly all (87. 5 %) had 
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been married at least once and a third (31% ) of those 
subj ects had been married more than once with several 
( n  = 6) reporting three or four marriages. Despite 
the percentage of subj ects who did marry , only a few 
of the subj ects were married at the time of the 
interviews. While some asserted that it was the 
criminal trial process that caused them to separate, 
most suggested that their relationships had dissolved 
prior to any charges being brought. Most (75 % )  have 
children, although a maj ority of these subj ects 
indicated that they were not actively engaged in their 
childrens 1 lives . 
Criminal Careers 
What about the subj ects 1 criminal histories ? Inf ormation 
elicited in the interviews and a review of information 
contained in the subj ects 1 pre- sentence investigation 
reports shows that thirteen (27% ) of the subj ects had 
previous criminal records, seven (14 . 6% )  for misdemeanors 
(e . g . ,  petty theft and drugs ) and six ( 12 . 5 % )  for felonies . 
Of those with felony records , three were convicted 
previously of telemarketing offenses. 
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Overall , this level of prior criminality is somewhat 
be low wha t is reported by other investiga tors of ordinary 
white-collar criminals generally and criminal telemarketers 
specif ically (Benson and Kerley, 2001 ; Weisburd, Waring and 
Chayet, 2001 ; Doocy et al . ,  2002). Still, a sizeable 
number "are no t strangers to the criminal j ust ice system " 
(Benson and Kerley, 200.1 :  131) . For members of the sample 
who have previous arrests, the age of onset for criminal 
activity is considerably higher than for street criminals. 
The data do show that some subjects appear to 
have had recurrent trouble with the law and, like 
street criminals, they are persistent users of alcohol 
and other drugs . In fact, some of the subj ects were 
attracted to the work because it supported their 
addictions. As one former business owner told me, " I  
had an alcohol problem at a young age, and to be able 
to suppor t the alcohol and drug habit with the kind of 
money that we were making seems to go hand in hand. " 
When invited to reflect upon how they differ from 
their siblings or peers, many reported they were aware 
of an in terest in money from an early age. As one 
subject told me: " I  had ·cer tain goals when I was a 
teenager, you know. And I had a picture of a Mercedes 
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convertible on my bedroom mirror for years . "  Another 
subject said, " [ Y ] ou know, I do have a major 
addiction, and I don ' t  think I ' ll ever lose it . And I 
don ' t  think there ' s  any classes [treatment ] for it. 
And it ' s  money. It ' s  Ben Franklin . "  Typically, they 
began working for pay while young and maintained 
employment throughout their adolescent years . 
Criminal Lure 
In Crime and the Ameri can Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld 
(2001: 5) assert that "crime in Amer ica derives in 
significant measure, from highly prized cultural and social 
conditions. " They go on to state: 
. . . the American Dream itself and the normal soc ial 
conditions engendered by it are deeply implicated in 
the problem of crime . In our use of the term "the 
American Dream, " we refer to a broad cul tural ethos 
that entails a commitment to the goal of mater ial 
success, to be pursued by everyone in society, under 
conditions of open, individual competition . The 
American Dream has both an evaluative and a cognitive 
dimension associated with it . People are socialized 
to accept the desirability of pursuing the goal of 
material success, and they are encouraged to believe 
that the chances of realizing the Dream are 
sufficiently high to justify a continued commitment to 
this cultural goal (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001: 5-6). 
Mat za and Sykes (1961) state that delinquents from all 
social classes tend to pursue certain values that are 
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conducive to delinquency; they may also have a disdain for 
hard work and a desire for quick, easy success. In his 
theory of middle-class delinquency, England (1960) states 
that delinquents reject such values as hard work, thrift, 
study, and self-denial. Miller (1958) makes a similar 
point in his discussion of lower class culture. At the 
same time, however, delinquents have grandiose dreams of 
quick success. They desire much money and all the luxuries 
money can buy. Entrepreneurship appealed to many of the 
subjects: 
You're always pursuing more money, most of us are. 
We're raised that way, we are in this country. And 
that's the way I was raised. But I also wanted to do 
my own thing. I wanted to be in business for myself, 
I wanted the freedom that came with that. 
"Crime, of course, would have an obvious appeal to someone 
who places a low value on hard work and a high value on 
money and pleasure" (Agnew, 2 0 0 0: 359). 
The sample subjects were aware that there are ways of 
earning a good income that do not require hard work and 
subordination to others. As one subject put it: 
You know, I was, I've never been a firm believer 
[ that ] you got to work for a company for 30 years and 
get a retirement. Like my dad thinks. I'm all about 
going out [ and ] making that million and doing it, 
doing it very easily. And there's a lot of ways to do 
it. 
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For the sample subjects, many of whom were previously 
foundering on conventional paths, telemarketing was a 
godsend . In the words of one of the subjects, 
"Telemarketing was a salvation to me as a means of income . 
And being able to actually accomplish something without an 
education . "  Aware that failing parental and self­
expectations would be unacceptable, it came along at a time 
when they needed to show that they could make something of 
themselves. It was the reason some reported for dropping 
out of college: 
[ Telemarketing ] was just something I picked up as 
a part time job, when I was sixteen . . . .  When I 
was in college, my second year in college, 
[ fellow students ] were talking about finishing 
their four years of college and making $28, 000 or 
$30, 000 a year . And I was making $1, 000 a week 
part time, you know . . . .  And I just couldn't 
see doing it . I mean, I wound up, after the end 
of my second year of college, I never went back. 
I was making too much money . It just seemed so 
easy . 
Indeed, success in the field of criminal 
telemarketing does not require a formal education. A 
cross-tabulation of educational background and 
telemarketing position [Table 5 . 1 ] suggests that 
failure to obtain a degree does not constrain one's 
"status" in the business . Although none of the three 
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Table 5 . 1 :  Cross-Tabulation of Education Bac kground and TM 
Position 
OWner Manager Re-Loader Sales Total 
Agent 
Less Than Count 2 1 3 
High School 
Within 6 6 . 7 % 3 3 . 3 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Within 2 8 . 6 % 9 . 1 % 6 . 3 %  
Position 
High School Count 8 1 3 4 1 6  
Degree/GED 
Within 5 0 . 0 % 6 . 3 % 1 8 . 8 % 2 5 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Within 3 3 . 3 % 1 6 . 7 % 42 . 9 % 3 6 . 4 % 3 3 . 3 % 
Posi tion 
Some Count 1 4  2 2 6 2 4  
College 
Within 5 8 . 3 % 8 . 3 %  8 . 3 % 2 5 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Within 5 8 . 3 % 3 3 . 3 % 2 8 . 6 % 5 4 . 5 % 5 0 . 0 % 
Posi tion 
College Count 2 2 4 
Degree 
Wi thin 5 0 . 0 % 5 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Within 8 . 3 % 3 3 . 3 % 8 . 3 %  
Position 
Graduate Count 1 1 
Degree 
Within 1 0 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Wi thin 1 6 . 7 % 2 . 1 % 
Position 
13 1 
subjects with less than a high school degree ascended 
to the posit ion of owner or manager, eight ( 50%) of 
those with only a high school diploma or GED did rise 
to the level of business owner . In that group were 
three subjects who obtained their degree by taking the 
GED. A ninth individual in the high school only 
category became a manager. 
In the some col l ege category (no degree obtained), 
fourteen (58.3%) became owners and two (8.3%) held 
managerial positions. Of the four who obtained college 
degrees, two were business owners and two were managers, 
while the one sub ject with a masters degree did not surpass 
the management level. In the end, twenty-two (91.6%) of 
the owners and three ( 50%) of  the managers in the sample 
had only a high school degree or some college. 
While the ability to achieve something wi thout an 
education was a fundamental reason for entry into criminal 
telemarketing, the fact that the subjects could make a 
large amount of money was by far the greatest lure. 
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Income 
Overwhelmingly, the subjects told me they got into and 
persisted at telemarketing for "the money. " How well does 
it pay ? Only one subject reported earning less than $1, 000 
weekly, and most said their annual earnings were in the 
range of $100, 000 to $250, 000. Seven told me their annual 
earnings exceeded $1 million. To conduct further analysis, 
cross-tabulations were run on income by position, 
education, age, and years in telemarketing. The income 
categories were designated as l ess than $99 , 0 0 0, $1 00 , 0 0 0  
to $24 9 , 0 0 0 , $250 , 0 00  t o  $999 , 999 , and 1 Mi l l i on and above . 
All of the millionaires {n=7) were owners of criminal 
telemarketing firms and only one owner made less than 
$99, 000 [Table 5 . 2 ] . The owners also made up 63. 6% {n=7) 
of the $250, 000 to $999, 000 income category {n= l l). The 
remaining 37. 5% {n=9) reported earning from $100, 000 to 
$2 49, 000 annually. Only one manager stated that he 
received an annual income over $250, 000, while four {66 . 7%)  
were in the $100, 000 to $249, 000 category. The remaining 
manager reported an income of under $99, 000. 
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Table 5 .  2 :  Cross-tabulation of TM Position and Annual 
Income Category 
Les s  10 0 , 0 0 0  2 5 0 , 0 0 0  Million Total 
Than to to and 
9 9 , 0 0 0  24 9 , 0 0 0  9 9 9 , 9 9 9  Above 
OWner Count 1 9 7 7 2 4  
Within 4 . 2 % 3 7 . 5 % 2 9 . 2 % 2 9 . 2 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos i tion 
Wi thin 2 0 . 0 % 3 6 . 0 % 6 3 . 6 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 5 0 . 0 % 
Income 
Manager Count 1 4 1 6 
Wi thin 1 6 . 7 %  6 6 . 7 %  1 6 . 7 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos i ti on 
Wi thin 2 0 . 0% 1 6 . 0 % 9 . 1 % 1 2 . 5 % 
Income 
Reloader Count 6 1 7 
Wi thin 8 5 . 7 %  14 . 3 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Po sition 
Wi thin 2 4 . 0 % 9 . 1 % 1 4 . 6 % 
Income 
Sales Count 3 6 2 1 1  
Agent 
Within 2 7 . 3 % 54 . 5 % 1 8 . 2 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos i t ion 
Wi thin 6 0 . 0 % 2 4 . 0 % 1 8 . 2 % 2 2 . 9 % 
Income 
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Almost all (85. 7%; n=7) of the reloaders fell within 
the $ 100, 000 to $ 249, 000 income range while the other 
reloader garnered between $250, 000 and $999, 000. The 
closers and sales agents were collapsed into one category 
based on the fact that closers are more experienced sales 
agents and work under similar circumstances using the same 
pool of consumers. Of the eleven -sales agents in the 
sample, 27. 3% (n=3) made less than $99, 000, whereas more 
than half (54 . 5%) reported annual earnings of $100, 000 to 
$249, 000. The two remaining sales agents (18.2 %), both 
closers, made over $250, 000. 
Obviously, it pays to be a business owner, but that 
does not necessarily mean that one needs a college 
education to profit from criminal telemarketing [Table 
5 . 3 ] . In fact, subjects with a high school degree or GED 
made up 57 . 1% (n=4) of the millionaires and 2 (12 . 5%) 
earned between $250, 000 and $999, 000. Of the subjects who 
dropped out of high and did not obtain a GED, one reported 
making between $250, 000 and $999, 000 while the other two 
had an annual income of $ 100, 000 to $250, 000 . 
The remaining millionaires (n=3) and 63. 6% (n=7) of 
the subjects that earned $250, 000 to $999, 000 per year 
attended some college but never obtained a degree. 
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Table 5 . 3 :  Cross -tabulation of Educat ion and Annual Income 
Category 
Les s  100 , 0 0 0  2 5 0 , 0 0 0  Mi ll ion Total 
Than to to and 
9 9 , 0 0 0  249 , 0 0 0  9 9 9 , 9 9 9  Above 
Les s  Than Count 2 1 3 
High School 
Within 6 6 . 7 % 3 3 . 3 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Educat ion 
Within 8 . 0 % 9 . 1 % 6 . 3 % 
Income 
High School Count 1 0  2 4 1 6  
Degree/GED 
Within 6 2 . 5 % 1 2 . 5 % 2 5 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Educat ion 
Within 4 0 . 0 % 1 8 . 2 % 5 7 . 1% 3 3 . 3 % 
Income 
Some Count 4 1 0  7 3 2 4  
College 
Wi thin 1 6 . 7 % 4 1 . 7 % 2 9 . 2 % 1 2 . 5 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Wi thin 8 0 . 0 % 4 0 . 0 % 6 3 . 6 % 4 2 . 9 % 5 0 . 0 % 
Income 
College Count 1 2 1 4 
Degree 
Wi thin 2 5 . 0 % 5 0 . 0 % 2 5 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Education 
Within 2 0 . 0 % 8 . 0 % 9 . 1 % 8 . 3 % 
Income 
Graduate Count 1 1 
Degree 
Wi thin 1 0 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Educat ion 
Wi thin 4 . 0 % 2 . 1 % 
Income 
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41. 7% (n=l O) of the subjects in this category reported 
income between $100, 000 and $249, 000 and four earned less 
than $99, 000; one garnering the least amount reported of 
$28, 000, equal to the projection of college graduates 
quoted by a subject in Chapter 3. College graduates fared 
similarly as 50% (n=2) received an annual income of 
$100, 000 to $249, 000 while another made over $250, 000 and 
the last taking in $60, 000 (the second lowest reported 
income in all categories). The one subject with a 
master's degree reportedly earned between $100, 000 and 
$249, 000. 
The data also reveal that subjects were able to make a 
lot of money relatively early in their careers. In order 
to run cross-tabulations on income by age [Table 5 . 4 ] ,  the 
subjects' ages were co�lapsed into three categories 
signifying different stages in life. The 39  and under 
category included those subjects in their twenties (n=2), 
wi th the other two categories designated as subjects forty 
to forty-nine and fi fty or older. 
Three (12. 5%) of the subjects in their thirties were 
making a million or more and four (16. 7%) others topped the 
$250, 000 mark. A similar number (n=4) made less than 
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Table 5 . 4 :  Cross-tabulation of Age and Annual Income 
Category 
Les s  10 0 , 0 0 0  2 5 0 , 000  Mi ll ion Total 
Than to to and 
9 9 , 0 0 0  24 9 , 0 0 0  9 9 9 , 9 9 9  Above 
3 9  and Count 4 13  4 3 2 4  
Under 
Within Age 1 6 . 7 % 54 . 2 % 1 6 . 7 % 12 . 5 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Category 
Wi thin 8 0 . 0 % 5 2 . 0 % 3 6 . 4 % 42 . 9 % 5 0 . 0 % 
Income 
40 to Count 6 3 4 1 3  
49 
Within Age 4 6 . 2 % 2 3 . 1 % 3 0 . 8 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Category 
Within 2 4 . 0 % 27 . 3 % 5 7 . 1% 2 7 . 1 % 
Income 
50 and Count 1 6 4 1 1  
Above 
Within Age 9 . 1 % 54 . 5 % 3 6 . 4% 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Category 
Within 2 0 . 0 % 24 . 0 % 3 6 . 4 % 2 2 . 9 % 
Income 
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$99, 000, but most (54. 2 % ; n=13) reported an annual income 
of between $100, 000 and $249, 000. Forty-somethings made 
the most money on average as four (30. 8 %) made a million or 
more and three (23. 1%) others made over $250, 000. The 
remaining six (46. 2 %) garnered $100, 000 and $249, 000 in 
annual income. While no subject fifty or older made a 
million, 36. 4% (n=4) made more than $250, 000. Most (54. 5% ; 
n=6), however, reported earnings between $100, 000 and 
$250, 000 ; the remaining elder received less than $99, 000. 
Additionally, the subjects were able to make a 
substantial annual income without having to first work long 
in the field [Table 5 . 5 ] . For this analysis, the subjects' 
years in telemarketing were categorized as 5 and under, 6 
to 1 0  years, and 11  or more years. Three (42. 9 %) of the 
millionaires had been in criminal telemarketing for less 
than five years, while two others had six to ten years 
experience ; the remaining two fell in the eleven or more 
category. 
Those subjects reporting annual incomes of $250, 000 to 
$999, 000 were divided rather equally among the 5 and under 
(36. 4% ; n=4), 6 to 10 (36. 4% ; n=4), and 11 or more (27. 3% ; 
n=3) categories. Those with 5 or fewer years in 
telemarketing made up 32 % (n=8) of subjects in the $100, 000 
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Table 5 . 5 :  Cross-tabulation of TM Years and Annual Income 
Category 
Les s  100 , 00 0  2 5 0 , 0 0 0  Million Total 
Than to to and 
9 9 , 0 0 0  24 9 , 0 0 0  9 9 9 , 9 9 9  Above 
5 and Count 3 8 4 3 1 8  
Under 
Within 1 6 . 7 % 4 4 . 4% 2 2 . 2 % 1 6 . 7 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
TM Years 
Within 6 0 . 0 % 3 2 . 0 % 3 6 . 4 % 4 2 . 9 % 3 7 . 5 % 
Income 
6 to 10 Count 2 12  4 2 2 0  
Within 10 . 0 % 6 0 . 0 % 2 0 . 0 % 1 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
TM Years 
Within 4 0 . 0 % 4 8 . 0% 3 6 . 4 % 2 8 . 6 % 4 1 . 7 % 
Income 
11 and Count 5 3 2 1 0  
Above 
Within 5 0 . 0% 3 0 . 0 % 2 0 . 0% 1 0 0 . 0 % 
TM Years 
Within 2 0 . 0 % 2 7 . 3 % 2 8 . 6 % 2 0 . 8 % 
Income 
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to $249, 0 0 0  income category compared to 48% ( n=12 ) of those 
with 6 to 10 years experience, and 20%  ( n=5 ) of the 
subj ects 11 or more years in the business. 
Only three subj ects with less than 5 years and two with 6 
to 10 years in the business made less than $99, 0 0 0. 
Personal Success 
As important as the income it yields and the casual 
approach to employment it permits, criminal telemarketing 
appeals to many who persist at it for reasons of career and 
identity. Despite class and parental expectations, most of 
the subj ects had not previously settled upon promising or 
rewarding occupations . Asked what he liked about 
telemarketing, one subj ect ' s  reply was typical: " Well, 
obviously, it was the money. " Immediately, however, he 
added that " it gave me a career, [ and ] to me it was my 
salvation. " As with this subj ect, criminal telemarketing 
enables fraudsters to own their own business despite their 
unimpressive educational background, their limited 
credentials, and the absence of venture capital. 
A comparison of the positions to which the subj ects 
eventually ascended in telemarketing to the occupational 
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positions of their fathers, reveals that there also were no 
relative limitations on their occupational mobility [Table 
5. 6 ] . As a result, many subjects were able to surpass 
their parents' occupational status by becoming business 
owners. 62. 5% (10 ) of the subjects whose parents held 
professional/managerial positions and 50 % { n=6 ) of those 
with parents listed in the laborer category did so. Of the 
sixteen subjects whose fathers held professional/managerial 
positions, ten { 62. 5% )  became owners of criminal 
telemarketing firms, and three { 1 8. 8% )  were managers. 
Likewise, six { 50 % ) of the subjects whose fathers were 
laborers also came to own their own business; none became 
managers. 
The sons and daughters of business owners did not 
attain as much "success. " Of the eighteen subjects whose 
parents were business owners, eight ( 4 4. 4 % ) eventually 
became owners and three { 16. 7% ) held managerial positions. 
The fact that these particular subjects exhibited less 
upward mobility is hard to explain. Overall, during the 
interviews, the subjects with professional/managerial 
parents expressed much more disdain about working for 
somebody else, often as a result of observing their 
fathers' situations. In general, the subjects from 
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Table 5 . 6 :  Cross-Tabulation of Parent Occupation and TM 
Position 
OWner Manager Re- Sales Total 
Loader Agent 
Business Count 8 3 2 5 1 8  
OWner 
Wi thin 44 . 4 % 1 6 . 7 % 1 1 . 1 % 2 7 . 8 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Parental 
Within 3 3 . 3 % 5 0 . 0 % 2 8 . 6 % 4 5 . 5 % 3 7 . 5 % 
Position 
Professional / Count 1 0  3 1 2 1 6  
Managerial 
Within 62 . 5 % 1 8 . 8 % 6 . 3 % 1 2 . 5 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Parental 
Within 4 1 . 7 %  5 0 . 0 % 1 4 . 3 % 1 8 . 2 % 3 3 . 3 % 
Position 
Laborer Count 6 2 4 12  
Within 5 0 . 0 % 1 6 . 7 % 3 3 . 3 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Parental 
Within 2 5 . 0 % 2 8 . 6 % 3 6 . 4 % 2 5 . 0 % 
Position 
Military Count 2 2 
Within 1 0 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Parental 
Within 2 8 . 6 % 4 . 2 % 
Position 
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business owner homes, were less concerned, but perhaps were 
more aware of the headaches of owning a business. 
Additionally, there is a lot of money to be made on the 
sales end and less perceived liability. 
The subjects were also able to become business owners 
relatively early in life. Nearly half ( 45.8%; n=l l) of the 
business owners started up their own firms before the age 
of 39; their average age was 35. The average age of all 
business owners was slightly under 42. Taking into account 
that ages used in the analysis were the subjects ' ages at 
the time of the interviews, this figure is even more 
impressive. 
Although only seven of the sample subjects were 
minorities, there appears to be no constraints on their 
status mobility such as exist in the general population. 
66. 7% ( n=4) of the African-American subj ects were business 
owners and another was a manager. The same equal 
opportunity was not seen for females ( n=6), as 66.7% ( n=4) 
were sales agents, one was a reloader, and only one was an 
owner. Even the one female who was an owner told me that 
she did not aspire to ownership, but rather was placed in 
the position by her fianc� to serve as a " front. " Although 
I did not spend much time exploring the gender issue, some 
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of the interview subjects did suggest that a glass ceiling 
does, in fact, exist and females were mainly used to make 
initial contacts. 
For those who persist at it, success at criminal 
telemarketing brings a strong sense of personal mastery, 
which gives rise to self-attributions of distinction and 
desert . As president of their own corporation, their 
position in telemarketing provides both outward 
respectability and an income sufficient to maintain the 
"good life. " It is the vehicle that permits them to lay 
claim to being talented and successful. 
This mode of deviant exploitation also offers the 
intrinsic emotional reward of "sneaky thrills" (Katz, 
1988). Seduced into the deviant activity primarily by 
their desire for easy economic gain, fraudulent 
telemarketers soon discover that employing their persuasive 
skills to exploit gullible victims provides feelings of 
power and control. The deviant work is "a kind of game 
. that produces a clear winner and loser" (Katz 1988 : 67). 
Duffield and Grabosky (2001) have commented on the 
importance of this dimension of the payoff from fraud. 
Characteristically, the subjects believe they are 
outstanding salespersons; they are supremely confident of 
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their ability to sell over the telephone by overcoming 
whatever resistance they encounter. Doing so successfully 
gives a sense of competitively earned distinction and 
power. 
[ I ]  sold the first person I ever talked to on the 
phone. And it was j ust like that first shot of 
heroin, you know. I'm not a heroin addict . .  
I've only done heroin a couple of times. But it 
was amazing. It was like, "I can't believe I 
j ust did this ! "  It was incredible. It was never 
about the money after that . . . .  Yeah, it was 
about the money initially, but when I realized · 
that I could do this everyday, it was no longer 
about the money. It was about the competition, 
you know. I wanted to be the best salesman, and 
I want to make the most money that day. And then 
it became j ust the sale. It wasn't the money. I 
didn't even add the figures in my head anymore. 
It was j ust whether or not I can turn this person 
around, you know, walk him down that mutual path 
of agreement, you know. That was exciting to me. 
It was power, you know; I can make people do what 
I wanted them to do. And they would do it. 
Another subj ect said simply that the work "gives you power. 
It gives you power. " 
To make such large amounts of money and do so without 
incurring restrictive responsibilities adds to the 
attractiveness of the work. The subj ects find appealing 
both the flexible hours and the fact that it requires 
neither extensive training nor advanced education. Few 
employers impose rigid rules or strictures. Generally 
there are neither dress codes nor uniforms; the work can be 
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done in shorts and a tee shirt (Doocy et al . ,  2002 ) .  In 
addition to the money and the success it provides, criminal 
telemarketers also find other aspects of the work 
attractive . 
Mobility 
Employment mobility by criminal telemarketers is 
common; individuals move from one firm to another, with 
some eventually taking managerial positions (Doocy et al. , 
2001) . After gaining experience, former managers told me, 
they were confident that they knew enough about the 
business to strike out on their own . They did so expecting 
to increase their income substantially . As one put it: 
" [ I ] n  my mind I believed I was smarter than the owners of 
these other companies that were making millions of dollars. 
And I just said, ' I  can do this on my own. '" 
Typical ly, defectors lure productive personnel from 
their current employer with promises of more money, and on 
the way out they are not above plundering the business's 
files and lead lists : 
file. I took it all . 
"I downloaded every lead in his 
I opened up . . . my own office, 
took all those people and said ' now, watch me . ' " Based in 
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part on the widely shared assumption that the market is 
never saturated, they generally open a company based on 
similar products and sales approaches. Others enjoyed the 
mobility without the responsibility of organization. As 
one rip and tear artist told me: 
Hell, I would go on vacation to New Orleans , or 
whatever, and work out of a hotel room for a few 
They probably tracked me down through couriers. 
5 of my buddies would do the same thing. 
days. 
4 or 
When I asked what his parents thought, the subject replied, 
"Hell, at the time my parents were glad because I was 
successful. " 
One subject summed up well not only the reason why 
most enter this type of work, but also the varied options 
available to them. 
I' ve done many things. I can' t even remember all the 
things . I don' t think I' ve worked steady ever up 
until I was 35 years old maybe. I just, you know, I 
could never keep a j ob. I could never, nothing can 
hold my interest that long until telemarketing. Cause 
then you didn' t have to keep a job. You just got to 
work for the next company. There was like 3 or 
4 of us that started together and we would branch out 
into different companies you know or we' d make our own 
companies or whatever, you know , and nobody wanted to 
do it at this time . And because I didn ' t  really want 
a job and I was a salesman. I started ripping and 
tearing out of hotel rooms and stuff you know just, 
you know, 5, 10 grand a week or something, just to 
keep me out of trouble. 
Asked if he ever considered changing his vocation, he 
replied, "All the time, all the time. So fuckin often the 
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things were more commonly criminal in nature. Still, 
wouldn't go get a job, you know. " 
Lifestyles 
Telemarketers generally distinguish between working 
hard and "working smart. " When asked, therefore, how he 
viewed those who work hard for modest wages, one replied " I  
guess somebody ' s  gotta do it. " By contrast, work weeks of 
20-30 hours are common for them, and even for owners and 
managers, the need for close oversight of operations 
decreases substantially once things are up and running. 
The short work-week and their ample income provides 
considerable latitude in the use of leisure time and in 
consumption patterns. 
The lifestyles of criminal telemarketers vary by age 
and the aspects of the work that employees find most 
appealing, but conspicuous consumption is common to all. 
The young, and those attracted to the work and leisure it 
permits, live life as a party. This is "enjoyment of good 
times with minimal concern for obligations and commitments 
external to the . . .  immediate social setting" (Shover, 
1996: 93). Use of cocaine and other illicit drugs is 
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common among this segment of the telemarketing workforce. 
One of the subjects recounted how the business accommodated 
his lifestyle. 
The hours were good. You'd work, sometimes, from 
about 9 to 2, 9 to 3, sometimes from 12 to 4. 
Basically, we set our own hours. It was freedom. 
The money was fantastic . . . .  You got the best 
of the girls. For me, it wasn't really about the 
job, it was a way of life . . . .  I had an alcohol 
problem at a young age, and to be able to support 
the alcohol and drug habit with the kind of money 
that we were· making seems to go hand in hand. 
And then you've got the fast lifestyle, . . .  up 
all night, sleep all. day, you know. So, 
everything kinda coincided with that fast 
lifestyle, that addictive lifestyle. 
Asked how he spent the money he made in telemarketing, 
another subject responded saying : 
Houses, girls, just going out to nightclubs. And 
a lot of blow [ cocaine] .  . Lots and lots of 
blow, enormous amounts. And other than that, you 
know, I look back, I get sick when I think about 
how much we spent, where the hell I put it all . 
I'm making all this money [ but] I don't have a 
whole hell of a lot to show for it, you know. 
That lifestyle didn't allow you to save. 
Gambling and ostentatious living are commonplace. One 
subject said that they � would go out to the casinos and 
blow two, three, four, five thousand dollars a night. That 
was nothing - - to go spend five grand, you know, every 
weekend. And wake up broke ! "  Commenting on one of his 
employees, a subject said that the man 
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had a Porsche Speedster after he sold his Porsche 
911 . He had· a Dodge Viper, he had a Ferrari 348, 
he had a Lexus LS400, he had a BMvv 850i, he had a 
Jeep Grand Cherokee . He liked his cars . Now, he 
didn't have all these at one time, but he ran 
through them, you know . He traded the Dodge 
Viper . . .  in for the Ferrari . He always had a 
Porsche . 
There was usually little money to be found when these 
subjects were investigated and it is assumed that most of 
it was lost in the process of conspicuous consumption . 
However, there is also evidence that the subjects spent the 
money to avoid detection . As one subject put it: 
Well I had to say my lifestyle, you know, we 
couldn't have bank accounts, you know . I didn't 
even have a driver's license for 10 years . We 
couldn't, we couldn't keep our money anywhere . 
We couldn't declare it anywhere, so you know I 
guess hotel rqoms, cars, drugs, clothes, 
girlfriends . You know money's really easy to 
spend . And we gambled too . We did just about 
everything that you would expect a criminal to do 
with their money. It was just a great lifestyle, 
man . 
What I learned about the lifestyles and spending habits of 
criminal telemarketers differs little from what is known 
about street criminals . It also confirms what has been 
learned about the relationship between easy, unearned 
income and profligacy: "The way money is acquired is a 
powerful determinant of how it is defined, husbanded, and 
spent" (Shover, 1996: 104) . 
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The lifestyles of telemarketers change somewhat as 
they get older and take on more conventional 
responsibilities : 
I started to realize that, as I was getting older 
in the industry, it was affecting my children and 
my relationship with my wife. To the point that 
it wasn't what I wanted. I wanted more of a 
home-type of family, where I got home at six 
o'clock and have dinner and spend time with my 
wife and children. And with that industry, it 
doesn't really do that. 
My lifestyle? Play golf, go to the lake, you 
know. I had a family, but . . .  I was also, you 
know, making good money. And I wanted to party 
and that kind of thing. So, I did that a lot. 
We got together and partied a lot and went here 
and there and went to, you know -- nightlife -­
go out to clubs occasionally, but, when you're 
married and have kids, it's limited. It changes. 
It changed a lot over those years. 
For older and more experienced telemarketers, the 
lifestyle centers around home and family and impressing 
others with signs of their apparent success: 
I played some golf. [ In the Summer ] ,  water 
skiing, fishing. I'm real heavy into bass 
fishing, me and my dad and my brothers. Hunting. 
Doing things with my wife and kids. I spent a 
lot of time with them. Evenings, maybe just 
walking the golf course, or whatever. Watching 
the sunset. 
Another subject told me that after he moved up in the 
telemarketing ranks: "My partner and I played, we played a 
lot of golf. The office was right down from the golf 
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course. We'd go to the golf course and play two or three 
times a week. " Except for the unrestrained hedonism of 
their lives when young and still new to criminal 
telemarketing, the broad outlines of their occupational 
careers, particularly for those who went on to form their 





Whereas rational street criminals generally conduct 
only a primitive cost-benefit analysis, the decision-making 
of fraudulent telemarketers involves several dimensions. 
An average burglar acting alone, for example , knowing his 
or her actions are a blatant violation of the law, will 
assess the possibility of getting caught as well as the 
potential for obtaining goods of value from an unoccupied 
building. Criminal telemarketers, on the other hand, 
largely deny that their actions are criminal. They employ 
a wide range of techniques of neutralization in their 
defense. Matza ' s  (1964) application of this concept 
questions whether techni ques of neutralization come before 
delinquent acts ( see also Bal l, 196 6) while others ( e . g., 
Hamlin, 1988) suggest that these techniques are motives 
that neutralize guilt after the fact. In this chapter, the 
techniques are viewed as one of several circumstances in 
the offenders ' criminal decision-making. 
The subj ects also claim that the law covering business 
transactions is vague and as a result they should not be 
held accountable. Questioned about an alleged violation, 
154 
fraudulent telemarketers tend to suggest that they are not 
accountable and other members of the organization are to 
blame. Applying a rational choice perspective, this multi­
level analysis reveals that fraudulent telemarketers are, 
in fact, rational criminal decision-makers. 
Denial of Crime 
In writing about newly emerging forms of criminal 
opportunity, Ross (1907) coined the label criminaloid to 
refer to those individuals that exploit them. He noted 
that despite their criminal conduct, these offenders 
refused to see their acts as crimes. In the decades that 
followed, others reported similar findings (e. g. , Cressey, 
1953; Geis, 1967; Sutherland, 1983). In more recent years, 
Jesilow, Pontell and Geis (1993) found that physicians who 
engage in Medicaid fraud typically define their violations, 
both in private and to others, in benign terms. Likewise, 
Doocy et al. (2002:  173) remark that the fraudulent 
telemarketer they interviewed "conveyed the assured 
appearance of a most respectable entrepreneur" as well as 
"no hint . . .  that what he was doing might not be 
altogether legitimate. " 
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Benson (1985 : 602) notes that a tendency to reject the 
criminal label was characteristic of fraud offenders he 
interviewed and that they "were more likely than other 
offenders to completely deny committing any crime at all. " 
(see also Willett et al . ,  20 01 ) . The sample subjects in my 
research are no different. Notwithstanding the fact that 
all were convicted felons, most reject the labels criminal 
and crime as fitting descriptions of them and their 
activities . They instead employ a range of mitigating 
explanations and excuses for their offenses, although 
claims of ignorance figure in most of their explanations 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Katz, 1980 ) . 
Some former business owners reported, for example, 
that they set out to maintain a legitimate operation, 
emulated the operations of their previous employers and 
assumed, therefore, that their activities violated no laws. 
Others said they were guilty only of expanding their 
business so rapidly that they could not properly oversee 
day-to-day operations. Some said that indulgence in 
alcohol and illicit drugs caused them to become neglectful 
of , or indifferent toward, their businesses . 
Few of the subjects acknowledged culpability. Only 
six admitted candidly that they were aware from the outset 
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of the criminal nature of their activities. Reflecting on 
his experiences in criminal telemarketing, one subject 
remarked : 
I had no respect for telemarketing, you know, 
companies that would come in and try to act like this 
is real cool, "we're gonna get away with it," because 
we have an attorney here, or we paid this bond, or 
whatever. After a few years •it was like, you know, 
what the fuck. This is, I know what we're doing : 
" we're taking as much money as we possibly can. 
That's what we ' re doing. " I'm a very black and white 
individual, you know. I just, I'm a straight-line 
man, I go right to it. And as much as a lot of people 
in our industry try to legitimize it and had all these 
excuses and stuff, I was always the one that sat back 
and said, "No, let's go stealing, you know. Let's 
make some money. " . . .  I mean, you had to have, I 
understand that the owners had to have some aura of 
legitimacy, ' cause they were running ads in the paper. 
They were getting young people in there, . . .  and 
they had to make it look real good. But me, I knew 
what was going on early on, and just attacked it with 
a vengeance. 
The appearance of legitimacy and respectability makes it 
easy for criminal telemarketers to manage culpability : 
You just, . I mean, you see so many rich people in 
that business. I mean, these are guys that come to 
work in a suit and tie everyday. And they have kids. 
You've been to lunch with these guys, you've been to 
dinner, you've been over to the house. They look like 
everyday, normal, average Americans . . . .  By the time 
you get good enough to do it along with them, then you 
find out, " okay, hold on, there's something not so 
right about this. " But these are great guys, who pay 
the taxes, you know. They're not criminals. These 
are the type of guys that don't get pulled over by the 
police. . So you don't really look at what they do 
as crime, ' cause they don't look like criminals. It 
just doesn't compute. Now once you go on down the 
road, . yeah, you start to understand that okay, 
157 
look, you know this is a shaft [ scam ) . . I never 
worked anywhere in anything I've done and not come 
into my office in a shirt and tie, you know. I left 
my house, you know, my neighbors all said every young 
man in the block should be like him. But that's what 
takes that edge off it, because you're a businessman. 
You are. It's still a business. 
Although less than a third (n=15) of the subj ects 
admitted culpability (12. 5%) or some awareness of 
criminality (18. 8%), a cross-tabulation of years in 
telemarketing and admission of guilt [Table 6 . 1 ] reveals 
that the amount of time an individual spends in the 
business has an effect on his or her willingness to 
acknowledge the criminal nature of the enterprise. The 
subj ects were placed in categories of less than 5 years , 6 
to 1 0  years , and 11  or more years. It appears that the 
subj ects became more enlightened as they spent more time in 
the industry. 
Of the subj ects with 5 or fewer years experience , only 
two (11. 1%) admitted guilt and three (16. 7 %) reported some 
awareness for a total of 27. 8% of that category. 
Comparatively, nearly twice the number of subj ects with 6 
to 10 years of experience (n=9; 47. 4%) admitted guilt 
(21 . 1%) or some awareness (26. 3%). Those subj ects in the 
11 years or more category, however , were the most adamant 
in their denial of criminality as only one subj ect stated 
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Table 6 . 1 :  Cross-tabulation of TM Years and Admission of 
Guilt 
No Yes Awarenes s  Total 
5 and Count 13 2 3 1 8  
Under 
Wi thin 72 . 2 % 1 1 . 1% 1 6 . 7 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Years 
Category 
Within 40 . 6 % 3 3 . 3 % 3 3 . 3 % 3 8 . 3 % 
Admis sion 
6 to 10 Count 1 0  4 5 1 9  
Within 52 . 6 % 2 1 . 1% 2 6 . 3 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Years 
Category 
Within 3 1 . 3 %  6 6 . 7 % 5 5 . 6% 4 0 . 4 % 
Admis sion 
11 or Count 9 1 1 0  
More 
Within 9 0 . 0 % 1 0 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Years 
Category 
Within 2 8 . 1 % 1 1 . 1% 2 1 . 3 %  
Admis s i on 
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that s/he had some awareness of criminal activity. This 
pattern implies that the subjects were hesitant to see the 
business as fraudulent in the beginning and determined to 
label it as non-criminal once they decided it was going to 
be their life ' s  occupation . 
Techniques of Neutraliz ation 
As with many categories of those who live at the margins or 
outside of the law, criminal telemarketers adopt 
perspectives that guard against self -blame and moral 
rejection. Their perceptual and belief systems include a 
range of techniques of neutralization and accounts ( Sykes 
and Matza, 1957; Scott and Lyman, 1968 ) .  To explain 
offenders ' justifications for engaging in criminal 
activity, Sykes and Matza ( 1957 ) ,  start with Sutherland ' s  
theory of differential association, which asserts that 
criminal or delinquent behavior involves the learning of 
( a )  techniques of committing crimes and ( b )  motives, 
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to the 
violation of law. They state that such neutralizations 
include the denial of responsibility, denial of injury, 
denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and 
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appeal to higher loyalties. In explaining their 
involvement in crime , almost all of the subjects employed 
one or more of these neutralization techniques. 
Fraud offenders typically justify their activities on 
the grounds that their crimes cannot succeed without 
acquiescence or cooperation from their victims. Unlike 
victims of burglary and robbery , those who fall prey to 
fraud sometimes are willing , if halting or confused , 
participants in their own victimization (Goffman , 1952). 
The tendency of fraud offenders to see their victims as 
deserving of what befalls them was noted by Maurer (1940) 
more than six decades ago , and it remains true of 
contemporary telemarketing criminals. 
Chief among the legitimating and defensive 
"vocabularies of motive " (Mills 1940 ) of telemarketing 
criminals is belief that "the mooch is going to send his 
money to someone , so it might as well be me " (Sanger 1999: 
9 ) . In other words , customers are thought to be so greedy , 
ignorant , or incapable that it is only a matter of time 
before they throw away their money on something impossible. 
In one subject ' s  account , " [ T ] hey know what they ' re doing. 
They ' re bargaining for something , and when they lose , they 
realize that they were at fault. " These subjects had 
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neither concern nor sympathy for their victims. As with 
convicted rapists (e. g. , Scully and Marolla, 1984), 
telemarketing criminals selectively seize upon aspects of 
their victims' behavior and point to these as justification 
or excuse for their crimes. 
Several told me they relied on the advice of their 
business lawyers. In effect, they "pinned" the 
justification for any wrong doing on erroneous legal 
advice. While. most of these subjects denied criminal 
responsibility, some also acknowledged they were left 
ambivalent: 
I believed it was okay, but a part of me said it · 
can't be okay. You have this, you ' re divided . .  
. . But the lawyer says it t�at's it's okay. Why 
would you not believe, you know, a lawyer? 
You're paying him for that reason. And the other 
part of you is saying "look at it . Look at it 
for what it really is. It can't be okay. " And 
you have this fight inside of you . . .  like the 
devil in you saying "you know it's okay you can 
do it. " And the other part of me is saying "I 
don't care what the attorney says, you can't be 
doing this you know. " But then you - you give 
into the fact that here's a man who has a degree 
in law, who knows what you're allowed to do and 
what you're not to do. And if you're paying him, 
you know, big dollars to give you the truth, well 
why don't we rely on what he has to say. Just 
like in any court case you would have, if you 
hire an attorney to take care of things for you. 
You would assume he knows what he's doing and 
rely on his judgment . 
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Ensconced in their outwardly respectable and self ­
indulgent lifestyles, it is both easy and typical of 
criminal telemarketers to imagine they can continue their 
activities indef in itely . Most said they believed that if 
trouble developed they faced nothing more severe than a 
f ine, an adverse civil judgment or a requirement that they 
make restitution . When asked what he thought was the worst 
that would happen if he lied in the sales pitch, one 
subj ect echoed others ' responses : " Somebody ' s  gonna 
complain on me . That was the worst case . I ' d have to send 
back a check . "  They claim the entire problem more 
appropriately was a "civil matter " and "should not be in 
criminal court . "  As one put it: " If you have people that 
are not satisfied, we would be happy to give their money 
back . " 
The trappings of a legitimate off ice and business can 
make difficult and time consuming the task of investigat ing 
their operations . As a result, when telemarketers are the 
focus of law enforcement, generally it is by federal-level 
criminal justice officials . Most attribute their arrest 
and prosecution to out-of-control or politically ambitious 
prosecutors, and they generally believe the punishment they 
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received was both unwarranted and excessive (see Willott et 
al. , 200 1). As one subject put it: 
I think they should stop this crap, . . .  coming 
in with the strong arm, and, you know, making 
these white-collar people, little people, look 
like big-time criminals or something like that . .  
. . They have no . mercy. They don't care, you 
know. They ' re not out there to help any victims, 
they're out there to put numbers on the board . .  
. . And then they make a big business of the 
prison industry. That ' s  all it ' s  about, you 
know. Yeah, put violent people away that belong 
in prison. But don't put people there that are 
nonviolent people, that can be out there and 
working a job . . . .  Maybe they did do something 
wrong, but give them another chance. 
The subjects also stated that they were unaware 
of the enhanced penalties statutes such as the 
vulnerabl e vi ctims and money laundering provisions of 
the sentencing guidelines. Similar to others, one 
subject, in contesting the vulnerable victims statute, 
asserted, " [ H ] ell, I would take anyone's money. I'm 
not going after the elderly. " Others claimed that the 
money laundering enhancement is wholly inapplicable to 
telemarketing. "How is it money laundering? I paid 
salaries and paid for the costs of the business with 
most of the money. This is a legitimate business; 
money laundering was intended for the drug business 
which is obviously illegitimate. " 
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A recurrent theme in the subjects ' responses was the 
claim that they were doing nothing different than 
conducting business. They maintained that they were not 
victimizing their customers but engaging in a routine sales 
transaction, no different than a retail establishment 
selling � shirt that is marked up 50 0 percent. 
I mean, and I used to say, " [ H ] ey, I went and bought 
this shirt over at whatever. You know this shirt 
costs a dollar to make for the manufacturer but I paid 
50 [ dollars ] at the store. " So am I getting screwed 
here? Oh yeah, technically I guess I am, but I ' m 
paying a markup. How is it illegal for me to do the 
same thing? That ' s  free enterprise. 
Even those who admitted their criminal wrongdoing held on 
to this notion. "In society it seems like implying, 
insinuating and lying is just the way things are." 
While a third of the subjects eventually admitted 
wrong doing, most suggested that they did not realize it 
until after the fact. Still, they asserted that it was 
more immoral than illegal . Telemarketing fraud is 
therefore construed by its practitioners as perfectly in 
tune with mainstream commercial interactions: a 
"subculture of business" { Ditton, 19 7 7: 173). 
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Organizational Buffers 
It is difficult to accurately determine the calculus of 
fraudulent telemarketers solely from self -reports of their 
individual involvement. Criminal telemarketers collaborate 
with others and design their organizations to shield 
themselves from detection. Thus, it is helpful to examine 
the subjects' motives and actions within the organizational 
context of their criminal enterprises. Organizational 
buffers are part of the design implemented by fraudulent 
telemarketers to avoid personal responsibility and deflect 
blame . 
Both the hierarchy of authority and the division of 
labor in telemarketing organizations facilitate denial of 
crime . The management and accountability structure of 
their operations is diffuse. Unlike at legitimate firms, 
unfettered discretion is given to those at the bottom of 
the hierarchy - the sales agents. This allows the owners 
and managers to blame rogue sales agents for any fraudulent 
or deceptive activities . As one owner put it : "The owners 
are trying to do the right thing. They ' re just attracting 
the wrong people. It's the salesmen. " 
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The owners never attribute the fraud perpetrated to 
the intentionally deceiving scripts written or approved by 
them. As one owner stated, "The scripts are drafted to 
enhance sales but we deliver on everything we promise. " 
They dismiss the fact that the sales agents are commission 
driven and deny encouraging the agents to do whatever is 
necessary to make a sale. This is reminiscent of the 
observation by Ross (1907: 52) that the criminaloid "must 
have responsible agents as valves to check the return flow 
of guilt" from his or her criminal proceedings. S /he 
"shows them the goal, provides the money, insists on 
results, but vehemently declines to know the foul methods" 
that they employ. 
The owners' method of operation may be likened to that 
of large-scale drug dealers. They have sales agents 
conduct their dirty work just as dealers use pushers to 
make transactions on the street to avoid direct attention. 
The owners may even deceive their own employees with 
respect to the legitimacy of the business. The owners of 
the XYZ Company referenced earlier, for example, placed 
testimonials from "satisfied" customers in the employee 
meeting area. In the end, blaming sales agents for the 
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deceptive practices they mastermind while they sit back and 
claim ignorance , is their primary line of defense. 
Criminal telemarketers also build other defense 
mechanisms into the organizational structure. The 
verification process in which the customers are taped 
stating that no false promises were made during the sales 
transact ion , for instance , is later used as ev idence that 
the sale was legitimate. Naturally , these tapes do not 
reveal the fact that the sales agents coach the customer to 
deny the inside information - the false promises - lest the 
deal be queered. 
More innovative owners also set up the ir own recovery 
rooms. This allows them not only to ma intain a signif icant 
portion of the proceeds from complaining victims , but also 
acts to deter complainants from report ing their activities 
to criminal justice agencies. The use of courier serv ices 
to pick up victims ' checks also shields the owners from 
detection by law enforcement. In addit ion , it ensures that 
less time is available for the victim to reflect on the 
transaction. 
Sales agents have their own lines of defense when 
faced with criminal responsibility. Most of them contended 
that they were convicted of practices that are common in 
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everyday life. According to them, puffery is used- in sales 
all the time and the good salesperson knows how to "push 
that envelop to the gray line. " The subjects suggested 
that it is incumbent on the government to make more clear 
the boundaries of sales transactions. In other words, the 
state needs to let them know what is wrong before pursuing 
criminal action. 
Additionally, sales agents use the organizational 
structure to claim that the owners and managers kept them 
in the dark about the business and its criminal nature. 
They viewed themselves as just carrying out orders with the 
belief that any criminal responsibility would befall the 
owners. One subject, for example, told me that he felt 
insulated from responsibility as long as he wasn't an 
owner: 
You're just a worker, man. You're getting paid well, 
but you're just a worker. If anything happens, you 
got to plead ignorance -- the worst case scenario. 
But once you start running the whole show, now goes 
the shi t. Cause you collected the money, cause you ' re 
writing that check. 
The sales agents were more prone than owners and 
managers to maintain their innocence. A cross-tabulation 
of telemarketing position and admission of guilt is 
provided in Table 6 . 2 . Eighty percent (n=12) of those who 
admitted guilt or some awareness of criminality were either 
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Table 6 . 2 :  Cross-tabulation of TM Position and Admission 
of Guilt 
No Yes Awarenes s  Total 
OWner Count 15  3 6 2 4  
Wi thin 62 . 5 % 12 . 5 % 2 5 . 0 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos ition 
Within 4 6 . 9 % 5 0 . 0 % 6 6 . 7 % 5 1 . 1 % 
Admission 
Manager Count 3 2 1 6 
Wi thin 5 0 . 0 % 3 3 . 3 % 1 6 . 7%  1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos ition 
Within 9 . 4 %  3 3 . 3 % 1 1 . 1% 12 . 8 % 
Admission 
Reloader Count 5 1 6 
Wi thin 8 3 . 3 % 1 6 . 7%  1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos i t i on 
Wi thin 1 5 . 6 % 1 1 . 1% 12 . 8 % 
Admis sion 
Sales Count 9 1 1 1 1  
Agent 
Wi thin 8 1 . 8 %  9 . 1 % 9 . 1 % 1 0 0 . 0 % 
Pos i t ion 
Wi thin 2 8 . 1 % 1 6 . 7 % 1 1 . 1 % 2 3 . 4 % 
Admis s i on 
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owners or managers . Thirty-seven and a half percent of the 
owners acknowledged the fraudulent nature of their 
businesses, while 12 . 5% (n=3) admitted guilt, and 35% (n=6) 
stated that they were aware of some potentially illegal 
activity . Half (n=3) of the managers also stated that 
either the business itself or some aspects of it were 
fraudulent. By contrast, only three (17. 6%) of the sales 
agents/reloaders acknowledged criminality in the business. 
Rational Choice 
Clarke and Cornish (1985; 1986) expanded on the rational 
choice perspective on crime . The central assumption is 
that 
offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal 
behavior; that this involves the making of decisions 
and of choices, however rudimentary on occasion these 
processes might be; and that these processes exhibit a 
measure of rationality, albeit constrained by limits 
of time and availability of relevant information" 
( Cornish and Clarke, 1986: 1). 
Not all crimes are carefully planned and systematically 
evaluated using a cost-benefit analysis. Street criminals, 
for example, typically give only some consideration to the 
benefits and costs before making a hurried decision on 
whether or not to engage in the criminal activity . 
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In contrast to the morally ambi guous relationships and 
recreational worlds of street offenders, many white-collar 
citi zens are reared, live and work in worlds structured to 
promote, monitor, and reward prudent and del iberate 
decision-making . This is one reason that white-collar 
offenders generally are sketched as being more rational 
than street criminals (e . g . , Paternoster and Simpso�, 
1993). Few investi gators, however, have used interview 
data to explore the fit between rational-choice theory and 
the behavior of white-collar offenders (Braithwaite and 
Makkai, 1991; Simpson and Koper, 1992; Willett, Griffin and 
Torrance, 2001 ) .  As a result, understand ing of white­
collar criminal decis ion making lags behind what is  known 
about their street -criminal counterparts 
Their disincl ination to see telemarketing fraud as 
crime, means that the subj ects found it difficult to 
respond to questions about their awareness and calculation 
of possible criminal penalties. Since they do not commit 
crime, most deny engaging in criminal decision-making. 
They are sustained in this moral stance not only by 
qualities of the work and the organi zations that employ 
them but also by the way the work is structured and carried 
out. 
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Telemarketers generally do not make calls to 
individuals residing in the state where their operations 
are located. This keeps victims at a safe distance and 
also contributes to offenders 1 belief that somehow they are 
unreachable. They assume that local police and prosecutors 
have little interest in protecting persons outside of their 
jurisdiction, and they know that few victims are likely to 
complain in any case. They distinguish their offenses from 
common street crimes: 
I mean, in that business, . . .  you don 1 t actually 
think of it as a crime while you 1 re doing it. Because 
it just happens so easily. It 1 s not like you 1 re 
putting a gun to somebody, it 1 s not like you 1 re 
robbing poor people. I mean, it 1 s not even -- all you 
do a lot of times is just making up, telling stories. 
And then it graduates. Because at first you 1 re not 
selling stories, you 1 re selling something real. But 
it 1 s devalued already. And I mean they [ "customers 11 ] 
don 1 t know that. You know that, [ but ] there 1 s no way 
they can tell that . . And then it gradually goes 
on to 100 percent. But, you know, that 1 s down the 
road. 
Willot et al. (200 1) had similar findings. 
Likewise, when asked why so many people in the 
business believe it is not criminal and they will not get 
caught, one subject responded: 
Because it 1 s a different type of, it 1 s a different 
type of crime, you know. It 1 s, you 1 re on, you 1 re 
using the phone, you 1 re not seeing these people. You 
don 1 t know what they look like. I mean, I don 1 t know 
how it is with other guys who may scam, like, life 
insurance. These people [ victims ] ,  man, these are 
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people that you can call one day - - this guy was 
sending me a $ 1 0, 0 0  check on Wednesday, and you call 
the next Monday, he ' s  forgotten your name already. 
And you know, 20 months, they forget all about me. He 
won ' t  remember me at the end of the year, then he ' ll 
j ust write it of f. 
They believe, moreover, that they need do nothing more than 
comply with the regulations of the state where the business 
is set up. In addition, most believe they are not at risk 
from the law as long as they maintain financial resources 
suf ficient to cover their obligations. 
When criminal telemarketers do come under scrutiny 
from law enforcement, the initiative usually is taken by 
federal-level of ficials. Most of the subj ects claimed that 
police attention came as a complete surprise. As a result, 
few of fenders are prepared for the criminal process. 
Nevertheless, several of the subj ects stated that they were 
aware of businesses , sometimes their own, being 
investigated but indicated that the money was too good to 
discontinue. One subj ect likened the lure to that of drug 
addiction. 
So I knew, you know, that there ' s  probably a 
problem out here somewhere but not a big enough 
problem to stop making the money we were making. 
So yeah, one time the local police came and 
raided us. They had a complaint and they came 
and they took all of our stuf f and everything. 
And very strategically left our database, our 
leads, which of course they seeded - - that was 
the catch. We knew it, but you know, it was the 
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equivalent to leaving a pile of drugs in the 
corner for a drug addict , you know , sure we ' re 
gonna take it. You know , you know we ' re gonna 
take it. That was a smart move [by the state ] .  
Retrospectively , many subj ects perceived a gradual 
crossing of the line from legitimacy to illegitimacy. 
Having crossed it , however , few retreated. 
You take a little bit , go a little bit further 
each time. I mean when you ' re first on the 
phones , you know. The perfect example is like , 
when you first start pitching on the phones , and 
the client asks you a question. And you don ' t  
know. And they hang up on you. You ' re like , "aw 
man , if I would ' ve just said such and such , even 
if it wasn ' t  right , who ' s  gonna know ? " I 
would ' ve got the sale , and it ' s  not gonna hurt 
the client . . . .  And then finally , when they ask 
you that question you go well " I ' m  sure " -- real 
quick , and you get the order . . . .  And all of a 
sudden that ' s  part of the pitch now , doing it all 
the time. It happens gradually. 
Sim ilarly , another subject reported that he became more 
brazen as time went on. 
I was good. I mean , when you ' re good at 
something , you exploit i_t. And it just became 
easier and easier for me to exploit it. And it 
became less reasons for me not to do it and more 
reasons for me to do it. It ' s  not like you look 
at these people , or you have to go to their house 
and take the money from their hand , you know. 
You ' re talking to them on the phone. And once 
they send you the check , and you don ' t  want to 
talk to them , you avoid their phone calls. So , 
you know , it becomes easier and easier for you to 
just keep on , you know , doing what you ' re doing. 
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With regard to crossing the line into illegitimacy , a 
former ( legitimate) businessman of 26 years responded , 
"Absolutely . I did , you know . It was because it was easy 
money and I didn't have the stress that I experienced for 
13 years earning that kind of money . "  He went on: 
And all the time not being familiar with the 
industry and at that time it was my understanding 
it was already going on for 1 8  or 19 years in Las 
Vegas . And the longer I was in it , the more I 
found out there's some very wealthy people in 
this town . But no knowledge at all that these 
people were committing crimes at that time early 
in the game . Only later did I realize that yes 
it is and still was at the time . Even when I 
figured out it was illegal , I still stayed in . I 
already crossed the line . There was no turning 
back . 
The allure of fast money distorted and gave a 
distinctive cast to risk decision-making by many of the 
subj ects : 
[ I  did ] order verification . . . , I guess , about 
a year . And I kept asking for raises and the 
owner , he goes , " I f  you want a raise , become a 
salesman . "  He looked at me , he said , "you could 
make 3 to $5 , 000 a week . " I thought , no , I can't 
do that . I hated sales , I was an order verifier . 
I knew they were lying to these people , you know , 
and I j ust , and I was like the policeman of the 
company . . . .  But it was amazing , it was like , I 
can't believe I j ust did this . I j ust made $250 
and it took me , what , 8 ½ minutes? That was it . 
It went off  like a rocket . Because of my 
experience with verification , I knew all the 
obj ections . I was already a professional 
salesman , I didn't even know it , you know . So 
after that I j ust took of f . I strictly worked 
sales . . . I learned how to acquire leads . I 
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learned how to go in to companies and extract 
their database and take that someplace else and 
make money for someone else . I learned how to 
make my employers pay for my rent, buy my cars 
and food and make sure I have drugs on the desk 
you know - - all pretty cool . 
The same subj ect later told me : 
I had to go from how I was raised, from my 
parents work ethic, to a different type of 
person . And I remember thinking that . . .  my 
head was j ust separating, and I slowly but surely 
went off into the realm of the salesman, you 
know . . . I really didn't understand why my 
father worked his ass off all of his life . It 
made no sense to me at this point . I'm thinking, 
"my God, " you know, "he's j ust not a very bright 
individual . He's j ust worked himself into a 
grave for me, not making any money. " I mean . 
. my father worked out of love, you know, and 
honor . I worked out of greed and self­
enhancement . 
Another simply stated, that '' [ he ]  needed the money and 
j ust didn't really think about it after he got away 
with it the first time . So [ he]  did it again and 
again until [ he]  got caught . "  
When asked to compare himself with his friends 
regarding his approach to life , ano ther subj ec t  responded 
directly in terms of risk . 
He [ my friend ] was never like a risk taker, he's 
not a risk taker . I think that's the big thing 
they're not risk takers my friends . They're not 
the type of guys that if there's a $ 1, 000 sitting 
over there and there's a cop 10 feet away and 
he's not looking right now, they're not gonna 
take the chance to go grab that . Me on the other 
hand, I take the chance . And it's not, I don't 
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think that's a bad thing on their part . I don't 
know , I think , you know , that's j ust the way we 
are . I was never really as like you say , scared . 
But you know I was the type of person that , you 
know , hey . . . .  it's worth it [ the risk ] . If 
something goes wrong , you go "hey , at least I 
came out okay . "  
He went on to say , "So I mean it's like the carrot on 
the stick , you know , right in front of you . . . .  Yeah . 
I mean I think that it's a numbers game with anything 
in life. " 
The maj ority of the subj ects indicated that they 
never thought of leaving the business for another 
vocation . One subj ect's comment echoed that of 
others , " [ I ] t's the only way I can make money . It's 
the only thing I know and it's what I'm good at . "  
Despite the money they made as telemarketers , when 
arrested , few of the subj ects had significant fiscal 
resources ; most was spent in conspicuous consumption . 
Some , however , did invest in efforts to avoid 
detection and to contest criminal charges . As one 
subj ect stated , 
Actually I did save quite a bit . I j ust , I got 
busted . I had to spend it . Actually we did have 
quite a bit saved up inside walls . 
inside walls, pictures , toilet bowls . 
In the end , a maj ority of the subj ects reported that 
they plan to return to telemarketing or a similar 
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business after release from incarceration or parole. 
In fact, some of the parolees had already returned to 
employment in sales. 
Although relatively few of the subjects candidly 
acknowledged the criminal nature of their vocation and 
most were reticent to discuss their decision-making in 
terms of engaging in crime, there is ample evidence to 
support that fraudulent telemarketers are very 
deliberate. To begin, like other white -collar 
criminals , the subjects employed a range of techniques 
of neutralization in their denial of crime. While 
criminologists disagree on whether these techniques 
precede criminal behavior { Sykes and Matza, 1957) or 
occur after the fact { Hindelang, 1970), there is some 
support for both contentions { Hirschi, 1969) . Viewed 
in light of all of the attending circumstances, 
including the organizational design, the ardent 
defense of their actions suggests that the subj ects 
gave careful thought to the nature of their actions. 
In the end, most admitted that they knew they were 
walking a fine line. 
More significantly, the owners organized and 
carried out their illegal activities in a manner 
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designed to shield them from responsibility . The 
subj ects called victims from other states in order to 
avoid the involvement of local law enforcement 
agencies and structured their organi zations to 
facilitate insulation from personal responsibility . 
While they skillfully trained agents to commit the 
actual fraud, they also relied upon the expectation 
that victims would not complain . 
Telemarketing fraud is a very lucrative crime and 
as such, the subj ects needed merely to determine the 
costs involved in pursuing it. The subj ects took a 
rational approach. They set up and maintained 
businesses that mirrored legitimate enterprises and 
built in lines of defense within the organi zations to 
shield themselves from criminal responsibility . The 
longer the subj ects escaped detection, the greater 
became their pursuit of profit and the less concerned 
they became about the potential risks . Analysis of 
their j ustifications, organi zations, and personal 
considerations reveals that fraudulent telemarketers 
clearly are rational criminal decision-makers . 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Structural changes in the nature o f  economic and social 
relationships have created new criminal opportunities for 
individuals who desire to exploit them. Fraudulent 
telemarketers hail from middle class backgrounds and 
embrace the societal goal o f  capital accumulation yet they 
rej ect legitimate means to attain it . They exploit 
ambiguity in the law and capitalize on the latitude 
provided in sales transactions to perpetuate fraud upon 
their victims. Criminal telemarketers design their 
operations both to facilitate large-scale fraud and to 
defend against personal responsibility. Their criminal 
decision-making reveals that they are driven by the 
substantial income the vocation provides and that they 
believe their actions are defensible in light o f  the law 
and standard business practice. In addition to crime 
control ef forts , policy makers should address factors at 
the cultural , legal and organizational levels and provide 
better education to the public. 
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Conc lus ion 
Americans are encouraged to strive for success - to 
pursue the American dream . This refers to "a commitment to 
the goal of material success , to be pursued by everyone in 
society , under conditions of open , individual competition" 
(Messner and Rosenfeld , 2000 : 5). In other words , everyone 
is encouraged to aspire to social ascent and everyone is 
evaluated on the basis of individual achievement . "An 
important corollary of this universal entitlement to dream 
about success is that the hazards of failure are also 
universal" (Messner and Rosenfeld , 2000 : 63). 
Sociological strain theory explicates the 
criminological consequences of frustration in achieving 
cultural goals and success. In his theory of social 
structure and anomie , Merton ( 1 938 ) devel oped a typology of 
modes of individual adaptation : conformity , innovation , 
ritualism , retreatism , and rebellion. Innovation occurs 
when an individual continues to accept the cultural goal of 
monetary success but rej ects the legitimate means to obtain 
such success . Merton ( 1 938) contends that crime results 
when individuals are unable to get what they want through 
legitimate channels , i . e. ,  innovation as a response to this 
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condition often takes criminal forms (Cloward and Ohlin, 
19 60 ) . 
The subj ects of this research aspired to and lived the 
American dream . They grew to adulthood in comfortable 
material circumstances. Despite their class origins, 
however, they were unable to maintain the standard of 
living provided by their parents. As they reached early 
adulthood, their directionless and lackluster performance 
only heightened the felt need to identify and settle upon a 
means of livelihood that would "pay off." They had little 
interest in occupations that require confining routines, 
hard or sustained physical labor, or subordination to 
others . Acquisitive crime can appear as an acceptable and 
attractive alternative to those in this position who place 
a low value on hard work and a high value on· money and 
pleasure (Agnew, 2000: 35 9 ) . 
In the logic of sociological strain theory, the 
subj ects share a structural vulnerability to innovative but 
criminal solutions. These mundane white-collar criminals 
are not distinguished by close up familiarity with poverty 
and disadvantage but instead by their anxiety either to 
maintain the comfortable circumstances they have known and 
now come to expect or "to climb closer to the top" 
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( Weisburd et al . ,  1991 : 18 5 ) .  In short , they found 
themselves in economical ly precarious and frustrating 
circumstances. 
Despite their ambitions , most either had stal led or 
were making little progress on conventional paths. They 
were mindful of the possibi lity of growing economic 
marginal ity if they did not find and settl e upon a 
satisfactory means of l ivel ihood. One subj ect said : 
I got into te lemarketing , how it al l came about 
is , I was working for a car wash , right up the 
road here. And I ' d been there eight months , you 
know. And I wasn ' t  real ly making , I mean , I made 
pretty decent money , what I thought was dec ent , 
you know. And . . .  I see al l these peopl e 
coming through driving these brand new cars and 
al l this ,  you know. Younger peopl e ,  you know , a 
l ittle bit older than me , but sti ll  . · . .  it 
would be ni ce to do that someday , you know. And 
most of them were in [ tel emarketing] . 
His remarks were echoed by another subj ect : 
Yeah , I ' m  not complaining but , you know , when you see 
someone next to you and it ' s  coming that easy for 
them , you always want to work twice as hard. To get 
everything twi ce as fast , to stay one step ahead of 
him. And I think everybody , in l ife , has an 
opportunity to go a different route. But a lot of 
people , they ' re scared. You don ' t  know. But when I 
saw that opportunity to go a different route that 
would get there twice as fast as somebody else , I took 
it. 
Criminal te lemarketing provided opportuniti es where 
their unimpressive work and educational experi enc es were no 
handi cap. Here there was little interest in formal 
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credentials and little need for venture capital. Working 
the telephones gave them a chance to show what they could 
do, and in the process they became self confident, 
interpersonally powerful, and self-indulgent models of 
success. Like street criminals , they committed crime in 
order to maintain a style of living experienced as 
satisfying. Unlike street criminals , they construe 
criminal decisions and construct criminal operations that 
blend imperceptibly into legitimate ones. 
The state provides wide latitude to parties in sales 
transactions. Part of the reason for this is that the 
state chooses to favor its function of facilitating capital 
accumulation over protection of its citizens when faced 
with placing prohibitive restrictions on economic practices 
(O'Connor, 1973). The very nature of sales, in fact , 
permits a certain amount of puffery, which is itself a form 
of deception. The market economy operates under the notion 
of cavea t emp tor - let the buyer beware. In essence, the 
seller seeks to make the deal seem better than it actually 
is and the buyer is left to determine the actual value of 
the product or service. 
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One o f  the subj ects  who was originally from England 
made the following observation about sales practices  in the 
U . S . : 
The way I looked at i t  i s ,  everybody here i s  a con 
man . They con people into buying s tuff  and they trash 
their oppo s i t i on to make an adverti s ing point , whi ch 
i s  i l legal in Europe . You can ' t do i t  in England . 
You can ' t say Coca Cola i s  better [ than ] Pepsi , or -
There ' s  law agains t that in England . You can ' t say 
that on TV . You can ' t say i t ' s  the best  thi s . You 
can say i t ' s  probably one of , but you can ' t say i t ' s  
the bes t . . The way advert i s ing was , I saw in 
England when I was li ttle . Let ' s  say I had a l i ttle  
train , wel l  they show a ·close  up o f  the little  choo 
choo train . The train happens to be the s i z e  o f  a 
pen , but they make i t  look like a s i z e  of , you know , 3 
feet long . But i t ' s  only the s i z e  of  a pen . And 
that ' s  mi sleading to chi ldren . So they don ' t  allow 
commerc ials  l ike that on TV peri od . You know , they 
have to show wi thin the commercial o f  the scope , the 
s i z e , the actual s i ze has to be represented accurately 
wi th something that they show you for you to have an 
idea o f  what the s i z e  i s . 
The subj ec ts  observed what they perceived to be ambigu i ty 
in the law and s et out to exploit  i t , both in perpetrat ing 
fraud upon the vi c t ims in the interaction process  and in 
defens e of their ac tions to potential law enforcement 
agency re sponse . 
There i s  a fine and at times imperceptible l ine , 
however ,  between good salesmanship and decei t . 
Unfortunately , i t  remains somewhat unc lear . As Doocy et 
al . ( 2 0 0 1 : 9 )  note : 
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Illegal telemarketing sales pitches come under the 
general category of fraud, which has been suc cinctly 
defined as "the art of deception for gain. " 
Nonetheless, the law does not specifically say what is 
fraudulent behavior. One judge noted, rather 
pedantically, that the law "does not define fraud; it 
needs no definition, it is as old as falsehood and as 
venerable as human ingenuity. " 
The subjects of this research contend that the law is 
ambiguous because as it does not clearly distinguish 
between permissible and impermissible marketing practices . 
Some sub jects who were business owners told me, for 
example, that they set out to maintain a legitimate 
operation, emulated the operations of their previous 
employers and assumed, therefore, that their activities 
violated no laws. As one put it, 
I thought, you know - - and that ' s  the reason I ' m here 
- - I thought I was in the right. I thought I could 
beat the government, and I thought there was a legal 
way of doing this, and that I was intelligent enough 
to find that legal way. 
The sub jects often sought legal counsel and approval from 
regulatory agencies prior to setting up their organizations 
in an effort to maintain the appearance of a legal 
operation. 
Some of the subjects suggested that their early 
dealings with state regulators led them to believe that the 
business was entirely legal. The fa ct that many were 
allowed to continue operating while investigators worked 
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and the measures they took to give the appearance of 
legitimacy contributed to this feeling of invincibility. 
After hearing that the authorities were looking into his 
business one indicated that , 
[ I ]  even invited them in to see the business , and they 
said it was unnecessary. The next thing I know is 
that there is a raid on my place. I didn ' t  do 
anything wrong , so I wasn ' t  worried. Eighteen months 
later I'm indicted. 
Even one of the U. S. Attorneys that I interviewed did 
not see the issue as cut and dry. He contended that the 
offenders were guilty of preying upon elderly people who do 
not have the requisite faculties to make informed decisions 
when confronted with high-pressure sales tactics. When I 
asked him what he thought if it was he or I that fell prey 
to these practices , he replied , "Oh , well , yeah , we deserve 
it . If you or I spend a dime on this stuff , we , you know , 
we'd have to wonder what's happening to our brain . "  In the 
end , individuals are prosecuted for fraudulent behavior , 
but the line of legitimacy in sales remains unspecified , 
leaving the field ripe for continued exploitation . 
The subj ects contend that their decision to set up 
formal businesses lies in their desire not only to abide by 
the law but also to create, an operation that wi ll provide 
them with revenue for a long time to come. Their 
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organizations , however , are designed not only to mount an 
offensive assault on consumers , but also to provide a 
complex defense strategy should the criminal nature of 
their activities be detected. Toward this purpose , they 
are loosely organized with a diffuse management and 
accountability structure , which allows deflection of 
responsibility. 
In order to capitalize on the criminal opportunities 
presented by changes in the nature of economic and social 
relationships , the owners employ individuals with good 
interpersonal skills. Their organizations are potentially 
volatile , however , as fraudulent telemarketers are 
extremely individualistic and their shared interest rests 
solely in the pursuit of profit. Criminal telemarketers do 
not , by and large , share a cultural identity as they prefer 
to blend into society and thus are more prone to 
distinguish themselves from others in the criminal 
vocation. 
While criminal telemarketers may be defined as a group 
by their commitment to illegal economic activities , their 
pursuits are decidedly individualistic , even within the 
organizational setting. In the end , they act independent 
of , or in competition with , their fellow fraudsters. They 
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look to deflect blame onto those that work beside them and 
most anxiously await the opportunity to set up their own 
businesses, taking the knowledge and leads from those that 
trained them. 
The picture of fraudulent telemarketers that emerges 
from this research is of persons whose backgrounds equipped 
them with a generalized expectation that they would be 
successful somehow. Pathways to success are no t identified 
easily or confidently by the young, however, and the 
subj ects dawdled or became distracted on what many would 
see as the road to marketable skil ls and credentials . 
Lackluster preparation for conventional occupational 
pursuits did litt le, however, to dampen either their 
pursuit of the good life or their pragmatic approach to the 
process. Instead it heightened the fel t need to identify 
and settle upon a means o f  livelihood that would "pay o f f " 
for them . Chance brought them in contact with criminal 
telemarketing, a way of earning money for which they 
discovered they have a special talent. I t  provides them 
with a high income and outward signs of success despite 
their shortcomings of preparation and legitimate resources . 
The knowledge and skills needed to expl oit criminal 
opportunities vocational ly and successful ly do no t differ 
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greatly from those required for success in the legitimate 
world. The blue-collar skills of an industrial society are 
not equal to the challenge of exploiting contemporary, 
increasingly white-collar, criminal opportunities. The 
technology-based and service-oriented economy instead 
places a premium on interpersonal and communicative skills, 
and it is the children of the middle-class who are most 
likely to acquire these skills. Exposure to 
entrepreneurial skills and perspectives may be important as 
well. 
Wielding class-based presumptions and notions of 
respectability, contemporary white-collar hustlers spend 
their weekends on the lake, play golf, and have friends 
over for barbeque. Still, they waste their earnings on 
drugs, gambling, fast living and conspicuous consumption. 
Despite their apparent embrace of some of the trappings of 
conventionality, they remain "marginalized middle-class 
persons ll ( Doocy et al . ,  2002). 
Pol icy Impl icat ions 
The complexity of telemarketing fraud and the fact 
that victims usually are located in multiple jurisdictions 
means that investigation and prosecution of these schemes 
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can be an expensive and time -consuming undertaking. Both 
cooperative effort by state and federal law enforcement and 
proactive enforcement strategies are required. " Operation 
Senior Sentinel, " for example, was initiated and co -
ordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the 
cooperation of state authorities and the American 
Association of Retired Persons . Volunteer retired persons 
secretly recorded calls from fraudulent telemarketers and 
forwarded them to an operations center for analysis and 
investigation. The operation resulted in over 4 0 0  arrests 
in more than 12 states (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
19 97) . 
In 1994, the U. S. Congress enacted legislation 
providing enhanced sentencing for offenders convicted of 
telemarketing fraud. The Senior Citizens Against Marketing 
Scams Act (SCAMS Act) - 18 U. S. C .  section 2326, reads as 
follows: 
A person who is convicted of an offense under (1028, 
1029), 13 41, 13 42 13 43, 13 4 4, 
or a conspiracy (371) to commit such an offense, in 
connecti on wi th the conduct of telemarke ting : 
(1) shall be imprisoned for a term up to 5 years 
in addition to any term of imprisonment 
imposed under any of those sections, 
respectively; and 
(2) in the case of an offense under any of those 
sections that 
(A) victimized ten or more persons over the 
age of 55 ; or 
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(B) targeted persons over the age of 55, 
shall be imprisoned for a term of up to 
10 years in addition to any term of 
imprisonment imposed under any of those 
sections, respectively. 
As a result, stiff sentences were issued to those violators 
that were detected by law enforcement. 
Focused and aggressive policing aimed at illicit 
telemarketing enterprises and operators has become 
increasingly common. Joint efforts and task forces have 
operated in many U. S. cities. The modus operandi of 
telephonic predators adapts to changing circumstances and 
challenges, however, and the boiler rooms that once 
characterized telemarketing fraud are gradually giving way 
to smaller and less permanent operations, operated 
increasingly from off-shore and cross-border locations . 
Reactive measures against illicit telephonic predators 
have been matched by a variety of proactive efforts to 
prevent fraud and sanction fraud offenders. These 
techniques are consistent with those promoted by supporters 
of situational crime prevention who contend that knowledge 
of the fears and rewards of fraud can lead to improved 
preventive measures. Effective policy development requires 
an understanding of these fears and rewards that can only 
be obtained by understanding the decision-making process of 
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fraudsters and how they manage the legal and organizational 
contexts of their criminal enterprises. 
The present method utilized to combat telemarketing 
fraud is one of search and destroy. While criminal j ustice 
agency response has been widespread and impressive , its 
procedures are time- consuming and costly. Stil l ,  the 
general deterrent effect remains unknown. Additional ly ,  
the task forces of the nineties have been disbanded , 
leaving local law enforcement agencies impotent to pursue 
trans-state operations. 
More efficient prosecution of telemarketing fraud is 
needed to prevent further economic damage. The present 
method of enforcement requires long periods of surveillance 
followed by an even longer period of review before taking 
legal action . Although significant pri�on time has been 
meted out to offenders , victims of telemarketing fraud have 
been depleted of life savings that will  never be recovered. 
Safeguards are needed to seize the assets of fraudulent 
operations in a more swift and efficient manner . It would 
be in the interest of the state to appoint a "receivership " 
(i. e . , an individual overseer) to suspected operations to 
monitor the financial activities of the business during the 
investigation process. 
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Despite past success in gaining convictions of criminal 
telemarketers, the general deterrent effect of criminal 
justice initiatives remains unclear. When the federal 
government enacted the SCAMS Act in 1994, it applied only to 
telemarketing and merely set out sentencing enhancements for 
those in violation of the fraud statutes. The legislation 
neglected to address the underlying precursors that initially 
led to the phenomenon. As Chambliss (1993) notes, 
[ It ]  is the conflicts that create the dilemmas; and it 
is the conflicts toward which state intervention is 
directed. Rarely . . .  are the basic contradictions 
addressed. The contradictions create conflicts and 
dilemmas, which people try to resolve. In the 
resolution of conflicts and dilemmas other 
contradictions are revealed and created, other 
conflicts generated, and a multitude of dilemmas 
ensue" (Chambliss, 1993: 15). 
The fact that the statute applies only to 
telemarketing offenses suggests that legislators were 
concerned primarily with protecting elderly citizens 
because of their presumed inability to decipher fraud. 
Although the state is also aware of the ambiguous nature of 
sales in general and that telecommunications lends itself 
well to the practice of deceit, it has failed to address 
these issues. The fact that the boundaries of sales 
transactions are not obvious and that enforcement is once 
again lax will reopen this criminal opportunity to the 
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truly motivated. The first course of action calls for the 
state to enact more definitive statutes and regulations 
governing the underlying contradictions. 
Regulatory agencies have very little oversight of 
telemarketing operations. Currently, regulations require 
only that telemarketers post a security bond, that the 
script be approved, and that sales agents acquire a 
"sheriff's" card. While the subjects often sought to 
comply with regulations, usually in preparation of defense, 
they were not subject to agency supervision. Legitimate 
organizations expressed that they were unaware of any 
"presence" from regulatory agencies. Considering the 
diffuse accountability structure of fraudulent firms, it 
would be prudent for regulatory agencies to become more 
involved in overseeing telemarketing operations . 
The business owners should be required to provide a 
model of their organizational structure and sign an 
accountability contract stating that s/he is responsible 
for the actions of employees if carried out in the 
commission of their work. A similar bill was passed in 
light of the recent stock fraud committed by large 
companies in the United States . Additionally, the 
regulatory agencies could conduct seminars on the "do's and 
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don'ts" of sales transactions. During these seminars, 
participants would also be informed as to their individual 
criminal liability for deceptive practices. 
It may be necessary to revisit the cultural factors 
that led to the proliferation of telemarketing and other 
forms of fraud. The market economy in the United States 
presently operates on an opt -out rather than an opt-in 
basis. Under the opt-out policy, consumers who make 
purchases or enter promotions are automatically placed in a 
data bank operated by marketing agencies. These consumer 
information profiles are then sold and resold to businesses 
- legitimate and illegitimate alike. As a result, 
consumers are inundated with sales promotions for products 
and services from countless businesses. If a consumer 
desires to be removed from these lists, s/he must submit in 
writing a request to be removed from each one. 
words ; s/he must opt out. 
In other 
The justification for having an opt-out policy is that 
it is supposedly good to inform the consumers about what is 
available to them - in marketers' terms, "what they need. " 
To prevent contact by fraudulent, as well as unsolicited 
companies in general, would be to allow the consumer to 
opt-in and thus decide for him or herself whether or not to 
197 
participate in a particular segment of the market . 
Unfortunately , the state would find such a policy too 
restrictive on economic exchange , which consequently would , 
it is alleged , have a negative impact on the economy . 
Thus , it will remain the burden of the consumer to opt-out 
and otherwise avoid fraudulent solicitations . 
Recently , a national do no t call list was placed into 
effect with the end goal of deterring telemarketers from 
placing calls to listed consumers (www . donotcall . gov ) . In 
the first day of the five-day campaign , over 800 , 000 
citizens filed for relief . In response , telemarketing 
supporters have begun to argue that the impact on the 
economy and employment will be stifling. It remains to be 
seen whether this law has a significant impact on halting 
telemarketing fraud or hampering legitimate businesses . 
The Direct Marketing Association ( 2003 ) estimates tha t 
there are approximately 6 . 5  million people that work in 
telemarketing and that 2 million of them may suffer loss of 
employment due to the do not call list . 
Educational methods employed to date have not been 
successful in training potential victims to protect 
themselves against fraudulent telemarketers . To tell 
citizens to " j ust say no " ignores the reasons why they 
1 9 8  
engage in these conversational transactions in the first 
place. It would be helpful to educate the targeted 
audience about the social-psychological ploys used by 
fraudsters to carry out their scams . It is important to 
understand that the majority of vulnerable victims 
participate because of deep-seated trust and adherence to 
social norms, enticing promises, and often diminished 
mental acumen. To educate the public about the social­
psychological methods employed may enhance their ability to 




2 0 0 
REFERENCES 
Abagnale, Frank W .  19 80 . Ca tch Me If You Can. New York: 
Grosset and Dunlap . 
Abelson, Robert P .  198 1 .  "Psychological Status of the 
Script Concept . "  American Psychologist 36: 715 -729 . 
Abelson, Robert P .  1976 . "Script Processing in Attitude 
Formation and Decision Making . "  Pp . 33- 45 in Cogni ti on 
and Social Behavi or . J .  S .  Carroll and J .  W .  Payne 
{ Eds . ) .  Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum . 
Adler, P . S .  1992 . Technology and the Fu ture of  Work. New 
York . Oxford University Press . 
Agnew, Robert . 2000 . "Sources of criminality: Strain and 
subcultural theories . "  In Criminology :  A Contemporary 
Handbook {3rd edition) . Joseph F .  Sheley { Ed. ) .  
Wadsworth. 
Albanese, Jay. 1996 . "Offense-based versus offender-based 
definitions of  white-col lar crime . "  In Proceedings of 
the Academic Workshop. James Helmkamp, Richard Ball and 
Kitty Townsend { Eds . ) .  Morgantown, WV: National White 
Collar Crime Center . 
American Association of Retired Persons . 1996a . 
hits ' phoney ' callers . "  Bulletin 37: 1, 14 . 
201 
" AARP 
American Association of Retired Persons. 1996b. 
Tel emarke ting Fraud and Ol der Ameri cans : An AARP 
Survey . Washington, DC: American Association of 
Retired Persons. 
American Association of Retired Persons. 1996c. 
Tel emarke ting Fra ud and Ol der Ameri cans : A Repor t of 
Focus Group Discussi ons. Washington, DC : American 
Association of Retired Persons. 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 2000. "Alleged scam on 
elderly by telemarketers is revealed. " September 6, p. 
B3. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2001. "Beyond the 
Boiler Room. " September 24. www. abc. net. au /4corners/ 
Babbie, Earl. 1998. The Practi ce of Social  Research. 
Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Backman, Carl W. 1985. "Identity, Self Presentation, and 
the Resolution of Moral Dilemmas :  Towards a Social 
Psychological Theory of Moral Behavior. Chapter Ten in 
The Sel f and Soci al  Li fe. B. R. Schlenker (Ed. ). New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Ball, Richard A .  1966 . "An Empirical Exploration of 
Neutralization Theory. " Criminol ogy 4 (2) : 22-32 . 
202 
Batty, M. and Barr. B. 1994. "The Electronic Frontier: 
Exploring and Mapping Cyberspace. " Futures 26 (7): 699-
712. 
Bennett, Trevor, and Richard Wright. 1984. Burglars on 
Burglary. Aldershot, U. K. : Gower. 
Benson, Michael L. , and Kent R. Kerley. 2001. "Life 
course theory and white-collar crime. " In Contemporary 
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice : Essays in Honor 
of Gi lbert Geis. Jackie L. Smith, David Shichor and 
Henry N. Pontell (Eds. ). Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Benson, Michael L. 198 5. "Denying the guilty mind: 
Accounting for involvement in a white-collar crime. " 
Criminology 23: 583-607. 
Blumstein, Alfred, Jaqueline Cohen, and David _ P. Farrington. 
1988. "Criminal Career Research. Its Value for 
Criminology. " Criminology 26: 1-36. 
Braithwaite, John, and Toni Makkai. 1991. "Testing an 
expected utility model of corporate deterrence. " Law & 
Society Review 2 5: 7-40. 
Braithwaite, John, and Gilbert Geis. 1982.  " On theory and 
action for corporate crime control. " In On White-Col lar 
Crime . Gilbert Geis (Ed. ). Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath. 
203 
Burger, J . M .  19 8 6 .  "Increasing compliance by improving 
the deal: The that ' s-not-all techni que. " Journal of 
Personal i ty and Social Psychol ogy 5 1: 277-2 83. 
Burger, J. M. , and R. E. Petty. 19 8 1. "The low-ball 
compliance technique: Task or person commitment ?"  
Journal of Personal i ty and Soci al Psychol ogy 40: 492-
500 . 
Cahill, Spencer E. 1995. Inside Social Li fe : Readings in 
Soci ol ogi cal Psychol ogy and Mi crosoci ol ogy. Roxbury 
Publishing Company: Los Angeles, CA. 
Cantrill, J .  G. , and D. R .  Siebold. 198 6. "The perceptual 
contrast explanation of sequential request strategy 
effectiveness. " Human Communi ca tion Research 13: 253-
267. 
Chambliss, William J .  and Marj orie S. Zatz. 1993. Making 
Law:  The Sta te ,  The Law, and Structural Con tradi c t i ons . 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Cialdini, R. B. 19 8 8. Infl uence : Sci ence and Practice (2nd 
Ed. } .  Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. 
Cialdini, R. B. 1993. Infl uence : Sci ence and practice (3rd 
Ed. } .  New York: Harper Collins. 
204 
Clarke, Michael. 1990. "Control of insurance fraud : A 
comparative view. " British Journal of Criminology 30 : 
1-23. 
Clarke, Ronald V. and Derek B. Cornish. 1985. "Modeling 
Offenders ' Decisions : A Framework for Research and 
Policy. " Pp. 147- 85 in Crime and Justice : An Annual 
Review of Research, Volume 6. Michael Tonry and Norval 
Morris (Eds. ). Chicago, IL : University of Chicago 
Press. 
Cloward, Richard A. , and Lloyd Ohlin. 1960. Delinquency 
and Opportunity. New York : Free Press. 
Cohen, A. 1955. Delinquent Boys. New York : Free Press. 
Cornish, Derek, B. and Ronald V. Clarke. 1986. The 
Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on 
Offending. New York : Springer-Verlag. 
Couch, Carl. 1989. Social Processes and Relationships. 
General Hall : Dix Hills, NY. 
Cressey, Donald R. 1953. Other People's Money. Glencoe, 
IL : Free Press. 
Cromwell, Paul. 2003. In Their Own Words : Criminals on 
Crime, An Anthology. Los Angeles, CA : Roxbury 
Publishing Company. 
205 
Dillard , J. P. 199 1. "The current status of research on 
sequential-request compliance techniques. Special 
Issue : Meta-analysis in personality and social 
psychology. " Personal i ty and Social Psychol ogy Bul l e tin 
17: 2 83- 288. 
Direct Marketing Association. 2001. Available on-line at 
WvJW . the-drna. org. 
Direct Marketing Association. 2003. Available on -line at 
WvJW. the-drna . org. 
Ditton , J. 1977. Part Time Crime. London: Macmillan. 
Doocy , Jeffrey , David Shichor, Dale Sechrest and Gilbert 
Geis. 2002. "Telemarketing fraud: Who are the 
tricksters and what makes them trick? " In Readings in 
Whi t e-Col lar Crime . David Shichor , Larry Gaines and 
Richard Ball (Eds. ) .  Prospect Heights , IL: Waveland. 
Doocy , Jef frey , David Shichor , Dale Sechrest and Gilbert 
Geis. 2001 . "Telemarketing Fraud: Who Are the 
Tricksters and What Makes Them Trick? " Securi ty Journal 
1 4 : 7-2 6. 
Duffield , Grace , and Peter Grabosky. 2001. "The 
Psychology of Fraud. " Paper #199. Australian Institute 
of Criminology. 
206 
England, R. W. 1960. "A  Theory of Middle Class Juvenile 
Delinquency. " Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Pol ice Science 50 : 535-540. 
Etzioni, A. 1964. Modern Organizations. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall. 
Etzioni, A .  1961. A Comparative Analysis of Complex 
Organizations. New York : Free Press. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Economic Crimes Unit. 
1997 . " Telemarketing Fraud : Senior Sentinel. " 
www. fbi . gov/majcases/telefrad/telefrad . htm 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1993. Crime in the 
United States-Uniform Crime Reports . Washington, DC : 
U . S. Government Printing Office . 
Feeney, Floyd. 1986 . " Robbers as decision-makers. " In 
The Reasoning Criminal : Rational Choice Perspectives on 
Offending . Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V .  Clarke 
(Eds . ) .  New York : Springer-Verlag. 
Feldman, Robert S. 200 1. Social Psychology ( 3 rd Ed. ). 
Prentice Hall : Upper Saddle River, N. J. 
Franc.is, Diane. 1988. Contrepreneurs . Toronto : 
Macmillan. 
207 
Freedman , J. L. , and S. C. Fraser. 196 6. "Compliance 
without pressure: The foot-in-the-door technique." 
Journal of Personal i ty and Social  Psychol ogy 8: 528-548 . 
Geis , Gilbert . 1967. "The heavy electrical equipment 
antitrust cases of 196 1." Pp. 139- 150  in Criminal 
Behavi or Sys tems . Marshall B. Clinard and Richard 
Quinney (Eds.). New 
York: Holt , Rinehart and Winston. 
Glaser , Daniel. 1972. Adul t Crime and Soci al Pol i cy .  
Englewood Cliffs , NJ: Prentice-Hall . 
Goffman , Erving. 1959. The Presen ta tion of Sel f in 
Everyday Li fe. Garden City , New York: Doubleday & 
Company: . 
Goffman , Erving. 1952 "On Cooling the Mark Out: Some 
Aspects of Adaptation to Failure" Psychia try 15: 451-
4 63.  
Gorassini , D. R. , and J. M. Olson. 1995. "Does self­
perception change explain the foot-in-the-door effect?" 
Journal of Personal i ty and Social Psychol ogy 69: 9 1 - 1 05. 
Grabosky , Peter N. , Russell G. Smith and Gillian Dempsey. 
2 0 0 1. El ectroni c Theft : Unl awful Acquisi ti on in 
Cyberspace. Cambridge , U. K. : Cambridge University 
Press. 
2 08 
Hamlin, John E. 1988. "The Misplaced Role of Rational 
Choice in Neutralization Theory. " Criminology 26 (3): 
425-38. 
Harris, Gina. 1998. "Using Federal Trade Commission 
resources to investigate and prosecute criminal fraud." 
United States Attorneys' Bulletin 46 (November): 48-51. 
Harris, Louis and Associates. 1992. Telemarketing Fraud. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, Institute 
for Research in Social Science. 
Hindelang, Michael J. 1970. "The Commitment of 
Delinquents to Their Misdeads. Do Delinquents Drift?" 
Social Problems 17 (4): 502-509. 
Hirschhorn, Larry. 1985. "InformationTechnology and the 
New Services Game". Pp. 172-90 in High Technology, 
Space and Society. M. Castells (Ed.). Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage. 
Hirshci, Travis. 1969. Causes of Delinquency. Berkely, 
CA: The University of California Press. 
Hobbs, Dick. 1997. "Professional crime: Change, 
continuity and the enduring myth of the underworld." 
Sociology 31: 57-72. 
Hobbs, Dick. 1995. Bad Business : Professional Crime in 
Contemporary Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
209 
Hochstetler , Andy. Forthcoming. " Opportunities and 
decisions: Interactional dynamics in robbery and 
burglary groups. " Criminology. 
Jackson, Jerome. 1994. " Fraud masters: Professional 
credit card offenders and crime. " Criminal Justice 
Review 19 : 24-55 . 
Jesilow, Paul, Henry Pontell and Gilbert Geis. 1993. 
Prescription for Profit : How Doctors Defraud Medicaid. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Johnson, John M. 2002. " In-Depth Interviewing. " Pp. 103-
20 in The Handbook of Interview Research : Context and 
Method. Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein ( Eds.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications. 
Katz, Jack. 1988. Seductions of Crime : Moral and Sensual 
Attractions in Doing Evil. New York: Basic Books. 
Katz , Jack . 1980. " Concerted ignorance : The social 
psychology of cover-up. " In Management Fraud : 
Detection and Deterrence. R. K. Elliot and J. J. 
Willingham ( Eds. ). New York : Petrecelli. 
Lash, S. and Urry , J. 1994. Economies of Signs and Space. 
London: Sage. 
210 
Markus, Hazel. 1977. "Self-Schemata and Processing 
Information About the Self. " Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 35 (2): 63-78. 
Matza , D. and G. M. Sykes. 1961. "Juvenile Delinquency 
and Subterranean Values. " American Sociological Review 
26: 712 -720. 
Maurer , David W .  1964 [ 1955 ] . Whiz Mob. New Haven , CT: 
College and University Press. 
Maurer , David W. 1940. The Big Con. Indianapolis , IN: 
Bobbs-Merrill. 
McCall, George. 1978. Observing the Law. New York: Free 
Press. 
McIntosh , Mary. 1975. The Organization of Crime. London: 
Macmillan. 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10 th Edition). 
1997. Springfield , MA: Merriam-Webster , Incorporated. 
Merton , Robert K. 1938. "Social structure and anomie. " 
American Sociological Review 3 :  672 -82. 
Messner , Steven F. and Richard Rosenfeld. 2001. Crime and 
the American Dream. Belmont , CA: Wadsworth/Thomas 
Learning. 
211 
Miller, W. 1958. " Lower Class Culture as a Generating 
Milieu of Gang Delinquency. " Journal of Social Issues 
14 : 5- 19. 
Mills, C. W. 1940. " Situated actions of vocabularies of 
motive. " American Sociological Review 5 :  90 4-913. 
Neuman, W. Lawrence. 1994. Social Research Methods : 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Boston, MA : 
Allyn and Bacon. 
O'Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. 
New York : St. Martins Press. 
Office for Victims of Crime. 1998. Telemarketing Fraud 
Prevention, Public Awareness, and Training Activities. 
Washington, DC : U.S. Department of Justice. 
Paternoster, Raymond, and Sally Simpson. 1993. "A  
rational choice theory of corporate crime. " In Routine 
Activity and Ra tional Choi ce. Ronald V. Clarke and 
Marcus Felson (Eds. ). New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction. 
Pendleton, M. G. , and C. D. Batson. 1979. " Self -
presentation and the door-in-the-face technique for 
inducing compliance. " Personality and Social Psychology 
Bul letin 5 :  77-81. 
212 
Pollock, C. L. , S. D. Smith, E. S. Knowles, and H. J. 
Bruce. 1998. "Mindfulness limits compliance with the 
that's-not-all technique. " Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 2 4: 1153-1157. 
Rebovich, Donald, and Jenny Layne, with Jason Jiandani and 
Scott Hage. 2000 . The National Public Survey on White 
Collar Crime. Morgantown, WV: National White Collar 
Crime Center. 
Rebovich, Donald. 1999. "The extent of fraud 
victimization: A comparison of surveys . "  Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Society 
of Criminology (Toronto) . 
Reich, Robert B. 1991. The Work of Nations. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 
Reinharz, Shulamit. 1992. Feminist Methods in Social 
Research. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Renno, R. R. , R. B. Cialdini, and C. A. Kallgren. 1993. 
"The transsituational influence of social norms. " 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64: 10 4-
112. 
Reuter, Peter. 1983. Disorganized Crime. Cambridge, MA: 
M. I. T. Press. 
213 
Richards , Lyn. 1999. Using N-Vivo in Qualitative 
Research. London : Sage. 
Ross , Edward Alsworth. 1907. Sin and Society : An 
Analysis of Latter-Day Iniquity. Boston : Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Ross , Lee and Richard E. Nisbett . 1991. The Person and 
the Situation : Perspectives in Social Psychology. New 
York : McGraw-Hill . 
Rubin , Herbert J. , and Riene S. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative 
Interviewing : The Art of Hearing Data. Thousand Oaks , 
CA : Sage. 
Ruggiero , V. and N. South. 1997. " The Late Modern City as 
a Bazaar. " British Journal of Sociology 48 : 54 -70. 
Samuelson , Robert J. 1995. The Good Life and Its 
Discontents. New York : Random House. 
Sanger , Daniel . 1999 . " Confessions o f  a phone-scam 
artist . "  Saturday Night 114 : 86 -98. 
Schulte , Fred. 1995. Fleeced ! Telemarketing Rip-offs and 
How to Avoid Them. Amherst , NY : Prometheus. 
Scully , Diana , and Joseph Marolla. 1984. " Convicted 
rapists ' vocabulary of motive : Excuses and 
j ustifications. " Social Problems 31 : 530-4 4. 
214 
Scot t, Marvin B . ,  and Stanford M .  Lyman . 1968 . 
"Accounts . "  American Soci ologi cal Review 33: 4 6- 62 .  
Shanab, M .  E . ,  and P .  O'Neill . 1979 . " The effects of 
contrast upon compliance with socially undesirable 
requests in the door- in- the-face paradigm. " Canadian 
Journal of Behavi oral Science 11 : 236-24 4 .  
Shank, Robert C .  and Robert Ableson . 1977 . Scrip ts, 
Plans, Goals and Understanding : An Inquiry in to Human 
Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum . 
Shichor, David, Jeffrey Doocy and Gilbert Geis . 1996 .  
"Anger, disappointment and disgust: Reactions of victims 
of a telephone investment scam . " In In terna ti onal 
Victimology:  Selected Papers from the 8th Interna ti onal 
Symposi um. C . M .  Sumner, M .  Isreal, M .  O'Connell and R .  
Sarre (Ed . s) .  Canberra : Australian Inst i tute of 
Criminology . 
Shover, Neal . 1998 . " Whi te-collar crime . " In Handbook of 
Crime and Punishment . Mi chael Tonry ( Ed . ) .  New York : 
Oxford Universi ty Press . 
Shover, Neal . 1996 . Grea t Pretenders : Pursui ts and 
Careers of Persisten t Thieves. Boulder, CO: Westview . 
Shover, Neal . 19 85 . Aging Criminals. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage . 
215 
Shover, Neal . 1973 . "The Social Organi zation of 
Burglary. " Social Problems 20: 499-514 . 
Shover, Neal, and Kevin M .  Bryant . 1993 . "Theoretical 
explanations of corporate crime . "  In Understanding 
Corpora te Criminali ty. Michael B .  Blankenship (Ed . ) .  
New York: Garland . 
Shover, Neal, and David Honaker . 1992 . "The socially 
bounded decisi on making of persistent property 
offenders . "  Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 31 : 27 6-
94 . 
Siguwade, P .  1995 . "Counterfeit Intimacy: A 
Dramaturgical Analysis of an Erotic Performance . "  
Social Behavi or and Personali ty 23 (4 ) :  369-76 . 
Silverstone, Roger . 1991 . Benea th the Bo ttom Line : 
Households and Informa ti on and Communica ti on 
Technologi es in the Age of the Consumer . London: 
Brunel University Centre for Research on Innovati on, 
Culture and Technology . 
Simpson, Sally S .  and Christopher S .  Koper . 1992. 
"Deterring corporate crime . "  Criminology 30: 347-75 . 
Social Security Administrati on . 1999 . 
WWVJ . ssa . gov/statistics/supplement /1999 / tables/ index. 
216 
Sparrow, Malcolm K .  199 6 .  License to Steal : Why _Fraud 
Plagues America ' s  Health Care System . Boulder , CO: 
Westview. 
Stevenson, Robert J. 2000. The Boiler Room and Other 
Telephone Sales Scams. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press . 
Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin . 1990. Basi cs of 
Quali ta ti ve Research : Grounded Theory Procedures and 
Techni ques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Stryker, Sheldon . 1980 . Symboli c In teracti onism :  A 
Social Structural Versi on. Menlo Park , CA: Benj amin­
Cummings . 
Sutherland , Edwin H .  1983 [1949 ] . Whi te-collar Crime : 
The Uncu t Versi on, with an introduction by Gilbert Geis 
and Colin Goff. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press . 
Sutherland, Edwin H .  1940. "White-collar criminality . "  
American Soci ological Review 5: 1-12 . 
Sweet , Nova , and Richard Tewksbury. 2000 . "Entry, 
Maintenance and Departure from a Career in the Sex 
Industry: Strippers' Experiences of Occupational Costs 
and Rewards. " Humani ty and Soci ety 24 ( 2 ) : 136- 61 . 
217 
Sykes , Gre sham , and David Matza . 1 9 5 7 . " Techniques o f  
neutrali zation :  A theory of del inquency . "  Ameri can 
Soci ol ogi cal Revi ew 2 2 : 6 6 7 - 7 0 . 
Taylor , Ian . 1 9 9 9 . Crime in Con text : A Cri ti cal 
Criminol ogy of Marke t Soci eti es .  Boulder , CO : We s tvi ew . 
Thomas , W .  I .  and Dorothy S .  Thomas . 1 9 2 8 . The Chi l d  in 
Ameri ca : Behavi or Probl ems and Programs . New York : 
Knopf . 
Ticke l l , A .  1 9 9 6 . " Taking the Ini tiative : Leeds ' 
Financ ial Centre . "  In Corpora te Ci ty? Partnerships 
Parti cipa ti on in Urban Devel opmen t in Leeds . G .  
Haughton and C .  Wi l l i ams ( Eds ) . Aldershot : Avebury . 
T i l lman , Robert . 1 9 9 8 . Broken Promi ses : Fraud by Smal l  
Business Heal th Insurers . Bos ton : Northeas tern 
Univers i ty Press . 
Ti tus , Ri chard . 2 0 0 1 . " Personal fraud and i t s  vi c t ims . "  
In Crimes of Pri vi l ege : Readings in Whi te-Col l ar Crime . 
Neal Shover and John Paul Wright ( Eds . ) .  New York : 
Oxford Univers i ty Pres s . 
Ti tus , Ri chard M . , Fred Heinzelmann and John M .  Boyle . 
1 9 9 5 . " Vi c t imi zation of  persons by fraud . " Crime and 
Del inquency 4 1 : 5 4 - 7 2 . 
2 1 8  
Tobias, John Jacob . .  1967 .  Crime and Industrial Society in 
the 1 9 th Century. London : Batsford . 
Turkle, Sherry . .  1995 . .  Li fe on the Screen : Identi ty in 
the Age of the In ternet . . New York : Simon and Schuster . 
1 8  United States Code Annotated, sec. 1, et seq . 
U. S. Congress, Senate . 1993 . Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Consumer of the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, Telemarke ting Fraud and S. 
568 ,  The Telemarke ting and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Pro tecti on Act. 103rd Congress, 1st session . 
Washington, DC : U. S .  Government Printing Office . 
U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare . 1959 . 
Social Bulletin (October) . Social Security 
Administration . 
U. S .  Department of Justice . 2000 . Criminal Vi ctimi za ti on 
in the Uni ted Sta tes 1995. Washington, DC : Bureau of 
Justice Statistics. 
U. S. Department of Justice. 1995 . Fraud Vi ctimi za ti on-The 
Exten t, the Targets , the Effects. Washington, DC : 
National Institute of Justice. 
Warner Home Video . 2000 . Boiler Room . 
219 
Warren, Carol A. B. 2002. "Qualitative Interviewing. " In 
Handbook of In tervi ew Research : Con text and Me thod. 
Jabber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein (Eds. ). 
Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage. 
Weinstein, Eugene A. , and Paul Deutschberger . 19 63. "Some 
dimensions of altercasting. " Soci ome try 26 : 4 5 4 - 66. 
Weisburd, David, Ellen F. Chayet and Elin Waring. 2001. 
Whi t e-Col lar Crime and Criminal Careers . New York : 
Cambridge University Press. 
Weisburd, David, Stanton Wheeler, Elin Waring and Nancy 
Bode. 19 91. Crimes of the Mi ddl e Cl ass. New Haven, 
CT : Yale University Press. 
Weisburd, David, Elin Waring and Ellen F. Chayet. 19 90. 
"White-collar crime and criminal careers : Some 
preliminary findings. " Crime and Del inqu ency 36 : 342-
55. 
Weisburd, David, Stanton Wheeler, Elin Waring and Nancy 
Bode. 19 91. Crimes of the Mi ddl e Cl asses. New Haven, 
CT : Yale University Press. 
Wei ss v. Uni t ed Sta tes . 19 41. 
Wheeler, Stanton, David Weisburd, and Nancy Bode. 19 82. 
"Sentencing the White Collar Offender : Rhetoric and 
Reality . "  Ameri can Soci ol ogi cal Review 47 : 641- 65 9. 
220 
Wiley , Norbert . 1998 . "Suspension of Disbelief as a 
Bridge between Media and Consumption . "  Paper presented 
at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological 
Association ( San Francisco , CA). 
Willett , Sara , Christine Griffin and Mark Torrance . 2001 . 
"Snakes and ladders: Upper-middle class male offenders 
talk about economic crime." Criminol ogy 39: 4 41- 4 6 6 . 
Winfree , L. Thomas Jr . ,  Lawrence Kielich and Robert E .  
Clark . 19 8 4 .  "On Becoming a Prosecutor: Observations 
on the Organizational Socialization of Law Interns . "  
Work and Occupa ti ons 11: 207 -226. 
Winlow , Simon. 2001 . Badfel las . Oxford: Berg. 
Wright , Richard T . , and Scott Decker. 1997 . Armed Robbers 
in Ac tion : Sti ck-up and Stree t Cul ture . Boston: 
Northeastern University Press . 
Wright , Richard , Scott Decker , Allison Refern , and Dietrich 
Smith. 1992 . "A Snowball ' s  Chance in Hell: Doing 
Fieldwork with Active Residential Burglars . "  Journa l of 
Research in Crime and Del inquency 29 (2): 14 8 -161 . 
van Duyne , Petrus . 1996 . "The phantom and threat of 
organized crime." Crime ,  Law and Soci al Change 21: 241-
77 . 
221 
Yablonski, Lee. 195 6. The Vi olen t  Gang. New York: 
McMil lan .  
Zervos , K .  1992. Responding to Fraud in the 1990s . "  In 
Complex Commercial Fraud . Peter Grabosky (Ed. } . 
Canberra: -Australian Institute of Criminology. 
222 
APPENDICES 
2 2 3  
A 
Introduction and Description of Research Proj ect 
My name is Glenn Coffey, and I am a research assistant in 
the Department of Sociology at the University of Tennessee 
in Knoxville, Tennessee . We are conducting a study of 
persons convicted of participation in telemarketing fraud 
in the U. S .  since 1994 . The obj ectives of the study are to 
gain a better understanding of the risks, the rewards, and 
the organi zational arrangements used to commit 
telemarketing fraud . 
We are using two procedures for the study. First, we 
are conducting interviews with a sample of persons 
convicted of telemarketing fraud . Each interview will last 
approximately one and one-half hours and will be tape 
recorded so it can be analyzed later . The purpose of the 
interview is to secure each person ' s  own description of 
past involvement in telemarketing fraud and aspects of it 
that caused them greatest fear and concern about arrest. 
Second, we are examining pre-sentence investigation reports 
prepared on each person we interview . We hope the result 
of this study will give us a better understanding of 
telemarketing fraud through the eyes of those who have 
participated in it . 
2 2 4  
We believe the risks and discomforts for you from 
participating in the research are minimal. Perhaps you 
will experience some psychological discomfort at telling 
about some of your earlier experiences ·in crime and in the 
criminal j ustice system. Otherwise, we do not believe 
there are any risks from your participation in the study . 
Benefits of the study are possible improvements in the way 
telemarketing fraud is controlled, in order to minimize the 
financial toll to victims and the wider society. There are 
no direct benefits to you from participating in this study. 
All information given to us will be handled in the 
strictest confidence. The results of the study will be 
published in the form of a book ; however, no individuals 
will be identifiable in it or in any reports from the 
study . 
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary 
and you may end participation at any time without penalty 
or prej udice. I will be happy to answer any questions you 
have about the study . Should you have questions later, you 
may call me at # 8 65 -300-2555  or the principal investigator 
(Professor Neal Shover) at the Department of Sociology, 




I ,  _________________ understand the study 
entitled "Telemarketing Fraud: An Exploratory Study " as 
explained on page 1 ,  and I consent to participate in the 
study. My participation is completely voluntary. I 
understand the purposes of the research and also that any 
information given to the researchers will be treated in a 
strictly confidential manner. It will be used only for the 
purposes of the research explained to me. I understand 
that in the course of the interview I will not be asked 
about and I will not answer questions about specific past 
crimes. Further , I understand that if I do divulge 
information about specific crimes I have committed , the 
investigator is bound to make this information known to 
criminal j ustice officials . I also understand that I may 
withdraw my participation in this study at any time , 
without penalty or prej udice . I consent to the following 
procedures (initial what you agree to , and cross out what 
you do not agree to ) :  
I authori ze the staff at 
to release the information specified below to the 
22 6 
researchers only for the purpose of this study and only 
unti l the completion of this proj ect. I understand that I 
may revoke this consent in writing before the information 
is disclosed . Initials 
1 .  I consent to participate i n  an interview . 
Initials 
2 .  I consent to have the interview audiotaped. 
Initials 
I understand that al l research information (with the 
exceptions mentioned above ) wi l l  be handled in the 
strictest confidence and that my participation wi l l  not be 
individual ly identifiable in any reports . I understand 
that participation or non-participation in this research 
proj ect wi l l  not affect my release date or parole 
el igibi l ity. I further understand that there is no penalty 
or prej udice of any kind for withdrawing from or not 
participating in the study. 
(Signature ) (Date ) (Register Number ) 
(Witness' Typed Name and Signature ) (Date ) 
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C 
Topical Interview Guide 
Demographics and Family Background 
Age 
Race 
Parent (s) ' Occupation While Growing Up 
Type of Area in Which Reared 
Marital Status (how many times married?) 
Employment History 
Early 
First Job? Age? 
Other Jobs 
Later Employment 
Positions Held and Length of Time 
Expectat ions 
Experiences 
Longest Period and Place of Employment 
Telemarketing Experience 
First 
Age and Circumstances 
Subsequent 
Age and Circumstances 
228 
Pos i t i on ( s ) , Length o f  Time and Income 
Likes and Di sli kes  
Tel emarketing Organi zational Employers 
How Many and Circums tanc es  
Who Was in Charge 
Hi erarchi cal Arrangement and Number of Employees  
Mode ( s )  o f  Operation 




Typical Workday ( describe ) 
Lei sure Time and Ac tivi ties  
Knowledge /Awarenes s  of  Culpabi l i ty 
Attract i ons and Fears 
Principal Attrac tions of Tel emarket ing Work 
Awareness  of Culpabi l i ty and Circums tanc es 
Greatest  Fear ( s )  and Ci rcums tances 
Feel ings o f  Invinc ibi l i ty?  
Nature 
Origin ( s )  
Why? 
2 2 9  
Arrest /Conviction / Penalty History 
First 




Age (s) and Place (s) 
Circumstances 
Outcome 




Prison and Confinement 
Expectations 
Experience 














Revised Interview Guide 
Demographics and Family Background 
How Parents earn a Living? What Learn? 
Points of Distinctiveness: Parents / Siblings/ Friends 
Primary Motivation: List of Importance 









Personal Attributes/ Qualifications 
Positions/ Lengths/ Income Averages 
Likes and Dislikes 
Most Abandon ; Why Persist? 
Describe Lifestyle 
Typical Day in Telemarketing/Money Spent 
Te lemarketing Organi zation 
Start Up 
232 
Finances / Regulations 
Product / Service / Pitch 
Mode of Operation 
Hierarchy /Division of Labor 
Management vs. Agent 
(Authority /Responsibility / Knowledge) 
Employee Compensation / Incentives 
Employee Lifestyle 
Fears / Risks 
Attractions to Business 
Concerns about Business 
Concerns about Culpability 
Circumstances / Reactions 
Feelings of Invincibility 
- Nature /Origin /Now? 
Increase with Time /Knowledge / Looseness? 
- Caught Up in Success / Inertia of its Own 
Consideration of Changing Vocation (Why? /Why not ? ) 
Comparison to Legitimate / Illegitimate Business 
Rationalization for Present Operation 
How Get Around the Law? 
Lega l Process 
Knowledge /Awareness of Culpability 
2 3 3  
Where does the Fault Lie? 
How much Money on Attorneys ? 
Reaction to Arrest/ Prison/Conviction 
How Compare Self to Common Criminal (e.g. , rape) ? 
Prior Criminal History/ Personal Trouble 
Personal 
Personal At�ributes (Success/ Failure) 
Variations in Lifestyle: Prior/ Preferred 
/Modification? 
Post -Release Plans 
2 3 4  
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